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persist because they have legitimacy, and that 
legitimacy comes from the perceptions of people. People 
give legitimacy and they can take it away. " (Eisler and 
Loye, 1990: 37) 
"Quis custodiet ipos custodes? " - [Who is to guard the 
guardians themselves? ] from Satires VI, written by 
Decimus Junius Juvenalis, Roman satirist (60-130 A. D. ). 
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ABSTRACT 
The professional independence of external auditors is 
fundamental to the auditing profession. Thus, it is 
important that auditors are not only independent in 
fact, but that they are also seen to be independent - 
i. e. independent in aPRearance. 
In that light, it is clear that external auditor 
independence (EAI) is a perceptual issue. Yet there is 
a marked lack of empirical research done with a view to 
determine how users of audited accounts perceive EAI, 
or to contrast such views with comparable ones held by 
external auditors themselves. Thus, the major objective 
of the research is to empirically examine how relevant 
groups see EAI within specified audit situations. 
The research examines how three groups of users of 
audited statements (bankers, credit managers and 
internal auditors - the user groups) and sets of 
external auditors (who issue audit reports - the issuer 
groups), see EAI in circumstances described in specific 
audit situations. This is the primary context of the 
empirical research. 
An appropriate questionnaire was developed and used as 
the research instrument because of its natural accord 
with the Brunswick Lens Model approach to perceptual 
examinations. The facts specified in each of the twenty 
situations were cues upon which judgement of EAI, was 
made by judges (the questionnaire respondents). 
Thus, the empirical chapters consider: 
1. Areas of concern with EAI 
2. Significant perceptual differences: 
a) between each user group and the issuer group 
b) within two sub-groups of the issuer group 
3. Possible explanations for differences by examining: 
a) the dimensions underlying group views of EAI 
b) the importance attached by groups to EAI cues 
c) the pattern between bio-data and views on EAI 
main findings indicate, within an EAI context: 
1. Significant differences of perception between the 
issuer group and each of the three user groups. 
2. Generally non-significant differences of perception 
within the external auditor group. 
3. Each group having its own unique set of underlying 
(factor or dimensional) constructs. 
4. The cues (facts) contained in audit environments are 
of consequence in explaining such group differences. 
5. Personal group characteristics (attributes) do not 
appear to be very helpful in explaining group views. 
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CHAPTER I 
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AUDITING PROFESSION 
0 1.1 Introduction 
The audit profession is charged with the responsibility 
of providing an "independent" opinion on the financial 
statements of the corporate (and other) entities 
audited by its members CAICPA, 1973b: 1] and fulfilment, 
of this responsibility provides the backdrop for a 
unique set of phenomena. 
Users of such financial statements cannot often (or not 
without significant cost, time and effort) assess their 
underlying quality (DeAngelo, 1981: 43] because of 
physical remoteness, legal barriers etc. Equally, users 
may see a conflict between themselves and the preparers 
of statements [CAR, 1978: 5). 
Thus, a (deemed) impartial (neutral) auditor is asked 
to perform an "independent" examination (audit) on such 
statements and to then give an "independent" report 
thereon. It is the auditor's duty to confirm (if so 
concluded) that the statements reported upon are free 
from bias, and so the auditor himself must be 
independent and free from bias. Lavin (1974: 14] states 
that "independence plays such an important role in 
auditing it is almost inherent in the term itself. " 
I 
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In fact, the auditor's freedom from all bias is his 
professional "independence" and it is this feature that 
is crucial in auditing. The AICPA [1972c: 7] describes 
it as the "cornerstone" of the auditing profession. 
A professional auditor occupies a unique position in 
society. He is engaged and paid for by the audited 
entity but he can and does serve other interested 
parties who bear no direct cost for his audit services. 
Among others, such interested parties are present and 
prospective investors, creditors, employees, and 
various government departments and/or agencies. In 
agency theoretic terms, this service to non-payers is 
seen as the "free rider problem" [Ng,, 1978: 1001. 
The primary purpose of an audit is almost always for 
the auditor to provide an opinion on the client's 
financial statements (DeAngelo, 1981: 33) and to assure 
interested parties that they present truly and fairly 
the financial position and results of the audited unit. 
Equally, as the objectives and interests of the 
management preparing the statements may be opposed to 
those who use or require them, the auditor is called 
upon to report on management's own representations of 
its stewardship (CAR, 1978: 5) function to owners. 
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However at this point that a seemingly conflicting 
situation arises. Because, even though parties outside 
the entity being reported upon do not employ, nor are 
reported to by the auditor, they are still entitled to 
a fair and impartial report of the client's operations. 
The auditor can overcome this conflict of interests 
only if he himself is totally objective and impartial. 
In short, if he is independent. It is this independent 
status that gives the auditor's report value and 
significance. Independence is a key element (if not the 
key element) underlying all auditing practices. 
Additionally,, "apparent" independence is as important 
as "real" (Higgins,, 1962) independence. If a statement 
user perceives a lack of external auditor independence 
(EAI) (even if not so in fact), then that user may well 
question the veracity of the auditor's representations. 
Audit independence is indeed the cornerstone of all 
auditing practices (AICPA, 1972c: 3], for if user 
groups even suspect the auditor to be not independent, 
his professional use is reduced or, in the extreme, is 
absent. Thus, in an effort to maintain the professional 
EAI of their members, audit bodies have rules and 
ethical guidance (ICAO, 1982; ICAA, 1984; AICPAI 1986; 
and ICAEW, 19871 to which their members must adhere. 
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Because external auditor independence (EAI) is as much 
a question of perception as of fact, Berryman [1974: 
14] recommends that: 
"research ... be undertaken with respect to user 
perceptions of independence; (in particular) the 
relationships which they (audit users) feel 
impair independence as well as those which 
promote independence. " 
As such, the empirical research presented in this 
thesis examines relevant group perceptions of EAI. 
The research is presented within a theoretical and 
empirical context. Chapters 1 through 3 are devoted to 
a theoretical examination of EAI while the chapters 
then following are devoted mainly to the empirical 
aspects of this research. 
This chapter has three further sections. Section 1.2 
following, discusses the inherent professional 
dimension underlying EAI, while Sections 1.3 and 1.4 
are devoted to a discussion of some of the main 
criticisms and concerns expressed in relation to EAI. 
At this juncture, such criticisms are intentionally 
presented only in a general context, without drawing 
attention to specific cases where EAI may have been 
compromised. However, Chapter 4 does consider recent 
UK instances where this may have been the case. 
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1.2 The professional dimension underlying EAI 
While the company auditor owes his appointment to 
provisions of company law, he does not derive the 
required or deemed independence attributed to him by 
law. In essence, that independence is attributed to him 
by virtue of him being a member of a profession. So any 
examination of EAI must be mindful of the professional 
domain within which the auditor functions. 
For, it is not primarily because the auditor has a 
prescribed knowledge of auditing or academic standard 
that users of audited statements ascribe the 
independence attributed to him. Rather, it is 
attributed to him because of his membership of the 
audit profession and the ethical base underpinning it 
[Freidson, 1970] and all other professions. Thus some 
words about the nature of professions are in order. 
One of the more distinctive features of a profession is 
that it possesses autonomy [Freidson, 1970] concerning 
matters such as entry requirements and professional 
standards, validation, certification, the enforcement 
of ethical standards and related disciplinary matters. 
However, in return for the autonomy granted to 
professions, society expects them to adhere to ethical 
standards that are far higher than those expected of or 
from non-professionals. 
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To meet such expectations, each profession establishes 
its own standards of work, professional norms and an 
ethical code (Freidson, 1971] to guide the behaviour of 
its members. 
Another one of the main distinctive features of a 
profession (as opposed to an occupation) is the 
enforcement of a prescribed code of conduct [Greenwood, 
1957; Benson, 1983] or ethical behaviour. 
In turn, this feature raises more philosophical 
questions about ethical behaviour and ethics (Moizer, 
1991: 38-40] which is generally seen as the science of 
morals, or as a study of human duty and the rules of 
conduct (or principle) governing right from wrong -a 
feature essential to the harmonious functioning of any 
civilised society. 
While a code of ethics is indeed important for a 
profession, its mere existence does not guarantee on 
the one hand the public belief (perception) in the 
ethicality of the profession's members nor does it 
guarantee that its members are, in fact, totally 
ethical (Freidson, 1971]. That must remain the subject 
of continual assessment by concerned parties. And so it 
is with the auditing profession in the UK and other 
countries. 
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As noted previously, in order to achieve and uphold the 
credibility of the audit profession, it has established 
sets of nationally [ICAEW, 1987] and internationally 
(IFAC and UEC] agreed standards, to which its members 
must adhere. In general, they relate to: 
1. Independence, integrity and objectivity 
2. Knowledge, expertise and validation thereof 
3. Communication 
4. Enforcement 
All the preceding standards deal with matters of 
importance relative to the credibility of the auditor 
and his work. However, it is above all the independence 
of the auditor (particularly from the management of the 
audited entity) that distinguishes him from all other 
information and communications practitioners. 
Another distinguishing feature of a profession is its 
service to the public at large (Cullen, 1978], as 
opposed to a segment of society. Professionals are 
highly skilled in some science or art, and desire to 
serve the public (Carey and Doherty, 1966a: 4], placing 
such public service above personal gain. 
Indeed, this "service to society" feature is a key 
feature of professions (Ritzer, 1975] and the audit 
profession is no different. 
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Thus, if this social responsibility feature, often 
expressed in the denial or rejection of personal self- 
interest or gain, were not present, then there would be 
little, if anything, to distinguish the audit 
profession from any other trade or craft. 
More than 40 years ago, the executive committee of the 
AICPA (1947] declared that "independence,, historically 
and philosophically is the foundation of the public 
accounting profession, and upon its maintenance rests 
the profession's strength and stature. " (For a more 
recent practice-based discussion of professionalism in 
the US auditing profession, see Zeff, 1986] 
As a consequence of their professional standingr 
society expects auditors to make sacrifices if 
necessary, to ensure their independence, and herein 
lies a unique phenomenon. The scale of sacrifice likely 
to be expected by society is all the greater because 
the costs of increased EAI are not borne by society as 
a whole, whereas its "benefits" accrue more generally 
to society and the audit profession. 
(Examined in this light, EAI forms part of the "public 
good" debate as put forth by (among others) Alchian and 
Allen (1972] and Alchian and Demsetz (1972], as does 
the "free rider problem" noted previously (Page 14). ] 
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1.3 Criticisms of and concerns with EAI 
External auditor independence is currently subject to 
intense questioning so that even selected references to 
the issue are too numerous to state. However, some 
indication of that intensity is to be seen from just a 
cursory review of the attached bibliography. 
In presenting criticisms levied against EAI, it is 
useful to adopt a distinction made by Aranya and Sarell 
[1975] when they considered EAI. They regard EAI as 
having two aspects -a macro-aspect and a micro-aspect. 
The macro-aspect of EAI refers to the professional 
dimension underlying the audit profession and the fact 
that its general control is a matter of public and 
governmental concern and involvement. Aranya and Sarell 
(19751 also refer to this aspect of EAi as being its 
"institutional" feature, while Freidson (1968] refers 
to it as its "public interaction" feature. 
Regardless, underlying all the terms applied to this 
aspect of EAI lies the fact that the macro-aspects of 
the auditing profession embrace matters relating to the 
overall structure and functioning of the profession - 
issues usually addressed in or governed by law on a 
national (UK), supra-national (EC), or quasi-statutory 
(SEC) basis. 
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on the other hand, the micro-aspects of the auditing 
profession embrace more specific matters relating to 
individual auditor-client relationships. Freidson 
(1968] refers to these aspects as being the "private 
interaction" of the profession while Aranya and Sarell 
[1975] refer to it also as its "interpersonal" aspects. 
Perceptions of relevant groups of such "interpersonal" 
micro-aspects are the essential focus of this research. 
Underlying all micro-aspects of the audit profession 
lie the specific circumstances governing the 
relationship between an individual auditor and an 
individual client. 
The degree of EAI exercised within any given auditor- 
auditee situation is a function of both macro-aspects 
and micro-aspects of EAI, and it is likely that the 
former influences the latter more than is the opposite 
case [Aranya and Sarell, 1975: 855]. 
In examining criticisms levied against EAI, the same 
micro- and macro- classification as that put forth by 
Aranya and Sarell (1975] has been used. As such, the 
following paragraphs first consider the main criticisms 
falling under the macro-aspects classification and 
subsequent paragraphs consider the same in terms of the 
micro-aspects classification. 
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1.3.1 Main criticisms of the macro-aspects of EAI 
criticism of EAI founded in its macro-aspects are 
levied not so much against individual auditors and/or 
their behaviour, but more against the structure of and 
environment in which the'audit profession operates. 
For example, the latter half of the Sixties saw 
criticism of the auditing profession (in the UK and the 
USA) on the basis that even where generally accepted 
accounting practices existed, on occasions they 
permitted a variety of (differing end-effect) 
accounting treatments (Briloff, 1966), and that in many 
other cases there was no prescribed accounting practice 
at all (Briloff, 1972]. 
This absence of prescribed accounting treatment, 
critics argued (e. g. Briloff, 1981 and Griffiths, 
1986), enabled auditors to report without qualification 
on the accounts of companies, drawn up under different 
(and sometimes conflicting) accounting practices. 
Thus it was argued that though an auditor may have 
found a particular accounting practice at odds with his 
own "independent" view, there was not much he could do, 
as there was often no accounting standard on the issue, 
or where one existed, it almost always permitted the 
practice of which the auditor did not approve. 
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In the UK, such criticism gave birth to the ASC set up 
in 1970 "in the face of mounting criticism of (then) 
prevailing accounting practices" [Dearing, 1988: 5]. So 
the first macro-criticism of EAI within the audit 
profession relates to the absence, of a well-defined 
and prescribed set of accounting standards. 
In that context, some critics argued that even when 
accounting standards existed, they were developed 
exclusively by professional accountants and/or 
auditors. Accordingly, they maintained that auditors 
not only play the "game",, but also to an extent, create 
the "rules" themselves. 
However the charge is less true of the US where the 
FASB, a body independent from and not reliant on the 
AICPA, has for many years been mainly responsible for 
the setting of accounting standards there. 
While the charge had only some UK basis (as the ASC - 
the successor body to the ASSC - had non-accountant, 
but accountancy informed, members from organisations 
concerned with and interested in the development, use 
and impact of accounting standards), it is no longer 
valid as, with the establishment of the ASB in 1991, 
the position with regard to the setting of accounting 
standards in the UK became much the same as in the US. 
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Additionally, some limitation on the choice of 
accounting practices in the UK is imposed by the 
European community (EC) requirement for the UK 
government to enact legislation giving expression to 
its Directives. For example, the Companies Act 1989, 
implemented many of the company law requirements 
(including those relating to EAI) necessitated by the 
Eighth Directive. Equally, accounting prescriptions 
necessitated by the Fourth and Seventh Directives of 
the kC are now to be found within UK company law. 
Additionally, even though UK company law may prescribe 
the specific accounting treatment required under given 
circumstances, in effect there is an overriding section 
(226) in the 1985 Companies Act that the annual 
accounts of a company show a "true and fair view". 
The result, of such legislation and standards is that 
the options available for use in accounts are now fewer 
but nevertheless continue to cause concern ("Five 
reasons not to trust company figures" - Financial 
Times, November 1,1990: 14]. However, as more 
limitations are imposed on the accounting treatments 
auditors may permit, without qualification of their 
audit reports, requests made for or pressure placed on 
auditors to approve "inappropriate" accounting 
treatment(s) must also be proportionately reduced. 
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The second main macro-criticism of independence within 
the auditing profession relates to the establishment 
and enforcement of auditing and accounting standards. 
Critics argue that "the professional rules on EAI were 
drawn up by faceless people who never consulted the 
membership, far less any member of the public" ("Real, 
audit reform needs statutory regulation" - Letters,. 
Financial Times, Dec. 28,1990: 9] and that there are 
no "teeth" to the standards set up by the profession. 
As such, there has not been much incentive for auditors 
to dissociate themselves from departures to standards. 
One example of this is seen in the frequent lack of 
adherence to SSAP 16 (which came into effect from 
January 1980 and is now withdrawn) which related to 
accounting for the impact of inflation. Even though 
SSAP 16 had been duly set up and ordained, there were 
frequent and flagrant instances of non-compliance with 
it. Referring to this fact Smith [1986] states there 
had been "a great deal of resistance against ... this 
standard, and as a result the ASC has now decided that 
this SSAP will no longer be mandatory. " 
However, it is true that SSAP 16 had no clearly defined 
legal basis and thus no legal recourse could be had 
against non-compliers. Indeed, most non-compliances 
were clearly noted in the relevant audit report. 
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Thus, even the possible stigma attached to a qualified 
audit report was not always a means of ensuring 
compliance with standards. 
The third main macro-criticism of EAI in the auditing 
profession relates to the enquiry and possible censure 
of auditors charged with the approval of accounting 
practices at odds with prescribed accounting standards. 
The UK professional accounting bodies operate a Joint 
Disciplinary Scheme whereby auditors who are brought 
before the Disciplinary Committee are duly examined and 
if found to be at fault, penalised. Thus, the criticism 
in this instance is the fact that auditors are examined 
into and judged by their fellow professionals. So, the 
disciplining committee may easily be seen as a club 
whose members would be slow to fault fellow-members. 
Thus, it is suggested, auditors are willing to allow 
themselves open to the charge of non-compliance with 
due standards (so compromising EAI) in the knowledge 
they will be examined and judged by co-professionals, 
with whom they are likely to have good rapport, 
persuasion and sway. As such, the belief has grown 
("Why the DTI baulks at bringing auditors to book" - 
The Guardian, Dec. 3,1990: 15] that self-regulation is 
"a self-serving exercise" for the audit profession. 
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However, recognising that EAI is only one determinant 
of audit quality and it is exercised with others, the 
Dearing [1988: 1) Report rightly holds that: 
"the effective working of the financial markets, 
the quality of the information available from 
companies to their shareholders, creditors, 
customers and workforce, and the quality of the 
service provided by accountants to their clients, 
are all bound up with the quality of the 
standards underpinning financial statements. " 
1.3.2 Main criticisms of the micro-asRects of EAI 
Criticisms levied against EAI within its micro-context 
can be reviewed from the standpoint of four main sets 
of considerations. Each of these sets are considered in 
turn in the paragraphs following, and are as below: 
1. Dependency considerations 
2. Financial considerations 
3. Personal considerations 
4. Commercial considerations 
1.3.3 Dependency considerations 
1. Appointments (initial and subsequent) generally 
The reality of an auditor's initial (and further re-) 
appointment is that for all practical purposes it 
depends on the board of the audited company. This leads 
to the key (dependency) criticism relating to potential 
threats to the auditor's independence. It is alleged 
that the auditor is in an insecure position and given 
the right conditions, may well be leveraged. 
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Recognising the genesis of this criticism, but in 
effect concurrently rejecting it, Michael Fowle, a 
partner in the London office of a Big-Six firm of 
auditors states ("Directors, not auditors, govern 
companies" - Financial Times, June 13,1991: 12] that 
the above situation: 
"is the auditor's rule of life and we understand 
it, but the world apparently does not - probably 
because auditors are in effect selected and 
removed from by boards of directors and because 
they necessarily work behind closed doors". 
If the above criticism is valid, then this position of 
auditor insecurity is perhaps aggravated in the present 
recession, especially against alleged "ferocious 
competition, one manifestation of which is the practice 
of lowballing" ("An uncertain future for a former safe 
career" - Financial Times, May 16,1991: 19). 
Even after having been appointed as auditor,, the 
auditor's position still remains dependent on the 
(audit) client and so his position continues to remain 
insecure. The foundation of this criticism of EAI lies 
in the belief that he who appoints the piper calls the 
tune and the fact that the auditor is dependent on the 
board of the very company he audits, in order to be 
appointed (and re-appointed) as such. If so, is it 
reasonable to expect the auditor to take a totally 
independent stance on all matters relating to the 
company's audit? 
29 
1.3.4 Financial considerations 
1. Trustee shareholder in audit clients 
The UK auditing profession has received much criticism 
for its tacit acquiescence [ICAEW, 1987: 21] (with 
varying limits for public and private companies) to 
auditors holding shares on a trustee basis in their 
audit clients. 
The basis of such criticism contrasts strongly with the 
situation in the US where for many years auditors have 
been prohibited both by the profession [AICPA, 1986: 
4411 - see also "Ethics Feature: Independence" - 
Journal of Accountancy, September 1987: 112] and the 
SEC (Rule 2-01 of Regulations S-X], from holding 
trustee shares in their audit clients. 
However the practice did evoke concern in the UK where 
Firth (1980] determined that 60% of respondents to his 
study perceived the auditor to be "not independent" 
when he held 10% of the shares in an audit client, even 
though in a trustee capacity only. 
Thus, it is suggested that auditors should if the 
occasion requires, choose between being auditors and 
acting as trustees, as they cannot function as both, 
and still expect to be seen as totally objective in 
their role as professional auditors. 
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2. Fees 
The question of fees has also been a source of 
criticism of EAI. Such criticism arises mainly because: 
1. the auditor is dependent to some extent on the 
client for his audit fees 
in some cases, that dependence may grow to unhealthy 
or undesirable proportions (in EAI terms). 
While stating the first of these criticisms, one must 
recognise that it is impossible to redress it without 
radical changes, such as that suggested by Davies - 
Controller of the Audit Commission, ["A working model 
of audit regulation" - Letters,, Financial Times, 
October 24,1990: 17], in the total financial structure 
and relationship between auditors and their clients. 
Further, given the present system of appointing and 
remunerating private-sector auditors, they must have an 
indirect financial interest in their clients, for, in 
the end, it is the client that appoints them and by 
paying their fees gives them their livelihood. 
0 Consequently, it is alleged, ("Discipline for the 
auditor" - Editorial, Financial Times, April 10,1991: 
18] that this creates "a temptation (for auditors) to 
give in to management on points of principle in order 
not to lose fees". 
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In contrast, one notes the independence manifest by 
public sector auditors who are appointed and paid by 
the Audit Commission (not the audited local authority). 
Thus, because of their non-dependence of audit fee 
income on the authority, public sector auditors are 
perceived to have more independence than their private 
sector counterparts and, in some quarters, a highly 
similar system is being advocated for UK public 
companies [11BCCI collapse: auditing at the 
crossroads" - Financial Times, August 15,1991: 10]. 
3. Unpaid fees and-analogous situations 
Unpaid audit fees and other analogous situations have 
also been the source of criticism of EAI. The AICPA 
(1986: 4444-4445] in the US dealt with the issue Of 
unpaid fees by stating if a (material) fee remains 
unpaid for more than a year, this gives rise to the 
appearance of non-independence. 
Thus, it is of interest to note that no similar formal 
prohibition or ruling is extant in the UK, where 
auditors are given only general guidance CICAEW, 1987: 
3] asking them to exercise professional judgement in 
resolving matters of this nature - and requiring them 
to be objective, impartial and "free from, (the) 
influence of any consideration which might appear to 
... conflict" with this requirement. 
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Analogous to the situation relating to unpaid fees is 
the situation where the auditor provides first year 
services on the basis of fees that are substantially 
below related costs, with the intention of recovering 
them in the following year(s) - i. e. the practice of 
I'lowballing". 
Within a US setting, the Cohen Commission (CAR, 1978: 
I 
xxxj considered the practice of lowballing and 
concluded that it "is a threat to the (professional) 
independence of the auditor" and recommended that the 
"problem" should be considered by the Ethics Division 
of the AICPA. 
The Commission arrived at this conclusion on the basis 
of a previous ethics ruling which stated that "when the 
preceding year's audit fee remains unpaid, independence 
is impaired" and in putting forth its view stating that 
lowballing gives the auditor the same "interest in the 
financial success of the client and (so) might 
influence his independence in carrying out the 
examination" (CAR, 1978: 121] as that created by unpaid 
audit fee circumstances. 
On the other hand, the ICAEW offers no definitive stand 
on the practice of lowballing, merely stating [ICAEW, 
1987: 12] that: 
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"if, in the course of an investigation into 
allegations of unsatisfactory work on the part of 
a member there is evidence of the work having 
been obtained or retained through quoting a fee 
that is not economic in terms of the time needed 
and quality of staff necessary to perform that 
work to a satisfactory professional standard, 
that factor is likely to be taken into account in 
considering the member's conduct having regard to 
the obligations placed upon the member under 
Fundamental Principle 211, 
i. e. in a professionally and technically competent 
manner. one implication of the above could be that 
lowballing practices are only appropriately judged 
within the context of investigations into 
unsatisfactory work. 
However critics (even in the profession, e. g. Aldous, 
senior partner of Robson Rhodes and co-author of) ["An 
uncertain future for a safe career" - Financial Times, 
May 16,1991: 19] allege that even when not accompanied 
by unsatisfactory work, lowballing is a threat to the, 
"public interest (role) and independence of the 
auditing firm (which) is compromised by its need 
to make a profit out of the relationship. Under 
this kind of pressure, the auditor is unlikely to 
take a robust stand on a point of principle: he 
will be putty in the hands of the management. " 
1.3.5 Personal considerations 
Criticisms levied against EAI in this context flow 
mainly from two areas of concern, as below: 
1. Personal and business relationships 
2. Directorships and other officer appointments 
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1. Personal and business relationships 
Another area giving cause for concern with EAI is the 
perceived or possible close association or involvement 
by some audit staff (especially partners and managers) 
with the management of some clients [Moizer, 1991: 34]. 
Critics allege that such close involvement (especially 
where audit staff have audited the client's accounts 
for a number of years, or where one or more of the 
client's senior management team are ex-employees of the 
audit firm), causes the audit staff to be adversely 
affected in terms of professional detachment and 
objectivity - and consequently EAI may become impaired. 
Referring to the situation where audit staff have 
worked on an audit client for several years, the 
Chairman of the 100 Group states, ("Coopers set to face 
flak over Maxwell collapse" - Accountancy Age, December 
12,1991: 1]: "It's a time-consuming and expensive 
business, but it's certainly a good idea if audit 
partners and senior managers are changed periodically. " 
In similar vein, mitchell ["Bankruptcies raise 
questions over auditors" - Financial Times, December 7, 
1990: v) complains that "the same auditors go on 
auditing the same businesses for years, leading to 
over-cosy relationships. " 
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Others express their similar criticism more abruptly 
["Discipline for the auditor" - Editorial,, Financial 
Times, April 10,1991: 18], stating that "it is a 
fundamental weakness in corporate accountability that 
the relationship between auditors and management tends 
to be over-cosy. " 
In part, such cosy relationships are seen to be 
encouraged by a cross-over of professional staff from 
audit firm to audit client and vice-versa. The threat 
posed to EAI in situations where staff transfer from 
the audit firm to the client (especially in a senior 
financial capacity) arises from possibly continuing 
personal trust (links) held by current audit staff for 
former audit colleagues now employed by the client. 
Firth (1981: 186], considered the possible impact of 
such crossover relationships and while admitting that 
UK ethical guidelines do not preclude them, sees them 
as problematic when he notes that "some discussion of 
the problems posed" by them is needed. 
on the other hand, the Cohen Commission (CAR, 1978: 
101) specifically held the view that their 
recommendations were not intended to limit such 
crossover relationships as they did not perceive them 
to be a threat to EAI. 
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2. Directorships and other officer appointments 
Welcoming the fact that auditors are debarred (both 
professionally and legally) from holding directorships 
in their audit clients, critics of EAI argue that this 
should extend to all (auditor) directorships. 
This argument is based on the view that such director- 
auditors run the risk of becoming so closely identified 
and of identifying themselves with the management view 
of corporate affairs, that they jeopardise their all 
important independent state of mind when auditing. 
1.3.6 Commercial considerations 
This particular set of criticisms finds strong 
expression in a recent book by Stevens [1991] which 
considers current US audit practices, the central 
thesis of which is ("Caught in the Savings and Loans 
backlash" - Financial Times, September 19,1991: 11) 
that: 
"the new found commercialism of the big (six) 
firms has compromised their professionalism (a 
vital attribute of which is independence) to the 
point where they are no longer fulfilling their 
obligation to society-" 
In considering reasons why the "professionalism" 
referred to by Stevens, may have become obscured, the 
concurrent provision of management advisory services 
(MAS) and accounting services appears pre-eminent. 
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The basis of both these-criticisms in the context of 
EAI are considered below: 
1. Provision of accounting services 
Criticism of EAI on this score is based on the view 
that it is impossible for someone to audit his own work 
or the outcome of such work, and still be independent 
and objective in the opinion he gives on such work. 
Indeed, there is substance to that view, as it is 
axiomatic that one cannot audit his own work and the UK 
au it profession (ICAEW, 1987: 24] recognises that fact 
in imposing a virtual complete prohibition on the 
provision of any accounting or accounting type services 
to their publicly listed audit clients. 
Thus, such critics argue auditors should not perform 
accounting and/or book-keeping services for clients, 
and should exercise great care and good judgement in 
performing any other services for their audit clients. 
Such critics state that people who choose to practice 
auditing should reflect upon the fact that their 
professional independence is so crucial, such that they 
ought to be more than prepared to avoid involvement in 
any other form of activity that will (can) or even may 
appear to compromise (might impair) their independence. 
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2. Provision of MAS 
The concurrent provision of MAS and audit service by 
the auditor is the source of significant, pronounced 
and frequent criticism of EAI. 
Perhaps Austin Mitchell ("Bankruptcies raise questions 
over auditors" - Financial Times, December 7,, 1990: V) 
best summarises criticisms on this score when he states 
that: 
"auditor independence is also compromised by the 
non-auditing services provided by the accounting 
firms. In the United States, the SEC bans 
auditors from performing certain services for 
their audit clients. In this country, (audit) 
firms are free to recruit company officers, write 
up the company records and then audit them. We 
are asked to assume that the extra revenue exerts 
no pressure on the compromises which auditors 
make. " 
While the UK audit profession generally, has not 
accepted criticisms made on this score, there does 
appear to be some basis for them. 
For instance, it was recently reported in a US context, 
that ("Auditing independence with a European face" - 
Accountancy Age, March 14,1991: 17): 
"the US controller general (of banks) is believed 
to be intending to bring in regulations which 
would insist that the (auditors) of the 50 
biggest US banks are not to be allowed to offer 
any services other than auditing" 
to those clients during their tenure as auditors. 
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Further, despite earlier protestations by Harold 
Cottam, then UK managing partner of Ernst & Whinney 
("Age of the all purpose salesman" - Financial Times, 
August 27,1986: 13] about such a (MAS) problem being 
"theoretical" and lacking "evidence". there has been 
some reappraisal of such thinking in the profession. 
For example, note recent remarks of Swinson, chairman 
of the ICAEW's financial reporting group, admitting 
concern with EAI when he declared ["Coopers set to face 
flak over Maxwell collapse" - Accountancy Age, December 
12,1991: 1) 
"People are extremely concerned about the way in 
which auditors are operating and the way in which 
the reports they produce are serving the public 
interest. We have to ask again whether other 
services can be sold to their (audit) clients. I 
believe the profession needs to review some of 
the sacred cows. " 
In addition to the provision of these two types of 
services, others detect another set of commercially 
inspired threats, which may cause the auditor to try to 
unduly satisfy client "demands", by acquiescing to 
unreasonable audit completion (time) and undue fee 
(budget) pressure - as levied by the client on him. 
The Cohen Commission (CAR, 1978: Section 9] considered 
both these forms of commercial pressure and concluded 
(Wolnitzer, 1979: 37] that: 
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the time and cost pressures to reduce the 
amount of audit work carried out tends to 
diminish independence; and 
arbitrary time deadlines imposed on auditors 
impairs their independence" 
1.4 EAI and expectations gaps 
To the extent that criticisms of standards of EAI 
reflect gaps between reasonable and (professionally) 
practical audit-user expectations of EAI and those 
actually prevailing, that gap is an expression of the 
EAI aspect within the overall audit "expectations gap" 
[Liggio, 1974; CARF 1978 and CICA, 1988]. 
In fact, Humphrey (1991: 14] sees EAI as integral to 
the audit expectation gap debate, concluding that "if 
any topic can be classified as going to the heart of 
the audit expectations (gap) debate, it is the issue of 
auditor independence. " 
In order to redress this aspect of the gap, several 
suggestions have been advanced to redress criticisms 
levied against the perceived weaknesses of external 
auditor independence in practice, and these tend to 
fall into one of four broad but distinct categories: 
1. Restricting (or prohibiting) non-audit services by 
the auditor thatmight be or be seen to be 
incompatible with the audit function. 
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2. Protecting the auditor (primarily in an economic 
sense) from the influence of or the dependency on 
the management of the audited entity (e. g. audit 
committees, rotation of audit appointments, 
independent fee-setting and audit-appointing body). 
3. Ensuring that audit firms are managed so that the 
necessary internal (e. g. compulsory rotation of 
audit staff and second partner review) or external 
(e. g. peer review) support for the independence of 
individual partners and staff is provided. 
4. Prohibiting by statute the auditor from having any 
(beneficial or non-beneficial) financial involvement 
in/with audit clients (e. g. trustee shareholdings). 
The long run welfare of the audit profession depends 
upon the auditor's independence and integrity. If he 
assumes a partisan role he sacrifices his professional 
status and his opinion is no more acceptable than the 
representations of the management preparing the 
relevant statements. The resolution of this and similar 
problems calls for the exercise of good judgement by 
the profession as a whole. If there should be any doubt 
as to how to handle a particular issue, it will be far 
better for the profession to err on the side of greater 
rigour and caution, rather than greater laxity. 
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For it is only through the enforcement of rigorous 
accounting and auditing standards that the profession 
will maximise its credibility - and in so doing its 
perceived professional independence. 
This chapter placed EAI within its functional context. 
This it did first by considering the professional 
dimension attached to it and then highlighting some of 
the major criticisms of or concerns (expectation gaps) 
about it when considered within its practical setting. 
The next chapter considers EAI from some of the 
theoretical stances from which it may be viewed and 
Chapter 3 reviews the major extant empirical research 
conducted into the issue of EAI. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
The previous chapter considered some of the more 
operational aspects and criticisms of EAI within its 
macro and micro contexts. It also asserted that the 
whole basis of the auditing profession rests on its 
ability to be, and to be seen to be independent, but 
made no attempt to examine (explain) the nature of EAI. 
Thus theýpurpose of this chapter is to examine the 
underlying nature of EAI and to consider why confidence 
held in the auditor's opinion (and so in related 
audited statements) varies directly with the auditor's 
ability to physically and mentally disregard and 
dissociate himself from the client and its management. 
This analysis of the nature of EAI is conducted on the 
basis that any research (empirical or other) into, 
and/or regulative measures governing EAI should only be 
conducted with a good knowledge of its underlying 
nature. 
In order to examine the nature of EAI this chapter 
draws on the theoretical offerings provided by a number 
of authors, each of whom have generally considered EAI 
from or within a specific standpoint or perspective. 
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This chapter has five major sections. The first reviews 
some of the definitions offered for EAI and places it 
within a theoretical frame. The second section outlines 
and considers the nature of EAI from some of the more 
important perspectives from which it has been analysed. 
The third section presents an understanding of the 
nature of EAI by assessing it from the main types of 
influences that are judged to possess power when 
shaping EAI in its practical forms. The. fourth section 
of the chapter considers the nature of EAI in an agency 
theoretic and Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) frame. 
The final section of the chapter consists of a summary 
and overall synthesis of the previous sections and some 
concluding thoughts as to the intrinsic nature of EAI. 
2.1 Zheoretical perspectives 
Belkaoui (1985: Chapter 3] offers various competing 
approaches to the formulation of an accounting theory 
and identifies the "behaviourial approach" as one. 
In his view [Belkaoui, 1985: 85], this approach 
"emphasizes the relevance to decision making of the 
information being communicated and the individual and 
group behaviour caused by (taking place within) the 
communication of information. " 
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Accordingly, since EAI is essentially a behavioural and 
relative quality, any theoretical examination of it can 
be seen as taking place within the auditing equivalent 
of such a behavioural approach. However precisely 
because EAI is a behavioural issue, it remains an 
elusive feature which, despite the many definitions 
offered for it, auditors have found difficult to 
clarify precisely within their professional role. 
Nevertheless. -as definitions are useful commencement 
points in order to understand the nature of EAI, some 
exposition of them is appropriate. For instance, from 
among the many definitions offered for EAI, we note 
that Kohler [1970: 229] defines EAI as: 
"The property or a relation between the 
accountant and his client, such that the 
accountant's findings and reports will be 
influenced only by the "evidence" discovered and 
assembled in accord with the rules and principles 
of his professional discipline. " 
Schandl [1978: 193] however, sees EAI more as: 
"the assurance that the auditor's personal, 
emotional and material interests will not be 
affected by others because of his communicating 
an opinion, judgement, finding or decision. " 
Expressed in more mathematical terms [Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986: 313], one may view total EAI as that 
which prevails when the probability of the auditor 
reporting ALL material facts about the client is 1. 
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In reality, since a probability of 1 equals certainty, 
such a state cannot be assumed because some uncertainty 
always remains attached to EAI. 
From the opposite standpoint, one might maintain that 
for the auditor's opinion to be of some value, the 
auditor must have some incentive to tell the "truth" 
when the "truth" is bad or unwelcome from the client's 
view. DeAngelo (1980-1981: 68] regards the auditor's 
incentive to reveal unwelcome news (not in the client's 
self-interest) as one definition or expression of EAI. 
However, a more pragmatic working definition might 
define EAI as the avoidance of situations which would 
indicate to others that an impairment (consciously or 
subconsciously) of the auditor's professional judgement 
could take place when there is a conflict or potential 
conflict between the auditor and the client or other 
parties. 
While definitions are useful starting points, they 
always need further expansion and elucidation. Analysis 
of EAI shows it to be a multi-faceted quality and in 
recognising this fact, three main different perceptual 
approaches to its examination are indicated in the 
literature, viz: - perspective based, influence based 
and factor (with constituent attributes) based. 
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2.2 Perspective based approaches to EAI 
This approach examines the nature of EAI from a number 
of alternative, equally valid, standpoints or 
perspectives. As such, any resultant understanding of 
EAI is governed by the particular perspective chosen 
when examining it. A survey of the literature 
identifies seven individual perspectives from which the 
nature of EAI may be considered. 
1. The "existential" DersDective 
Auditors have for many years recognised 
within two broad dimensions - "fact" ani 
Thus, this distinction made over thirty 
(Higgins, 1962: 31], refers to the form 
"exists" and holds that: 
that EAI exists 
"appearance". 
years ago 
in which EAI 
"there are actually two kinds of independence 
which a CPA must have - independence in fact and independence in appearance. The former refers to 
a CPA's objectivity, to the quality of not being 
influenced by regard to personal advantage. The 
latter means his freedom from potential conflicts 
of interest which might tend to shake public 
confidence in his independence in fact. " 
Many years later Arens et al (1984: 34] restated that 
two important aspects of EAI relate to "fact" and 
"appearance". This they did stating that: 
"not only is it essential that CPAs maintain an 
independent attitude in fulfilling their 
responsibility, but it is also important that the 
users of financial statements have confidence in 
that, independence. These two objectives are ... identified as independence in 'fact' and ... 'appearance'. " 
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Independence in fact exists when the auditor is 
actually able to maintain an unbiased attitude 
throughout the audit (i. e. being independent), 
whereas independence in appearance is dependent 
on others' interpretation of this independence 
(i. e. being seen to be independent). " 
Both dimensions are crucial to the proper fulfilment of 
an audit - one without the other is of little value. 
EAI in appearance, which involves the perception of the 
auditor's independence by all interested in the audit 
report has received much attention by US researchers. 
In relation to users, every judgement by the auditor 
has an EAI aspect. Such judgements include his search 
for clientele, staff hiring, assignment of staff to the 
audit engagement, approach to audit investigation, 
evaluation of evidence and his development of opinions. 
In fact, if any judgement (no matter how important), 
appears to involve compromise, then subordination may 
be alleged and consequently perceived independence 
could very well be questioned. 
For example, agreement by the auditor to an audit 
client request not to seek direct confirmation of a 
particular trade receivable (whether or not the auditor 
deems it necessary), can be seen by users of the 
audited statement as a subordination of the auditor's 
judgement, and in effect an impairment of his 
professional independence. 
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The same can'be said of the auditor's acquiescence to a 
change requested by the audit client to the wording of 
a particular note or set of notes to the financial 
statements, whether or not the auditor is convinced 
that the revised wording in fact assists with a true 
and fair view of the relevant financial statements. 
While much emphasis has been placed on the determinants 
of the appearance of EAI, understandably, less emphasis 
appears to have been placed on determining what 
attributes create independence in fact. 
However it is obvious that this "factual" aspect of EAI 
calls for the total intellectual honesty of the auditor 
and his complete absence of any indebtedness or 
obligation to any user of his report. 
2. The role perspective 
Judged from this perspective, EAI has two main role- 
based dimensions [Carmichael and Swieringa, 1968], the 
first being "practitioner independence" and the second 
being "professional independence". 
The dimension relating to practitioner independence 
refers to the attitude of the individual auditor's mind 
and his personal principles and self-reliance (such as 
illustrated in the public's perception of a priest). 
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on the other hand, the professional dimension relating 
to EAI refers to the image of the auditor as a member 
of a distinct group to which is attributed certain 
features (e. g., the public's negative view of used car 
salesmen). Thus membership of a particular group acts 
as a surrogate assurance of the qualities or character 
traits attributed to all members of the group. 
3. The human dynamics perspective 
Agency theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983] views the 
firm in terms of a "nexus of contracts" [Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976] between different parties operating in 
a socio-economic framework. The interactions between 
them which gives rise to the need for an independent 
audit, are predicated on inter-personal dynamics. 
Thus,, assuming that an auditor is fully competent and 
knowledgable, and has all the means to apply his skills 
and knowledge, then the only other determinant that may 
stand in the way of a credible audit report, is the 
auditor's willingness and ability to act independently. 
Unaudited accounts lack credibility because of the 
questionable objectivity of their issuers. However the 
auditor's non-involvement in the daily activities of a 
company provides the required objectivity for his audit 
opinion on the company's financial statements. 
51 
The need for EAI stems from the "remoteness" between 
the management of a company and users of its accounts. 
This gives rise to the "stewardship" aspect underlying 
accounts [CAR, 1978: 93] and the need for an auditor. 
Further, the larger the company, the more remote from 
each other owners and managers are likely to be. 
The auditor acts as a bridge in the process of ensuring 
management remains accountable to (primarily) the 
company's shareholders and (generally) to other users 
of the company's audited financial statements. Clearly 
then, it is vital to the strength of this bridging that 
the auditor is not only independent "in fact", but is 
also seen to be so independent "in appearance". 
As a result, user confidence in the financial data 
presented by a company is closely related to the 
position ofýindependence taken by its auditor. The more 
independent or objective the auditor, the greater-the 
probability that shareholders and other interested 
parties will have confidence in his EAI and in his 
underlying work and opinion. The CAR [1978: 105] puts 
forth its belief that: 
"the obligations created by the audit function 
may require the auditor to persuade management to 
present a measurement of earnings or disclose 
material information that reflects unfavourably 
on its performance. Often, the independent 
auditor's task is to persuade people to do 
precisely what they do not want to do. " 
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Thus, the value of an audit to consumers of audit 
services, depends on and stems from the auditor's 
ability to withstand client pressures to do or-not do 
precise actions and to disclose information partially 
and/or selectively. 
Considering EAI from a human dynamics perspective, one 
notes that the closer the perceived alignment of 
incentives between the auditor and the client, the 
lower the value of the auditor's opinion on the 
client's financial statements to consumers of audit 
services. 
4. The-environmental perspective 
Certain auditing theoreticians [e. g. Aranya and Sarell, 
1975] have considered EAI from the perspective of the 
environment within which it is exercised, contending 
that the degree of independence an auditor brings to 
bear in any situation is a composite result of factors 
that are external (i. e. "macro" aspects) or internal 
(i. e. "micro" aspects) to the audit parties themselves. 
The distinction between these two aspects from which 
EAI may be regarded, was explained within, and formed 
the structure for the criticisms of EAI presented iny 
Chapter 1 and so are mentioned here for the sake of 
completeness only. 
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5. The sociological perspective 
Such studies view auditing and audit phenomena (such as 
EAI) within a sociological framework and attempt to 
analyse it using sociological concepts and terms. 
Barrett [1969: iii] views EAI as containing two 
underlying sociological role constructs and maintains 
that: 
"the audit profession's ethical notion of 
apparent independence can be operationally 
defined as a sociological role construct, and its 
conception of real independence can be 
operationally defined as a personality 
construct. " 
Barrett [1969: iii] further puts forth the view that: 
"Interpersonal independence describes functional 
situations which promote, or dysfunctional 
situations which impair, the profession's auditor 
image as perceived by reasonable observers. 
Intrapersonal independence is the second order 
factor containing three operational content 
variables. 
It is assumed that male individuals - who are 
field analytical rather than global field types, 
who evidence a low, social approval need rather 
than being approval motivated and who prefer to 
describe themselves in terms of independent 
rather than intermediate or dependent personality 
typologies - tend to possess a high degree of 
intrapersonal independence as characterised by 
their behaviour in test and non-test situations. " 
on the basis of his exploratory studies, Professor 
Barrett concludes that interpersonal and intrapersonal 
EAI are both amenable to identification and 
determination by empirical testing. 
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6. The components perspective 
Here the individual components associated with EAI are 
considered directly. For example, considering EAI from 
this perspective, Berryman (1974) views "time" as an 
important component. In this regard, he contends-within 
each audit engagement, that EAI must exist for some 
minimum period of time. 
An independent state of mind must exist from the time 
an audit contract is first contemplated (bidding,, 
tendering) or comes into existence, until the time the 
relevant audit report is rendered and subsequent 
responses interpreting reactions to the report have 
been given. 
In practice this means an independent attitude must be 
maintained (by all audit personnel concerned) from the 
time that an audit engagement is considered until all 
audit work is done and the audit report is duly 
communicated. 
Berryman's second component is a "party" component. As 
such, the auditor must not be under the influence of 
any party (client or otherwise) who is or may become 
interested (positively or otherwise) with the outcome 
of the audit. In giving due recognition to this "party" 
component of EAI, Berryman poses questions such as: 
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1. Who should select the auditor? 
2. Who should decide to change the auditors? 
3. Who should pay the audit fee? 
4. With regard to whom must the auditor be independent? 
In considering this "party" component attached to EAI, 
one notes that the auditor must guard his independence 
not only in terms of shareholders, but also in terms of 
all potential users of the accounts under audit. 
Until relatively recently shareholders were generally 
regarded as the sole beneficiary of the audit, and so 
auditor independence was conceived of solely in terms 
of protecting their interests. 
This traditional view appears to have been reinforced 
in the recent House of Lords decision in the "Caparoll 
case (Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman, 1990 - All ER 
HL 568] limiting the scope of the auditor's 
professional liability. 
However, recognition, use and acceptance of the audit 
report by a much wider audience and reader group has 
meant that EAI is potentially as important to the 
company audited, its lenders, suppliers, bankers and 
employees, as it is to its shareholders and is 
increasingly being regarded as such. 
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Accordingly, previous decisions arrived at in lower 
courts on the Caparo case (and other cases elsewhere, 
e. g. the 1963 Australian case of Reid-Murray Holdings 
Ltd) give closer legal expression and substance to the 
more "modern" view that the auditor must safeguard his 
independence within the widest possible scope, if he is 
to pay due respect to the wide "party" component 
attached to EAI. 
7. The (inteqrative) phases DersDective 
Mautz and Sharaf [1961] integrate within one framework, 
some of the previously considered perspectives, using a 
three phase model. 
The first of these three phases is described bY Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961: 230-231] as: 
"the independence of approach and attitude which 
any professional man should have ... a 
combination of self-reliance, freedom from client 
control, expert skill and ability, and considered 
judgement based on training and experience not 
available to those who are not members of the 
profession. " 
Carmichael and Swieringa (1968: 698] refer to this 
phase as "professional independence" -a feature to be 
observed not only in the audit but in all professions. 
Its basis is control by self-imposed standards, 
self-regulation of professional standards, and 
peer-group surveillance. 
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This phase of EAI therefore implies and requires 
freedom from control and/or pressure from and by 
superiors or other vested interests. To exhibit this 
form of independence, an auditor must accept and 
conform to all the obligations arising from his 
professional status. 
To do this effectively requires that the auditor be an 
individual of high morals, character and integrity. 
Pearson (1979: 20] states the auditor "must be willing 
to conform to the norms of his profession, while at the 
same time be willing to speak out on matters where he 
or she feels the profession is deficient. " 
Additionally, the auditor's personal value system must 
prohibit him from obeying commands that are clearly in 
violation of professional standards and prohibit him 
from performing duties less than professionally. 
Comparing this particular phase of auditor independence 
with its parallel features in other professions, Carey 
and Doherty (1966a: 18] note that: 
"Independence, in the sense of being 
self-reliant, not, subordinate, is essential to 
the practice of all professions. No 
self-respecting professional man - physician, 
lawyer or certified accountant - will subordinate 
his professional judgement to the views of his 
patient or client. He cannot evade his 
professional responsibility for the advice, 
opinions, and recommendations which he offers. 
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If his patients or clients do not like what he 
says, the practitioner may regret it; but no one 
would condone his changing his honest opinion so 
as to avoid giving offence or to secure a fee. " 
Professional training alone will not assure this phase 
of EAI, because in addition to the professional aspects 
noted above, it is a composite function of personal 
values, heredity, and family and social background. 
Mautz and Sharaf [1961: 231] see the second and third 
phase of EAI as being particular to the audit 
profession. They see the second phase of EAI as: 
"that required by an auditor if he is to perform 
his function of review and verification in a 
satisfactory manner. Independence here-consists 
of freedom from bias and prejudice, whether 
recognised or not ... 
The practitioner must be aware of the various 
pressures, and an auditor must be constantly 
alert to any deleterious influences on his 
planning (programming), investigative, or 
reporting independence. " 
The above three freedoms must be present in this second 
phase of EAI. Impairment of any of them results in a 
loss of EAI and must not be endured by an auditor. The 
importance attached to these freedoms in an EAI context 
warrants brief clarification viz: - 
Programming: Freedom from control or undue influence in 
the planning, programming and the selection of audit 
techniques and procedures and the extent of their 
application. 
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investigative: Freedom from control or undue influence 
in the selection of areas, activities, personal 
relationships, and managerial policies to be examined. 
ReRorting: Freedom from control or undue influence in 
the statement of facts revealed by the examination or 
in the expression of recommendations or opinions as a 
result of the examination. 
The third and final phase of EAI per Mautz and Sharaf 
[1961: 231] focuses on the recognition that "public ... 
acceptance of the auditor's status is significant to 
the successful accomplishment-of his purpose. " 
2.3 Operational influences on EAI 
Certain authors (Goldman and Barlev, 1974 and 1975; 
Nichols and Price, 1976; Shockley, 1982 and Farmer et 
al, 1987] have attempted to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature of EAI by identifying those 
features, forces or factors that may influence it. In 
turn, the following considers each of these attempts. 
Features influencing the operation of EAI 
Shockley (1982] identifies the following 10 features of 
the audit environment which, in his view and with 
varying degrees of underlying significance, act as 
- 
influencing determinants of EAI. These features are: 
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1. Client-auditor dependencies 
2. Accounting flexibility 
3. The provision of other services (MAS) to the client 
4. Size of the audit firm 
5. Degree of competition for audit services 
6. Years the auditor has acted as such (tenure) 
7. Professional integrity 
8. Professional sanction 
Fear of loss of reputation and clientele 
10. Legal liability 
Empirical research conducted by Shockley [19811 
indicated that (in order of significance) the degree of 
competition, the size of the audit firm and provision 
of MAS to audit clients are the features that most 
influence an audit firm's independence being impaired. 
Forces (conflicts) influencing the operation of EAI 
other authors Goldman and Barlev (1974] (using 
behavioural analysis) and Nichols and Price (1976] 
(using exchange theory) consider EAI in terms of 
asymmetrical power structures between the auditor and 
management and in sets of conflict relationships, viz: - 
1. between the auditor and the firm 
2. between the shareholder and the management 
3. between the auditor's self-interest and professional 
standards 
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Despite their consideration of essentially the same 
conflict relationships, as a result of differing logic 
and views, Nichols and Price (1976] and Goldman and 
Barlev [1974] arrived at totally contradicting 
conclusions. 
However, they both agreed that the position of 
management was stronger than that of the auditor on the 
basis that it was relatively less difficult for 
management to find a replacement auditor than it was 
for the auditor to find an equivalent audit client. 
Three broad approaches-are recommended by the authors 
to assist the auditor to withstand firm pressure in the 
first conflict relationship. In the first of these 
conflict relationships they suggest increasing the 
power of the auditor, primarily by increasing the 
ability of a replaced auditor to cause sanctions to be 
imposed on the firm resulting from unjustified removal 
replacement. 
In the second case they recommend increasing the 
expected cost to the auditor and/or the firm from 
taking inappropriate actions. Finally Goldman and- 
Barlev [1974] argue for a change in the structure of 
the auditor-firm contractual relationship so as'to 
reduce the firm's discretionary options. 
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Factor (attributes) influencing the-operation of EAI 
Farmer et al [1987: 5] provide an identification of 
five major constructs governing EAI. They contend that 
within each of them lies differing sets of attributes. 
The five constructs identified by Farmer et al and some 
of the attributes contained within them are: 
1. The psychological construct, which refers to the 
auditor's psychological framework, with particular 
significance being attached to the auditor's 
objectivity and sense of realism. 
2. The economic construct, which refers to the facts 
governing the auditor's own economic standing, 
which in turn normally functions as a determinant of 
his propensity to succumb to pressure on his EAI. 
3. The third party construct, which refers to the 
auditor's recognition that he is his own agent and 
once appointed is professionally independent of both 
primary audit parties (owners and management). 
4. The technical competence construct, which refers to 
the auditor's possession of more than due accounting 
and auditing knowledge so that he may professionally 
assess the appropriateness of accounting treatments 
and the related auditing of them. 
63 
5. The standard setting factors, which refer to the 
existence of a strong standard setting body that 
dictates firm accounting principles, thus providing 
a more limited area for judgement disagreements 
between the client and the auditor. 
2.4 EAI in an agency theory and EMH context 
In addition to providing an explanation (information 
asymmetry) for the practice of auditing, agency theory 
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1981; 1983 and 1986: Chapter 13] 
also allows one to obtain an understanding of the 
nature of EAI by focusing on EAI's role in the theory. 
The theory suggests that, in an efficient market, 
"rational" agents (Moizer, 1991: 36] will view auditors 
having a known economic interest in their clients as 
having increased incentives to "cheat" and so they are 
seen as less likely to be independent. 
The costs of increased uncertainty caused by such 
incentives to cheat ("opportunism") are likely to be 
imputed into the share/bond price of the client (if 
current) or its price of attracting fresh capital (if 
new). This view is reinforced by the theory of the EMH 
which states that the securities market quickly 
receives all publicly available data and promptly 
reflects it in the prices of relevant securities. 
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Thus, even if one accepts that auditing or EAI has 
little to do with an efficient market, one cannot deny 
that audits at least provide a means of confirming or 
correcting data previously received by the market. 
In this context therefore, audited statements help to 
assure the efficiency of the market by limiting the 
life of incorrect or inaccurate information or by 
deterring its further dissemination. 
Such thinking also suggests that in a truly efficient 
market, the expected economic benefits of EAI will be 
fully reflected in the market price of the relevant 
share or bond. 
Under non-regulated conditions, audit clients would 
have the incentive to contract with auditors in such a 
way as to maximise, by virtue of the audit process, the 
incremental value of the firm. The independent 
assurances provided by an audit hold significant 
information value for users of financial statements. 
2.5 Summary and synthesis of the nature of EAI 
This chapter provided an analysis of the underlying 
nature of EAI, first by offering some definitions of it 
and then by examining it using some of the perspectives 
from which it has been studied. 
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This perspective-based examination of EAI was conducted 
from varying but equally valid standpoints. It 
determined that EAI is a multi-faceted feature which is 
perhaps best assessed using suitable multivariate 
approaches, so that due provision is made for these 
multi-facets of EAI to be captured and/or unfolded. 
A section of the chapter explained the linkage between 
EAI and agency theory and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis - noting that there is a basis for 
convergence between these two theoretical paradigms. 
Summarising the main aspects relating to EAI when it is 
being exercised, we note that for it to be present and 
so perceived, it is vital that an auditor possess not 
only the necessary characteristics to be independent, 
but that he must in fact exercise them fully so that 
users of accounts see them to be present and 
functioning. 
By the same token, we note that the nature of EAI 
requires that the auditor be aware of and constantly 
re-assess and examine the likely causes or situations 
that may result in his professional EAI being impaired. 
First,, in the sense of not being subordinate, EAI 
implies honesty, integrity, and complete objectivity. 
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Second, in the narrower sense in which it is used in 
connection with audits and the expression of opinions 
on financial statements, independence means avoidance 
of any relationship which would be likely, even 
subconsciously, to impair an auditor's objectivity. 
Third, it means avoidance of any and all relationships 
which may reasonably suggest a conflict of interest. 
But how can auditors be assured that users of audited 
statements have (at least) a high level of confidence 
in their independence? To do so, the independence 
perceptions of audit users must be determined. 
Further, how does one measure perceptions of EAI as 
seen by the users of audited financial statements? 
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Could it be possible to develop a sort of measuring or 
gauging instrument, such that the profession could use 
to monitor users perceptions about their independence? 
Differing users and user groups may have varying 
concepts of auditor independence and may thus have 
conflicting perceptions about it, its importance and 
the degree to which it must be present. 
Such differences in views will present difficulties, as 
would attempts to develop universal recommendations for 
actions to raise the level of perceived EAI. 
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Berryman (1974] raises an important point in asking 
what relationships should be avoided and/or proscribed 
by the auditing profession. However one wonders whether 
the same auditor-client relationship is uniformly 
perceived by all relevant groups. Further, one might 
enquire as to those relationships or situations that 
best distinguish between EAI views of such groups. 
The empirical part of this research attempts to 
identify and examine some such relationships in the 
context of both selected groups of UK users of audited 
statements and the UK audit profession. 
Further, as the nature of EAI appears to be multi- 
perspective and therefore multi-faceted, much of the 
empirical research in this thesis adopts a multivariate 
approach. 
Despite the increased understanding of EAI made 
possible through its consideration from several 
perspectives and the influences that appear to govern 
it, in the final analysis EAI is an issue of integrity 
and so a part of the general characteristic of human 
honesty. However honesty is itself a relative concept 
and varies with individuals, so determining if an 
auditor has or has not been honest is not without 
problems. 
68 
Perhaps Shakespeare offers some useful practical 
guidance to professional auditors in Hamlet (I. iii), 
in the words spoken by Polonius, when he says: 
"This above all - to thine own self be true 
And it must follow, as the night the day 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. " 
This chapter examined the nature of EAI within a 
theoretical context. In the main, the next chapter 
presents results made available from previous empirical 
research into specific aspects of external auditor 
independence. 
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CHAPTER III 
SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE 
The purpose of this chapter is to review previous 
important research into external auditor independence 
that (inter alia) also considered aspects of the 
subject empirically assessed in the present research. 
Most research into EAI has been done in the last thirty 
years in the US. However, in order to consider only the 
more current findings in this chapter, research 
conducted pre-1970 is not necessarily addressed here. 
This chapter has three major sections. The first 
considers the theoretical'research conducted on EAI 
while the second addresses three differing types of 
empirical research on the same issue. The third section 
presents a brief integrative review of, and conclusions 
drawn from the chapter. 
3.1 Theoretical research 
Research into EAI has been both theoretical and 
empirical. The theoretical research considers EAI 
devoid of any practical or "real-world" setting and 
confines itself only to conceptual models or analyses. 
In turn, this research has also been of two types. 
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The first type of theoretical research into EAI has its 
origins in the literature of psychology [Gul, 1987 and 
Wilkinson, 1988] and/or that segment of the 
sociological literature relating to professionalism 
[Schilit, 1981], as considered in Chapter 1. 
This type of research considers those influences likely 
to condition EAI [Nichols and Price, 1976). Further, it 
has generally viewed auditor behaviour in terms of 
conflict, essentially between the auditor and company 
management, and has examined [Shockley, 1982] or built 
models [Goldman and Barlev, 1974] of the influences 
(variables) likely to prevail upon EAI. 
More recently this type of research has been furthered 
by the second type of theoretical research, which 
concerns itself with the development of formal economic 
models considering EAI mostly in the frame of agency 
theoretic (DeAngelo, 1981a] contractual relationships. 
Both types of theoretical examination have helped with 
an understanding of the dynamics of the auditor-client 
relationship. For example, it drew attention to the 
fact that while audit clients have some ease and choice 
in selecting auditors, audit firms have comparatively 
less choice in accepting audit appointments and much 
difficulty in replacing lost audit clients. 
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However, such theoretical study is yet to produce the 
definitive model of influencing variables on EAI, and 
with the emergence of audit tendering and lowballing, 
this relationship is further compounded. As such there 
is still no overall consensus as to which aspects of 
this relationship likely strengthen or impair EAI. 
3.1.1 Influence based theoretical research 
The theoretical contributions to the study of EAI 
provided by Goldman and Barlev [1974), Nichols and 
Price (1976] and Shockley (1982] have been alluded to 
in Chapter 2 when considering the nature of EAI. Hence 
only brief details of their research are noted below: 
Goldman and Barley r19741 
The authors see the auditor-firm relationship as the 
composite result and inter-action of the influences of 
three distinct sets (independent, intervening and 
dependent) of variables upon each other. They suggest 
that auditor independence is, in many ways, a symptom 
of the power asymmetry existing in this role structure. 
They hold that the more non-routine the auditor's work, 
the greater is his strength (power) and so the basis of 
his independence. They see MAS (because it is a 
non-routine service) provision as strengthening the 
auditor's independence (Moizer, 1991: 42]. 
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In contrast, they see the statutory audit as a routine 
service and in consequence auditors who only provide 
external audit services are likely to be less I 
independent. Considering their power-analytical model, 
Goldman and Barlev suggest three possible approaches 
which together would be helpful in strengthening EAI. 
These approaches are: 
1. Decrease the potential power of management vis-a-vis 
the auditor by limiting its freedom of action. 
Reduce the auditor's flexibility of action by laying 
down rigid accounting and auditing standards. 
Change the very structure of the audit role and/or 
the auditing profession. 
Nichols and Price r19761 
The consideration of EAI done by these authors utilised 
interpersonal exchange theory and focused on those 
variables which, in their view, are likely to affect 
the auditor's ability to withstand pressure from a 
client. 
Based on their assessment of the variables that 
influence the auditor-firm relationship, Nichols and 
Price suggest that there are three reasonably distinct 
approaches or sets of procedures that are likely to 
increase the auditor's ability to withstand pressure to 
comply with the client's demands. 
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1. Increase the power of the auditor (e. g. requiring a 
new auditor to consult with the previous one so as 
to obtain all relevant information he may require 
before accepting a new audit appointment). 
2. Increase the expected cost to the auditor and/or the 
firm from taking inappropriate actions (e. g. more 
precise formulation and specification of auditing 
and accounting standards). 
Change the structure of the auditor-firm contractual 
relationship so as to inhibit or limit the firm's 
discretionary options (e. g. statutory basis to audit 
committees made up of only non-executive directors). 
The conclusions arrived at by Nichols and Price appear 
to be quite contrary and opposed to those arrived at by 
Goldman and Barlev. Contrary to these authors, Nichols 
and Price held that the more limited the possibility of 
discretionary judgements available to auditors, the 
less likely it is that there will be violations of 
generally accepted accounting or auditing standards. 
They opine that even though the statutory audit is a 
routine service, if it is bound by tightly prescribed 
rules, so that the scope of individual auditor 
judgement is limited, the potential pressure on the 
auditor to act unprofessionally will be limited and so 
the auditor will in fact be more able to exercise EAI. 
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Shocklev r19821 
Shockley's theoretical contribution to the subject of 
EAI has been the provision of a model (developed using 
causal analysis) that integrates differing research 
directions on it within a conceptual framework. He 
concluded that whether or not a particular auditor or 
firm of auditors is seen to be independent, is the 
result of interactive variables which are causally 
related to each other. He also held that the variables 
of significance to audit user views of EAI are the ten 
previously noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3). 
3.1.2 Agency theo; a based theoretical research 
Certain'researchers [DeAngelo, 1981a and Antle, 1984] 
have used models arising from the auditor-client (and 
other) contractual relationships identified within the 
framework of agency theory [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 
Chapter 131 which is premised on a network of deemed or 
real contractual relationships. 
Such research investigated the behaviour of management 
and auditors when both are seen as agents of the same 
principal (the owners) in an environment where the 
actions (and their results) of management are assumed 
to be not directly observable by the principal, but are 
observable by the auditors (the asymmetrical knowledge 
or action situation) (Thornton, 1984 and 1985]. 
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DeAngelo r1981a and 1981bl 
Using agency theory as a mainstay, DeAngelo considered 
EAI generally, and more specifically the practice of 
I'lowballing" - setting audit fees below costs on 
initial audit engagements, with a view to recovering 
them in the future or possibly through the provision of 
more lucrative non-audit services to the audit client. 
The practice has been cited by both the SEC and CAR 
[1978: xxx] as one likely to impair independence and is 
one aspect of EAI judged in the research questionnaire 
developed for this research (Situation 14). With the 
growing number of UK companies trying to limit audit 
costs by requesting tenders for their audit, the topic 
has become of much concern in the UK also. It is thus 
pertinent to examine how lowballing is'seen by DeAngelo 
within agency theoretic terms. 
DeAngelo's model reflects a simple multi-period 
depiction of the market for audit services in terms of 
audit fee, start-up and transaction costs. 
Using this model DeAngelo demonstrates that normal 
competitive market equilibrium requires initial fees to 
be less than costs (i. e. lowballing to take place). 
However, DeAngelo's view is that lowballing in itself 
does not constitute a threat to independence. 
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DeAngelo's rationale is based on the fact that because 
initial fee reductions are sunk-costs, in future time 
periods they will have no effect on the magnitude of 
future quasi-rents or on the auditor's EAI. She argues 
that it is the very existence of these quasi-rents that 
is detrimental to EAI and so holds that lowballing in 
itself is not a threat to EAI, so that rules 
prohibiting lowballing will have little effect on EAI. 
Antle U9841 
Antle's model, also developed within an agency theory 
framework, holds that if the remuneration of both 
management and auditor is a function of their 
respective reports, then there are incentives for them 
to co-operate, or to even enter into direct collusion 
(perhaps involving side-payments), with each other, and 
that in such circumstances lucrative MAS contracts 
might act as a good cover for possible side-payments. 
Antle's model assumes auditors to be no different from 
any other "economic agent" and so regards him in the 
same way as any other type of economic agent. The model 
uses "casual empiricism" and considers those pressures 
that might induce the auditor to forgo the "benefits" 
of non-independence, while employing game theory and 
related statistical concepts to substantiate its 
mathematical validity. 
77 
In developing his single-period (partial-equilibrium) 
model, Antle concurs with Watts and Zimmerman [1981] 
who state that even without regulations auditors have 
incentives (especially "reputation effects" -a multi- 
period phenomenon) to maintain their independence, and 
so self-monitoring (regulation) is enough to maintain a 
reasonable level of auditor independence. 
Antle's model suggests appropriate checks to encourage 
EAI include: 
1. continual monitoring of transactions between the two 
agents - auditor and management (by say, reporting 
the extent and value of non-audit services). 
long-run observation of tendencies of audit reports 
on the basis that audit firms actively colluding 
with client managements will present fewer 
unfavourable reports. 
Antle's model is premised on the view that while there 
may be powerful incentives for individual audit firms 
to act in a non-independent manner, if all firms acted 
in like manner, then in the long run, the market for 
audits (other than statutory audits) would rapidly 
contract as principals perceived that management and 
auditor were effectively acting as one agent. 
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However, generalising from his model, Antle recognises 
that differing long-term results may be noticed, 
because firms would have a common incentive to act in a 
collective manner so as to maintain appropriate levels 
of independence, precisely to ensure against the 
collapse of the market for audit services as a whole. 
3.2 Empirical research 
The more pragmatic type of research into EAI recognises 
that it is a concept difficult to define in finite or 
absolute terms and whose meaning may shift over time. 
Thus, it sets itself the more limited goal of 
identifying what current perceptions of EAI (as held by 
various groups interested with audits) are, and of 
comparing these views with the current requirements of 
relevant professional auditing and other (SEC) bodies. 
As with the theoretical research into EAI, most of its 
empirical research has been conducted in the US. In 
general, the empirical research has been of two types. 
The (more frequent) first type of this empirical 
research has addressed itself to the perceived impact 
on EAI when the auditor provides various types of non- 
audit services - usually classified as management 
advisory services (MAS). Hence research of this type 
can be termed as MAS-based empirical research. 
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The (less frequent) second type of research, like that 
conducted within this thesis, has addressed itself to 
examining EAI within differing audit environments or 
specific situations. Hence research of this type can be 
termed as situation-based empirical research. 
Empirical research into EAI has sought the views of 
auditors themselves [Amernic and Aranya, 1981] or those 
of audit users [Firth, 1981]. On some occasions, such 
research has sought the EAI views of both auditors and 
the users of their services (Firth, 1980]. as is the 
case in this research. 
small segment of research into EAI [Scheiner and 
Kiger,, 1982; Scheiner, 1984] has researched the impact 
of US disclosures made as a result of the ASR-250 SEC- 
regulation. The disclosures required related'to details 
(primarily fees) about MAS services, when provided by 
the company's auditors. (The regulation was withdrawn - 
so the experience may be indicative in a UK context. ] 
However, as the present research does not directly 
address disclosure issues relating to MAs fees paid by 
companies to their auditors, this segment of research 
is not elucidated further, nor for the same reason is 
that conducted by Simunic [1984], which judged the 
joint impact of MAS-provision and internal audit costs. 
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3.2.1 MAS-based emRirical research 
one of the audit environments considered in the present 
research questionnaire relates to an auditor's dual 
provision of audit and MAS (Situation 13). so the 
following section reviews previous research examining 
views of EAI in such MAS-providing situations. 
Dermer. Evans and Pick r19711 
This Canadian study, one of the earliest to investigate 
the perceived compatibility of auditing and MAS, was 
targeted at 300 individuals, who because of their 
occupations (bankers, mutual fund managers, stock 
brokers etc. ) were deemed to be users of audited 
statements and so concerned with EAI - particularly 
with the concurrent provision of audit and MAS (as for 
Situation 13 of the present research questionnaire). 
Curiously, 60% of the respondents, had never even 
considered the potential incompatibility posed by the 
dual provision of auditing and MAS. A like number 
responded that their confidence in audit independence 
would in no way be affected by the auditor providing 
these dual services, while only 26% indicated a 
lessening of confidence and 14% were undecided. "In 
contrast, the comparable statistics of a similar US 
study (Schulte, 1965) were 43%, 33% and 24% 
respectively" (Dermer, Evans and Pick: 23]. 
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Titard r19711 
As in Situation 13 of this research, Titard examined 
the issue of EAI when audit services are accompanied by 
the provision of MAS. It updated Schulte's 1965ýstudy,, 
by sending a mail questionnaire to 220 users of audited 
statements, all of whom were employed by 
large institutional investors. The sample intentionally 
included only, the largest US financial institutions. 
After confirming that the majority of respondents did 
use audited financial statements and that they were 
aware of the concurrent dual provision of audit and MAS 
by some CPA firms to their audit clients, Titard asked 
whether providing MAS "might possibly result in a CPA 
losing some of his audit independence". 
The questionnaire included 33 specific types of MAS 
offered by CPA firms to their clients. Although he 
concluded that there was nogreat concern over the dual 
provision of audit services and MAS, 49% of respondents 
felt that when combined with audit services, at least 
one of the 33 MAS listed in Titard's questionnaire 
inhibited EAI. However, 42% did not believe that a loss 
of EAI would occur and 9% had no opinion at all. 
Conclusions put forth by Titard on the basis of his 
research included the following: 
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1. That there was more concern with the dual provision 
of accounting-type services by some auditors than 
with MAS services - (a finding with bearing to 
Situation 3 of the present research questionnaire). 
2. The auditing profession should inform members of the 
financial community what the former expects of those 
of its members who also who render MAS - (relevant 
to Situation 13 of the present questionnaire). 
Titard's general conclusion was that MAS and the 
appearance of independence was not a serious problem 
for the profession at that time. However, he cautioned 
(Titard, 1971: 24] that since society and the audit 
profession are ever changing,, his "should not be the 
final research on this topic", and that the profession 
must keep itself informed about the opinions of its 
most important client - the public. In UK terms, the 
present research is a response in that direction. 
Hartley and Ross r19721 
Within a MAS context, similar to that of Situation 13 
of the present research, Hartley and Ross surveyed 
practising CPAs, financial analysts, and senior 
financial executivesýin companies with annual audits. 
Thus, members of all three groups can be regarded as 
persons associated with audited financial statements. 
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After confirming that respondents viewed EAI as being 
"very important" and determining that they were aware 
of the MAS controversy, respondents were asked to state 
to what extent they felt a CPA's performance of MAS 
affects his audit independence. 
In total, just under half (48%) of all respondents 
believed that the provision of MAS decreased auditor 
independence. However, perhaps more expectedly, 77% of 
the financial analyst respondents believed it 
"decreases independence",, while in marked contrast, 
only 37% of the auditors responded in the same way. 
Thus, this study into EAI revealed that financial 
analysts perceived the rendering of MAS by auditors to 
be more of a threat to auditor, independence than did 
auditors themselves. 
Respondents were also asked to state if they agreed or 
disagreed with the view that even though MAS provision 
might appear to lead to a loss of auditor independence, 
the professional integrity of the auditor would provide 
a reasonably high assurance that EAI would not be lost. 
Again,, of the total respondents, 48% agreed with this 
statement. In terms of individual groupings, 77% of the 
CFAs and 37% of the CPAs agreed with the statement. 
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Thus, it was interesting to note that the same 
percentage of respondents from each classification who 
felt that MAS decreases auditor independence also 
believed that the integrity of the auditor prevented 
him from losing his independence. 
Rhode r19781 
This empirical study was done at the Berkeley campus of 
UCLA at the request of the CAR [1978]. It considered 
the "work environment" of the professional auditor and 
(inter alia) asked professional auditors for their 
views on EAI when MAS was also provided by the auditor. 
As with most of Rhode's findings, those relevant to 
here were consistent with traditional expectations. 
Thus, a substantial majority of the subjects did not 
believe that consulting, work performed by audit firms 
(the essence of Situation 13 in the present research) 
affected EAI, so contributing to substandard audits. 
Further, as Rhode's survey was conducted at the behest 
of the CAR, it is of interest to consider what the 
final report of the Commission stated in terms of the 
management advisory services controversy. in this 
context, the Commission stated that (CAR, 1978: 97] 
apart from the three (US) cases, brought to its 
attention by Professor Briloff (1976], its own 
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"analysis of legal cases did not disclose any 
other examples where (providing other nonaudit 
services has resulted in a loss of independence, 
and our survey (Rhode, 1978] of audit staff 
members failed to indicate any significant 
relationship between the provision of MAS and 
substandard audits. In addition, both AICPA 
committees that studied the issue, and one other 
researcher, Arthur Schulte, Jr., solicited 
evidence from a variety of groups without 
uncovering additional examples. " 
Reckers and Stagliano r1981al and r1981bj 
This study sought evidence not only on how the dual 
provision of audit and MAS affect perceptions of EAI, 
but also on the extent to which such nonaudit services 
were, in fact, being supplied. 
The data analysed came from the ASR-250 filings of 100 
randomly selected companies. For this sample, it was 
observed that the mean value of MAS fees earned by 
auditors was 32% of the relevant audit fee. The median 
value of this ratio was 17%, and 25% of companies paid 
more than 40% of their audit fee to their auditors for 
MAS. [Situation 13 of the present questionnaire (see 
Appendix B of Volume II) is one where MAS-related 
"billings have averaged 40% of the year's audit fee-"] 
The most common nonaudit services provided by auditors 
to their audit clients were taxation advice, actuarial 
and pension reviews, and the design of accounting 
systems, which on average attracted the highest fees. 
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These researchers also carried out a (case study) 
, 
questionnaire survey to determine the extent to which 
the provision of nonaudit services affects perceptions 
of auditor independence, and in particular, whether 
concern about the potential conflict between MAS and 
auditing decreased as relevant "familiarity with the 
nature of services offered" by auditors and the 
financial sophistication of the user increased -a view 
upheld by the CAR [1978: 96]. 
To that end, participants in this study were 50 
financial analysts (more sophisticated users) and fifty 
MBA students (less sophisticated users). Each 
participant received an identical set of 32 cases in 
which the percentage value of 5 specified nonaudit 
services provided by the auditor varied randomly with 
the value of audit services provided. Nevertheless, the 
percentage of any individual type of nonaudit services 
provided was limited to 12% of the audit fee, while the 
aggregate percentage of fees for nonaudit services 
provided, varied between 8% and 51%. 
In each of the 32 cases described, participants were 
asked to assess their confidence in the independence of 
the auditor on a percentage scale. As such, the 
researchers implicitly recognised that in a given case 
an auditor may or may not act independently. 
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Thus,, one method of assessing possible concern with the 
auditor's independence in each case would be to measure 
confidence in the likelihood that the auditor will be 
independent in his audit function, while providing 
nonaudit services. (An extremely similar approach was 
used for the present research questionnaire. ] 
The 5 nonaudit services assessed in the 32 cases were: 
1. Acquisition Search 
2. Pension and Actuarial Computation 
3. Systems Design 
4. Tax Planning 
5. Tax Preparation 
Consistent with the previously noted view of the CAR 
(1978: 96], the results strongly suggested that the 
"more sophisticated" group of users had greater 
confidence in the independence of the auditor than the 
"less sophisticated" group. The researchers concluded 
that overall neither group seemed particularly worried 
by the provision of nonaudit services (even when their 
value exceeded 30% of the relevant audit fee). 
Additionally, the "more sophisticated" group expressed 
a very high degree of confidence in the cPAIs ability 
to remain independent while providing nonaudit services 
in conjunction with audit services. 
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Panv and Reckers r19841 
These researchers also investigated the issue of the 
provision of nonaudit services. They noted that the 
AICPA (1981] Peer Review Manual proscribes members of 
the SEC Practice Section (i. e. those auditors that 
undertake audits of SEC registered clients) from 
performing the following types of nonaudit services for 
their SEC registered audit clients: 
Executive Recruitment 
2. Public Opinion Polls 
3. Merger and Acquisition (on a finder's fee basis) 
4. Psychological Testing 
5. Actuarial Computations for Insurance companies 
Against this background the researchers carried out a 
mail survey in order to provide evidence as to whether 
these services are perceived as being more or less 
harmful to auditor independence than other services, 
(such as say, systems design) which are not proscribed. 
[They also tested if a respondent's understanding of 
the audit affected his view of EAI, but as they are not 
germane, these results are not considered here. ] 
200 questionnaires were sent to financial analysts and 
another 200 to stockholders. 67 (33.5%) of the analysts 
and 46 (23%) of the stockholders replied. 
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Respondents evaluated EAI in each of ten sets of 
circumstances in which various nonaudit services were 
performed, either by an individual involved in the 
audit, or by a member of the auditor's associated 
management services department (though not by a 
separate but associated management consulting entity). 
However, the results showed that the distinction 
between whether a service was provided by the auditor 
or by the separate (but associated) MAS section was 
significant, with the adverse effect on EAI being 
reduced in the latter case. [It is interesting to note 
that this finding somewhat contrasts with Shockley 
(1981], who found that a separate MAS department had 
little effect on perceptions of EAI. ] 
The results also suggested that respondents had neither 
extreme confidence in, nor extreme concern with, the 
level of EAI when nonaudit services were concurrently 
provided by the auditor. 
There was little clear evidence that the particular 
nonaudit services proscribed by the AICPA, were seen as 
significantly more damaging to EAI than other nonaudit 
services. [In passing, one notes that none of the MAS 
proscribed by the SEC appear to be similarly proscribed 
either by law or professional ruling for UK auditors]. 
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3.2.2 Other issue based emRirical research 
In addition to examining EAI perceptions surrounding 
the MAS controversy, some of the above researchers also 
addressed similar issues that may be of consequence 
when shaping such perceptions. To the extent that such 
issues are common to those also addressed in the 
present questionnaire, their relevant findings are 
presented and discussed below. 
Discounts - Situation 14 
In his research, Rhode (1978] also addressed the issue 
of an auditor accepting gifts from clients and the 
purchase by them of clients' products at discounts not 
available to the general public. 
In a sense, one may regard the receipt of an 
unwarranted or unusual discount as receiving a gift and 
in that context, gifts and discounts may be considered 
to be of the same ilk. Thus, even though the present 
research questionnaire does not directly address the 
question of the auditor receiving gifts, that feature 
is nevertheless discussed further. 
The basis of Rhode's research in this direction was the 
contention that, whether or not such practices cause an 
actual or real loss of independence, they are likely to 
lead others to believe that EAI had in fact decreased. 
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Indeed, a majority of Rhode's respondents felt that the 
acceptance of gifts does affect an auditor's ability to 
resist pressures on his professional judgement. In fact 
76% of respondents agreed that there was always an 
effect, or that there was an effect depending upon the 
scale of the gift. 
The facts of Situation 14 of the present research 
questionnaire refer to an audit firm accepting 
auditorship of a printing company on a beneficial trade 
discount arrangement. Thus, unlike the situation - 
researched by Rhode, the discount here is directed more 
at the firm rather than the individual auditor(s). 
Nevertheless, Rhode's findings are pertinent. He 
determined that a majority of the respondents (57%) 
believed that purchases at discounts not available to 
the public generally, adversely affected an auditor's 
ability to resist pressure to subordinate his or her 
professional judgement. 
A similar study by Pany and Reckers (1980] also 
explored the perceived effect of client gifts and 
discounts on auditor independence, in the light of the 
Rhode survey carried out at the behest of the CAR. The 
survey sought views on the issue from both practising 
(CPAs) auditors and registered stockholders. 
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The research questionnaire, sent to 480 registered 
stockholders, identified four levels of gifts or 
discounts (no gifts, $3, $40, $125), set against two 
possible percentages (1% and 10%) of fee income derived 
from the client in question. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate, on a graded scale, 
the auditor's ability to resist client pressure to act 
unprofessionally, when judged against specified 
backgrounds (relating to various "mixes" of level of 
gifts or discounts and percentage of audit fee income). 
The Pany and Reckers graded response scale (whose two 
extreme points were "strong belief" and "strong 
disbelief") had seven points (the same number as that 
used in the response scales for the present research) 
for respondents to register their degree of agreement 
(or not) with the statement made in the questionnaire. 
Notwithstanding the low 26% response rate (a problem 
with most mail surveys) responses to the research 
questionnaire, showed that as gift size increased, 
stockholders became more concerned with the auditor's 
independence. However, it was observed that the 
percentage of fee income generated by the audit client 
did not have any significant effect on the perceptions 
of auditor independence by respondents. 
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The survey also revealed that with respect to the 1,126 
CPAs who responded, that: 
1.32% worked for a firm where there was no rule 
prohibiting the acceptance of gifts from clients 
2.66% worked for a firm where there was no rule 
prohibiting the use of client discount facilities. 
Time and Budget Pressure - Situations 11 and 10 
one of the important aspects examined in the study of 
Rhode (1978] was designed to see whether the auditor's 
time pressures (be they inspired as a consequence of 
(unrealistic? ] tight fee budgets - as is the case in 
Situation 10, or extremely stringent reporting 
requirements - as is the case in Situation 11 of the 
present research) were affecting their professional 
integrity and objectivity. If this were so, auditor 
independence may be impaired. 
The study (CAR, 1978: 116] revealed some alarming 
f acts: 
1158% of (auditor) respondents had signed for 
completing audit steps (not covered by another 
compensating step) when they had not performed 
the work. Of the several deficiencies revealed by 
the survey, the Commission believes that this is 
the most serious" 
1156% of auditor respondents believed that audit 
programs and time budgets are unduly influenced 
by client-negotiated fees. Further, pressures to 
meet time budgets also cause approximately 52% of 
respondents in the profession ... to complete (audit) work on their own time without reporting 
the chargeable hours. " 
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These facts assume even more serious dimensions when 
one reads that the survey [CAR, 1978: 116] "directly 
identified time-budget pressure as a primary cause of 
substandard audits". The Commission summarises the 
views of respondents to this survey by stating that, 
"in summary, the profit motive, competition among 
firms, and the need to attract new clients and 
keep existing ones are, in the opinion of the 
respondents to the survey, emphasised too much. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
excessive competition producing low fees can 
cause unrealistic budgets and that such budgets 
can increase substandard performance. " 
staff crossover - situation 9 
Rhode 1978 
Pressures to complete an audit within time constraints 
may manifest itself in forms other than signing for 
audit steps not in fact completed. In situations where 
senior management are ex-employees of the audit firm in 
question (a staff "crossover"), it is alleged, that on 
occasions more junior audit staff are "pressured" by 
ones more senior, to accept without due verification, 
representations and assurances of such management. 
In turn, worries about advancements and survival on the 
job by such junior staff are alleged to cause them to 
do so. Thus Professor Rhode was mindful to obtain if 
EAI was in fact being impaired by such a "pragmatic" 
audit approach, and one part of Professor Rhode's 
survey addressed itself to this possibility. 
95 
While the survey did not reveal a widespread occurrence 
of such a feature,, a very low number of the subjects 
responding believed there was pressure from supervisors 
of audit firms on less junior members of the firm to 
accept (prima-facie) the representations made by either 
former members of the audit firm now employed by the 
client, or by executives placed with the client 
following an executive search by the audit firm. 
Imhoff r19781 
In recognition that the practice of staff crossovers 
appeared to be not infrequent, Imhoff's research 
concerned itself with this very specific aspect of EAI. 
It focused exclusively on the practice of professional 
auditors in (the then) Big-Eight firms leaving to take 
senior financial positions with their audit clients, 
and the effect that practice had on perceptions of 
external auditor independence. 
Regrettably, Imhoff's survey lacked the support of six 
of these audit firms and so the assessed data was 
severely restricted. What data that became available 
was thus restricted to certain offices of the two Big- 
Eight participating firms. Nevertheless, it showed that 
out of 258 audit staff leaving these offices in a 
particular year, 42 (app. 16%) took up positions with 
clients on whose audit they had previously worked. 
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To test the effect of such employment moves on 
respondents' perceptions of auditor independence, a 
survey of CPAs (auditor-group) and bankers and analysts 
(user groups) was undertaken. This showed that a 
majority of all groups questioned independence only if 
the employee had been engaged on the client's audit in 
a supervisory role within the last six months. 
However, a minority of respondents, more significant in 
the two user groups than the CPA group, expressed 
concern as to the effect on audit independence of moves 
by more junior audit staff, even when accompanied by a 
longer elapsed time interval between engagement by the 
audit client and service in the audit team charged with 
the audit of the client in question. 
3.2.3 Situation based-empirical research 
The present research is very much of the situation 
based type of empirical research, in that within 
specified audit scenarios or situations, it researches 
relevant views of confidence in the external auditor - 
and in so doing his professional independence. 
Thus, the present research is of the same genre as that 
conducted by Lavin (1974], Firth (1980 and 1981-1j, 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1981a and 1982]. Moore [1983], 
Badran [19831 and Agacer [1987]. 
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Indeed, the conceptual genesis of the present research 
owes something to these previous research studies and 
shares many features in common with them. Thus, these 
studies are reviewed individually in the next section 
with some of their more detailed findings noted in the 
(questionnaire development) context of Chapter 6. 
Lavin r19741 
The main thrust of Lavin's research compared the 
requirements of the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics 
with the SEC position on EAI as expressed in ASR 126. 
Its purpose was to provide empirical evidence on the 
existence of differences in opinion regarding the 
concept of independence between accountants themselves, 
and between accountants and financial statement users. 
Equally, the research sought to determine whether the 
financial statement users' perceptions of EAI (or lack 
of it), had an effect on related business decisions. 
Twelve situations describing relationships between 
auditors (CPAs) and their clients were used as the 
basis of the questionnaire. Each of these twelve 
(hypothetical) situations were essentially drawn from 
ASR 126, the SEC document issued in 1972 which provided 
illustrations of 39 situations in which an auditor may 
or may not be independent (i. e. EAI was suspect). 
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The situations selected by Lavin included those in 
which the SEC considered it likely that independence 
would be impaired but which, at that time, the AICPA 
considered to be compatible with an objective opinion. 
The hypothetical situations included rela- 
as the provision of book-keeping services 
client by the auditor, and the renting of 
from the auditor by the audit client. The 
was mailed to three sample groups and 390 
replies were received. 
tionships such 
to the audit 
computer time 
questionnaire 
usable 
The first sample group consisted of CPAs listed in the 
1972 AICPA members register. The second sample group 
was made up of bankers selected from banks listed in a 
Bank directory and the third sample group was selected 
from brokerage houses listed in "Finance". 
The samples were based on the fact that financial 
analysts (concerned with investments) and loan officers 
(concerned with loans) almost always use audited 
statements when making financial decisions. 
Lavin's study examined only one independent variable in 
detail - the effect a financial decision maker's 
perceptions of the auditor's professional independence 
would have on a related financial decision. 
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Lavin based his research on the belief that those 
respondents who perceived the auditor to be lacking in 
independence might permit that perception to adversely 
impair a financial prospect. Conversely, the views of 
those respondents who perceived the auditor not to be 
lacking in independence, would not affect adversely or 
may even improve, a financial prospect. 
Generally, financial analysts perceived the auditor's 
EAI as having less of an effect on their investment 
decision than loan officers on their lending decision. 
Further analysis showed that for the majority of cases 
there was a consensus of opinion within each group 
(particularly the CPA and Loan officer groups). The 
findings with respect to some of the twelve research 
situations showed that: 
1. The CPA group showed marginally more concern with a 
possible lack of independence with regard to 
book-keeping services than the bankers and brokers. 
2. Two of the financial statement user groups (bankers 
and brokers) did consider that the acceptance of a 
promissory note in payment of the audit fee impaired 
independence, whereas there was no cpA consensus on 
this issue. 
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3. No group considered the provision of computer time 
to impair professional auditor independence. 
Although respondents did not concur entirely with the 
SEC's or the AICPA's position, they tended to concur 
more with the AICPA than the SEC. Nevertheless, within 
the CPA group there was a significantly different 
response between members of Big-Eight auditors, who 
were more inclined to follow the SEC's view, and 
members of smaller firms, who were not so inclined. 
Firth r19801 and r19811 
In addition to these research studies being situation 
based (as is the present research), the summaries of 
the two following studies by Firth are interesting 
because they appear to be the earliest attempts of 
empirical research into the subject of EAI in the UK. 
Firth r19801 
This mail study examined the role and importance of EAI 
as perceived by various individuals in the UK who would 
normally be concerned with the issue. In setting the 
context for the study Firth briefly reviewed the 
regulatory environment for auditor independence as set 
up by the professional accounting bodies in the UK. 
Then differences in perceptions of EAI according to job 
roles were hypothesised. 
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The questionnaire postulated 29 auditor-client 
relationships and major groups of interested parties 
were asked whether these relationships were likely to 
impair or improve investment and lending decisions. 750 
individuals from the groups identified below were 
randomly selected as sample respondents and asked to 
assume the role of investor and lender when responding. 
The prime thrust of the analysis was to examine if 
there were any significant differences between the EAI 
perceptions, and therefore the lending decisions, of 
individuals within. the job roles listed below, given 
that all other data and relationships were the same. 
1. CAs grouped by those working in: 
A Big-Eight firm 
b) Any other professional accounting practice 
c) Industry or commerce 
2. Financial analysts 
Bank credit officers 
The study achieved a 50% response rate and showed that 
in general non-independence was perceived to impair 
investment/loan decisions, a finding supported by the 
traditional view of EAI which states that total auditor 
independence lends itself to total credibility, while 
impaired independence leads to impaired credibility. 
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(Exceptionally, in a very few situations, a small 
number of respondents felt non-independence might even 
improve the prospects of an investment/loan decision]. 
The results also showed that there were significant 
differences between the various respondent groups as to 
what constitutes professional EAI and its importance. 
In general, qualified accountants working outside the 
auditing profession, analysts, and bankers were much 
less prepared than practising auditors to accept 
certain of the specified relationships as independent. 
There was, however, some variances in the responses 
between the two audit groups - the (then) Big-Eight and 
nonBig-Eight professionals, the former being less 
tolerant than the latter of the EAI suggested in some 
of the auditor-client relationships considered. 
Response differences were in line with those expected, 
given the roles of the groups. Those with the most to 
lose from the implementation of restrictions, 
accountants practising as professional auditors, 
thought auditors could maintain independence in many 
situations where others thought independence would be 
impaired. Further, accountants in practice often 
perceived breaches of EAI to be of a lesser importance 
in their investment decisions than the other groups. 
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In general, the views of accountants in practice were 
similar to those of the major British professional 
accounting bodies, while the users of financial 
statements were often more sceptical. 
The results showed few significant group differences 
for situations judged to have an "independent" auditor. 
However, there were significant differences in the 
importance scores attached to those situations where 
the auditor was judged "not independent". 
Thus,, an interesting finding generated as a by-product 
of such differences in the study was the reported 
importance placed by the analysts group and the bankers 
group (Firth, 1980: 461-462] on the presence of an 
independent audit report. 
"Specifically, financial analysts and bank loan 
officers gave lower importance scores for "not 
independent" situations than did accountants in 
public practice. Although all groups perceived 
"not independent" situations as reducing the loan 
and credit potential of a firm, the users of 
financial statements viewed such auditor-client 
relationships more seriously. " 
The year after this study was reported, Firth published 
the results of a similar study - an examination of 
which follows. This later study was also situation 
based, but offered for consideration in an EAI context, 
only 9 of the 29 auditor-client relationships set out 
in the questionnaire of the 198o study. 
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Firth r19811 
This study assessed the effect of bankers' loan 
decisions, consequent to their views of EAI within nine 
specific situations. A sample group of 1700 bankers, 
all of whom were members of the UK Institute of 
Bankers, were sent a set of audited statements for a 
hypothetical company and asked to participate in the 
research. 74% of them provided usable responses. 
800 respondents from the selected sample were provided 
with two types of financial statements. The first type 
was predicated on an auditor-client relationship of 
complete EAI. This type was used as a control group. 
The second type was predicated on and described one of 
nine particular auditor-client relationship where 
independence may be impaired. Thus, relationships 
described in the second type of statements were ones 
where individual perceptions may or may not be judged 
to impair auditor independence. 900 respondents 
received only the second type of financial statements. 
In all cases, the financial statements carried an 
unqualified or "clean" audit report. The audit reports 
of some financial statements were based on an 
independent auditor-client relationship, while those of 
the others may not necessarily have been so. 
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Responding bankers were then asked to state the maximum 
amount of money they would be prepared to lend the 
company or companies whose financial statements they 
had been sent and assessed. 
The results were studied to see if there were any 
significant differences between the loan responses for 
companies with perceived "independent" and those with 
perceived "non-independent" auditor-client 
relationships. They (Firth, 1981: 187] 
"showed that seven of the nine relationships 
described in the questionnaire reduced the 
bankers' perceived confidence in the company's 
statements and that significantly lower loans 
were granted in these situations than if the 
company had an independent audit. " 
Additionally, Firth concluded that five of these seven 
"non-independent" relationships would be considered to 
be independent by the major British professional 
auditing bodies. 
His general conclusion was that the study revealed some 
discrepancy between the views on EAI of, on the one 
hand the ICAEW/ICAS and the perceived decision making 
of UK bankers on the other - implying that the ethical 
standards afforded to UK bankers by the UK audit 
profession fall short of those expected by these 
bankers. on that basis, one might read into such 
findings the beginnings of a UK audit expectations gap. 
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Dvkxhoorn and Sinning r19811 and r19821 
Much of the literature surrounding the issue of auditor 
I 
independence outside the UK and USA relates to (then) 
West Germany, and has been put forth by Dykxhoorn and 
sinning. 
Dykxhoorn's interest in the subject stems from his 
doctoral thesis [Dykxhoorn, 1978) at Michigan State 
University. His concern, and that of Sinning's, in the 
subject lay in the volume of US investment in West 
Germany, often by way of a West German subsidiary 
company whose financial statements were audited not by 
US auditors, but by "Wirtschaftspruefer" (WP), the 
German equivalent of US CPAs or UK CAs. 
German financial statements are often consolidated into 
the financial statements of a US parent corporation, 
and to that extent, investors in the US rely on audit 
practices, customs and conventions in another country,, 
i. e. Germany. However, often Us investors may not be 
fully aware of such foreign practices and conventions 
and the implications attached to them. 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning contend that if foreign financial 
statements are to be consolidated into those of a US 
parent, then the foreign auditors must comply with the 
SEC requirement that auditors be independent. 
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The 1981 study was essentially a survey to determine WP 
perceptions of auditor independence, while the 1982 
paper investigated the impact of perceptions of auditor 
independence on investment and loan decisions of West 
German bankers. 
The 1981 study encompassed a virtual replication of 
Lavin's work in the context of studying the perceptions 
of EAI of WPs. The questionnaire that was the basis of 
the study listed ten auditor-client relationships for 
which the SEC position on auditor independence was 
known in ASR 126. Nine of these relationships were 
considered by the SEC to compromise independence. 
The questionnaire was mailed to a random sample of WPS 
in Germany and sample subjects were asked to indicate 
for each situation whether they considered the relevant 
auditor independent or not. 
The results of the questionnaire showed that, on the 
whole, German auditors take a less strict view of EAI 
than the SEC. By a narrow majority, the WPs considered 
only one of the ten relationships described to impair 
independence. There was however, evidence to suggest 
that WPs affiliated to firms carrying out US subsidiary 
audits had perceptions of independence closer to those 
of the SEC than other WPs. 
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Dykxhoorn and Sinning's 1982 study also employed a 
questionnaire and respondents were asked to assess the 
independence (or otherwise) of each of a set of 
auditor-client relationships. Respondents were also 
asked to indicate on a five-point verbal scale (i. e. 
not numbered) the effect of the relationship on their 
investment or loan decision. 
The results showed that there was a significant 
correlation between the independence assessment and the 
conclusion generated on the investment or loan 
decisions. Perceptions of non-independence were clearly 
associated with a negative effect on the investment and 
loan decisions and vice-versa. 
The authors suggest that, since the SEC rules on 
independence are, with minor exceptions, applicable to 
all auditors of SEC registrants, it is important that 
foreign auditors be made aware of the SEC rulings 
concerning auditor independence. 
other situation based studies 
The above situation-based research of Lavin, Firth and 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning have been more closely examined 
because they appear to be the first major studies in a 
US, UK and European c ontextf respectively, of EAI 
within specified auditor-client relationships. 
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However there have been other situation based studies. 
For instance, in a US context, one might mention the 
work of Pearson (1979] which examined the EAI construct 
with specific reference to Big-Eight auditors. Of equal 
interest is the research contribution of Moore (1983], 
who considered on a research basis, the MAS debate, 
auditor rotation and peer review. 
As examples in a more international context, one might 
refer to the work of Badran [1983] (which examines EAI 
views of Egyptian auditors) and Agacer [1987]. Agacer's 
research is truly international in that it is a cross- 
cultural study of EAI in Germany, Philippines and USA. 
While Agacer's research is not strictly situation- 
based, it presents audit scenarios (akin to audit 
situations) evolved from various "mixes" of Shockley's 
EAI influencing variables - and offers these scenarios 
for consideration in terms of EAI perceived therein. 
3.2.4 Other empirical-research 
In addition to the MAS based and situation based 
research into EAI, there is a third type of empirical 
research that cannot be appropriately classified as 
either of the two identified. Two such research 
contributions, having a bearing on the present research 
are noted below. 
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Shocklev r19811 
The theoretical assessment of auditor independence 
undertaken by Shockley suggested to him that there were 
four main factors likely to influence auditor 
independence. 
These factors were: 
1. The level of competition for auditing services. 
2. The provision of MAS (i. e. nonaudit services). 
The size of the audit firm. 
The length of the auditor's tenure in office. 
Shockley used a mail questionnaire and sent it to a 
sample from: 
1. Professional auditors (CPAs) in practice within: 
a) A Big-Eight audit firm 
b) A nonBig-Eight audit firm 
2. Financial analysts 
3. Bank credit officers 
The overall results suggested thatrespondents saw the 
first three factors (level of competition within the 
auditing profession, provision of MAS, and the size of 
the audit firm) as likely to impair auditor 
independence, whereas the last factor (the number of 
years the audit firm has been auditor to the client) 
was not seen as significant in this context. 
ill 
on the basis that the larger the audit firm, the more 
likely is it to act independently, the size of the 
audit firm was not seen as significant by nonBig-Eight 
firm respondents, whereas respondents from Big-Eight 
firms deemed this factor to be very significant. 
Given that Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight auditors were in 
effect commenting'on themselves, the findings stated in 
the preceding paragraph may have been somewhat expected 
or anticipated. 
However respondents from nonBig-Eight attributed more 
importance to the degree of competition in the auditing 
profession and the provision of MAS as negatively 
influencing EAI than those from Big-Eight firms. 
Shockley did not find that the views of financial 
statement users group (i. e. bankers and financial 
analysts) were less tolerant of relationships and 
factors likely to affect EAI than those of the auditor 
groups (i. e. from Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight firms). 
Nevertheless, he did observe that the views of the Big- 
Eight auditor group tended to coincide with those of 
the banker group, whereas the opinions of the nonBig- 
Eight auditor group tended to be the same or at least 
similar to those held by the financial analyst group. 
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Amernic and Aranva r19811 
This study is important because it concentrated on 
examining perceptions of EAI as held by professional 
auditors in Canada. In that sense, there is a parallel 
to the similar Big-Six v nonBig-Six assessment done 
later in this research (Chapter 11). 
Amernic and Aranyals research dwelt on the individual 
auditor's own perception of the degree to which he/she 
considered him(her)self to be independent. Respondents 
were all registered professional auditors (members of 
the CICA), though not all were engaged as such. 
This Amernic and Aranya research focused on two 
structural factors which (inter alia) may potentially 
affect EAI. These two factors were the size of the 
audit firm and an individual auditor's level in the 
professional hierarchy established therein. 
The basic findings were that in general, public 
I accountants in larger firms perceive CAs generally and 
they themselves as being more independent than do 
smaller firm practitioners. 
It also appeared that senior practitioners (i. e. at 
higher levels in the firm hierarchy) saw themselves as 
more independent than less senior auditors. 
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Significantly, partners perceived that CAs in general 
and they themselves are more independent than did CA 
firm employees. In addition, there was the suggestion 
that they rejected the acceptability of modifying one's 
standards of independence to a slightly greater degree 
than do CA firm employees. 
The study suggested that there is a differential 
distribution of, and attitudes towards, independence 
among auditors in firms of varying sizes and at varying 
ranks. Partners appeared to be "more independent" than 
employees, and large firm practitioners appeared to be 
"more independent" than smaller firm practitioners. 
ICAS r19871 
One further UK study is pertinent to some of the 
aspects of EAI researched in the present context. 
This empirical research was undertaken by the ICAS in 
the autumn of 1986 and its results made public in 
January 1987. 
The research instrument was a simple questionnaire 
containing five questions, each posed against the 
background of a statement on EAI arising from the DTI's 
(1986] Consultative Document entitled "Regulation of 
Auditors". Respondents chosen for the questionnaire 
were the chairmen of the Top 1000 UK companies. 
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The results unearthed no great concern with present 
practice surrounding EAI. Some mild uneasiness was made 
apparent, but it was certainly not of the magnitude to 
warrant radical change to the present order. 
In general, respondents were not perturbed with EAI in 
the UK and did not see two of the proposals set out in 
the DTI's Document (fixed term appointments for and 
automatic rotation of auditors) as necessary. 
While there was some variation amongst the responses 
from the chairmen of the 571 companies (from the Top 
1000 UK companies) who responded to the questionnaire, 
in general the responses showed that a significant 
majority of respondents (at least 70% in every case and 
quartile of the Top 1000 UK companies) believed that: 
1. There was no need for any detailed legislation on 
(auditor) independence to safeguard against any 
conflicts of interest that may arise. 
2. Auditors should be allowed to provide audit clients 
with services in addition to the audit (i. e. MAS) 
3. The independence of auditors was not prejudiced bY 
the provision of management consultancy services to 
audit clients. 
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4. Fixed terms of office would not increase the 
independence of auditors, at least not to an extent 
that could justify the extra cost. 
5. Regular rotation of auditors would not bring 
significant benefits to the British economy. 
3.3 Chapter summarv 
By necessity this chapter provides only the main 
ingredients of previous important research into EAI 
sharing elements in common with this present research. 
Thus the review is not intended to be a comprehensive 
summary of all theoretical and empirical research work 
previously conducted in terms of EAI. 
The research review shows that in the earlier stages of 
the controversy surrounding EAI, the debate focused 
almost only on its MAS dimension [Dermer, Evans and 
Pick, 1971 and Titard, 1971]. 
However the research arena seems to have widened in the 
early 1980s, with researchers (Pearson, 1979 and Firth, 
1980 and 1981] recognising EAI can be vulnerable in a 
variety of auditor-client situations and so attempting 
to obtain perceptions of it within these situations 
(perhaps an implicit recognition of the multi-faceted 
nature of EAI). 
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In general, the research showed that auditors tend to 
be more confident of their ability to preserve their 
professional EAI than users of their services. Indeed, 
all relevant studies revealed some concern by users 
when auditors provide both audit and MAS. 
While user groups revealed a degree of commonality in 
terms of their perceptions of EAI, their views on all 
researched aspects EAI were not identical. Equally, 
significant differences of views were noted between 
auditors from (then) Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight firms. 
The research review also shows that the subject of EAI 
(specifically within the context of the audit 
expectations gap) has not really been addressed in the 
UK - and certainly as not as-much as it has in the US. 
This apparent non-attention to external auditor 
independence within a UK empirical context - despite 
the issue being central to the whole profession of 
auditing, provides much of the motivation behind and 
rationale for the present research. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CALL TO RESEARCH EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
The previous chapter provided a summary of research 
(mainly empirical and US) into EAI. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explain why EAI should be researched at 
this time - to present the case for researching EAI. 
The case for researching EAI is based mainly on three 
sets of considerations. Firstly, the paucity of UK- 
based empirical research. Secondly, the consequences of 
not conducting research into EAI, and thirdly the 
growing frequency with which current standards of 
auditor independence are criticised and questioned. 
Thus, the first section of the chapter laments the 
scarcity of UK-based research on the subject and the 
second section of the chapter outlines possible 
consequences of not conducting research into EAI. 
The third section has two major segments. The first 
highlights the growing frequency with which EAI is 
criticised and considers some of the possible causes 
provoking such concern. Then, to demonstrate that EAI 
is a "live" issue, the second segment presents recent 
instances where EAI may have been impaired and recent 
criticisms made of it by members of differing groups. 
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4.1 The paucity of UK-based empirical research 
Given the importance of EAI to the auditing profession, 
it is surprising how little theoretical examination has 
been done on it. Even less UK-based empirical research 
has been done. only two empirically based academic 
studies in the UK are noted in the literature, and both 
are from the same author, i. e. Firth [1980 and 1981]. 
Thus when one considers that the very structure of the 
auditing profession rests on its ability to proclaim 
itself as being independent, that fact is alarming. 
Thus the prime case for research into EAI in the UK, is 
that it has received scant attention of that nature. 
While auditors manifestly continue to research their 
technical methods and procedures, regrettably no major 
profession driven studies on EAI are at hand. CICAS, 
1987 and LSCA, 1988) are essentially surveys. ] However, 
given the importance of EAI to the profession, in the 
long run, the lack of it, may be more damaging to the 
profession than deficient technical standards. 
Even when the profession does conduct research, it is 
accused of providing little evidence to support claims 
of empirical analysis. Rather, the approach has usually 
been to establish committees who tend to focus on the 
views of practising auditors (e. g. ICAEW, 1986). 
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In'similar vein, Sikka (1987: 23] berates the fact that 
"hardly any steps are taken to ascertain the views of 
the users of audit opinions, and consequently very 
little is learnt about user anxieties and their 
perceptions of an audit and auditors. " 
Sikka carries on to question whether an audit 
"monopoly" created by the state can justifiably 
continue if the views of the users (consumers) of audit 
services are constantly ignored. Consequently, he 
suggests that research should be undertaken to 
establish what the EAI views of UK users of audited 
statements are. 
4.2 Consequences of EAI not being researched 
Research into EAI should be undertaken on the grounds 
that if it were not conducted, then some unwelcome (in 
the eyes of the audit profession) consequences might 
follow. Such consequences are likely to see a loss of 
the (virtually) self-regulating character that the 
profession in the UK has long guarded and enjoyed. 
The consequences of not conducting research into EAI 
can be seen from three distinct dimensions, as below: 
1. The UK government dimension 
2. The audit profession dimension 
3. The European Community dimension 
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The UK government dimension 
The UK government has manifest a willingness to get 
involved in accounting and auditing matters if the 
audit profession is unable to put its own house in 
order. Witness its stands on fraud and inflation 
accounting. Alternatively, the government may involve 
itself more with audit matters and in doing so move 
towards a state controlled audit board. 
The mere fact that some of these possibilities are 
mentioned by the DTI [1986) in its Consultative 
Document, gives an indication that such approaches are 
at least being considered at governmental level. 
The audit profession dimension 
Professional auditing bodies have a strong vested 
interest in EAI and in particular in its appearance. If 
outside parties doubt the independence of auditors, 
then a number of possibilities may arise. 
Such possibilities are likely to be against the 
self-interest of the professional bodies and individual 
auditing firms. For instance, audits may begin to be 
seen as valueless and so audit work and audit fees 
would disappear. Another possibility is that stock 
exchanges and/or other large institutional investors 
may become more closely involved in auditing matters. 
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This outside involvement could result in lower earnings 
for auditors and would lessen the self-regulatory 
powers of the professional auditing bodies and their 
members. 
Recognising the impact of such possibilities, some 
efforts have been made by the UK audit profession to 
forestall them by issuing revised (updated) Ethical 
Guidelines [ICAEW, 1987] to which members must adhere. 
The European Community dimension 
When researching EAI, sight must not be lost of the 
European dimension - one that will be very evident in 
the UK after implementation of the Single European Act. 
The years post-1992 will see moves towards a European 
audit profession, when EC citizens will be free to 
engage in their professions all over the EC (Mutual 
Recognition Directive - effective January 41 1991). 
While legal provisions can be made to ensure that 
professionals from other EC countries acquire the 
relevant UK knowledge and experience, there is 
presently no method to ensure that the audit 
professional who arrives in the UK from another EC 
country, will adhere to ethical norms woven into the UK 
cultural fabric (e. g. Agacer, 1987], as opposed to 
those prescribed by statute or professional guidelines. 
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Thus before devising methods to ensure compliance, 
research should first be undertaken to establish what 
such norms are, and how they are perceived by persons 
affected by them. This is particularly true of EAI. 
Consequently, research into EAI should be undertaken in 
order to help evolve a harmonious pan-EC audit 
environment in that respect. 
4.3 summary review of EAI in the UK 
4.3.1 The increasingfrequency of EAI criticisms 
Even though Berryman (1974) traces UK legal attention 
to EAI as far back as the 1845 English Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act, expression of any major 
concern with it is of relatively recent appearance. 
Thus, concern with the question of external auditor 
independence has grown since the late 1960s. Davison 
(1977: 87] maintains that to some degree this may be 
attributed to the fact that: 
"a large proportion of the recent Department of 
Trade investigations into company frauds and 
company bankruptcies have criticised auditing 
firms regarding standards and firmness in dealing 
with company chairmen of strong personality. Some 
of these investigations have concluded that the 
auditors had not exercised independence in their 
work. " 
Thus,, in recent years, UK auditors (in particular their 
professional independence) and their relationships with 
their audit clients have been the subject of increasing 
scrutiny and criticism. 
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In the main, this has been due to the failure of major 
companies shortly after they have received clean bills 
of health in the form of "unqualified" audit reports. 
Such events have raised eyebrows, if not suspicions, so 
as to allege that individual auditors may have 
compromised their positions of independence. (The 
important distinction between audit failure and 
business failure is assumed and so not clarified here. ) 
A few examples of recent UK company (bank) failures 
(though until now not proven audit failures) are De 
Lorean [1981], Johnson Matthey Bankers (1987], Polly 
Peck [1990], British & Commonwealth (1990], BCCI Bank 
(1991] and even more recently Maxwell Communications 
Corporation [1991]. 
However, one must reiterate that while all the above 
are cases of business failure only, they have not 
helped improve perceptions held by interested parties 
of auditors generally and EAI in particular. However, 
there is presently still no evidence to prove 
impairment of EAI in any of these cases. 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to infer that the 
concern of public and professional (regulatory) bodies 
with EAI is partly a result of their perception of some 
prima-facie evidence of the lack of EAI in such cases. 
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In their consultative document "Regulation of 
Auditors", the DTI [1986] noted some concern about a 
possible conflict with EAI arising from the provision 
of MAS and other selected auditor-client relationships. 
The document [DTI, 1986: 32-33] issued to elicit views 
on possible UK legislation so as to reshape the audit 
profession to conform with the EC's Eighth Directive, 
called for research on specific aspects of EAI saying 
that such points for consideration would include: 
"a) the extent, if any, to which there may be a 
conflict between independence and objectivity 
and attempts to gain new business by. offering 
reduced rates or other benefits to potential 
clients 
b) whether more specific rules should be 
developed relating to any financial interests 
held by an auditor in the affairs of an 
audited company 
c) whether there is a need for rules regulating 
situations where there is a close family or 
personal connection between an auditor and 
one or more of the directors of a client 
company 
d) whether rules which disqualify one member of 
a firm from carrying out a particular audit 
should not similarly disqualify the firm as a 
whole 
e) generally, whether rules on independence 
should not state Positively what is required 
of approved auditors rather than merely 
outline what should not be done. " 
Given such concern, UK audit bodies in acknowledging 
the importance of EAI have reacted by re-formulating 
and revising their ethical guidelines (ICAEW, 1987]. 
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While it is also important to identify manifestations 
of instances where EAI may have been impaired, it is of 
more consequence to search for possible reasons as to 
why perceptions of impaired EAI might arise. The next 
section considers such reasons on a macro-level. 
4.3.2 Macro-level criticisms of EAI 
In situations where observers believe EAI has been 
compromised, at a macro-level one might observe that a 
basis for such perceived compromise lies in one or more 
of the following main causes, each considered in turn: 
1. imprecise understanding of EAI and its nature 
2. conflicting views on the role of the auditor 
3. alleged secrecy when developing professional codes 
4. plethora of acceptable accounting treatments 
5. cultural diversity 
Imprecise understanding of EAI and its nature 
The very notion of "Independence" itself is somewhat 
nebulous and not uniformly perceived. This is seen in 
the variety of interpretations and/or explanations that 
have been offered for the concept and, as an indication 
of the same, some are repeated below: 
"In the auditor-firm conflict situation, the 
power of the firm can be represented by its 
ability to influence the audit or report of the 
auditor. The independence of the auditor can be 
represented by the auditor's ability to withstand 
such influence" (Nichols and Price, 1976: 336) 
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"By definition, there is perfect independence 
when the conditional probability that the auditor 
will report a discovered breach is one. " (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1981: 7] 
"The concept of independence implies freedom from 
control and domination by another party. It 
implies impartiality and the absence of bias in 
the gathering of evidence, interpretation of 
evidence and opinion formulation. The auditor as 
an independent party must be willing to and be in 
a strong position to insist on that course of 
action which his professional judgement urges is 
the appropriate one in the circumstances. " 
(Berryman, 1974: 10] 
"Essentially an attitude of mind characterised by 
integrity and an objective approach to 
professional work. " [ICAEW, 1987: 9] 
"Professional independence is a concept 
fundamental to the accountancy profession 
requiring integrity in and an objective approach 
to professional work. " CICAA, 1984: 23061) 
"the concept of independence ... is fundamental 
'" because it implies an objective analysis of ýhe 
situation by a disinterested third party. " 
(SEC,, 1972 - ASR 126]. 
One notes from the above that, in a strict sense, 
there is not one all-comprehensive definition of 
auditor independence. It would be practical and 
useful to have one. In turn, that calls for research 
and close study of the nature of EAI. It is because 
of the variety in views about and definitions of 
auditor independence, that research is called for. 
The nature of EAI does not appear to be uniformly 
nor universally understood. Thus, research should be 
conducted to assess where these pockets of ignorance 
and/or misunderstanding lie. 
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Conflicting views on the role of the auditor 
However even when research has been undertakenj 
researchers have sometimes arrived at conflicting 
I 
conclusions. 
For example, the Metcalf Committee [1977] concluded 
that EAI was impaired when auditors supplied MAS to 
clients. AICPA committees however, have concluded 
that whereas these services may appear to impair 
EAI, they generally do not. 
one reason why such differing conclusions have been 
arrived at may be the different definitions of 
external auditor independence employed by the 
researching committees. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1981: 1] contend that these 
"definitional differences are not just a semantic 
debate but rather result from different roles 
assumed for the auditor. " 
Hence, even the very role of the auditor, let alone 
the independence on which his role is based, does 
not appear to be generally perceived or understood. 
on that basis, research should be undertaken to 
establish the nature of auditor independence within 
the auditor's role. 
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Alleged secrecy when developing Professional codes 
A weakness alleged to prevail when developing or 
revising guidelines for the audit profession is that 
they are developed behind "closed doors" and without 
consultation with audit users or "the public" 
("Bankruptcies raise questions over auditors" - 
Accountancy Age, Dec. 6,1990: 13]. It is alleged 
their formulation takes place with much secrecy. 
If this be so, then of course it would be desirable 
if future revisions of such guidelines took place 
with greater account of the views of the public and 
other non-auditor but audit interested parties. It 
is they, after all, whom the auditors are trying to 
convince about their independence. 
Plethora of acceptable accounting treatments 
Concern with EAI appears to be compounded by the 
choice of accounting policies within generally 
accepted accounting policies. 
Hence, EAI cannot and should not be examined in 
isolation. EAI should be examined in the context of 
accounting and the choice of acceptable accounting 
principles, which in the UK, has recently been 
examined in the Dearing [1988] Report and is being 
examined by the Solomons Committee of the ICAEW- 
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It is argued that the need for independent auditors, 
both in fact and appearance, is reinforced by the 
choice of accounting policies, each as valid as the 
other. Many examples of the variety of accounting 
treatments are noted and need no restatement. (For 
some of the more significant choices of accounting 
treatments, see Griffiths, 1986. ] 
Nevertheless, as varying interpretations of 
accounting rules evolve, users may begin to believe 
that the auditor's acceptance or concurrence of a 
"particular" accounting principle, is governed by a 
"special" relationship with the audit clientl which 
may not be desirable, or at least questionable. 
This "special" relationship may influence the 
auditor's independence and so research should be 
undertaken to establish the nature of those 
relationships that are seen to negatively influence 
the auditor's EAI. 
Thus auditors are well served by recalling that the 
crucial characteristic underlying the quality of 
audited information is EAI. If auditing is to give 
assurance of the propriety, credibility and veracity 
of financial information, that information must 
correspond with a specified set of facts. 
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If the choice of which facts are to be reported is 
left open, or if non-facts may be reported, and if 
the manner of presentation may be selected from a 
range of options, then the mere requirement that 
auditors be totally independent will in itself not 
ensure that accounts possess these attributes. 
Thus, auditing has two features. The first is 
documentable and evident, the other non-documentable 
and non-visible. The operational aspects of the 
auditor's work covers the former, while EAI 
encompasses the latter. It is because EAI is 
non-visible and non-documentable, that the audit 
profession must examine it carefully. 
It must also develop and maintain an environment 
such that the degree of non-visibility and 
non-documentability is minimized, recognising that 
these two features can never be totally eliminated. 
The establishment and maintenance of such an 
environment calls for research. More pointedly, this 
research must be empirical and "real world" based. 
UK audit bodies need to show they have developed 
ethical codes (part of which relates to EAI) based 
on the perceptions of the public generally and users 
of audited accounts specifically. 
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Cultural diversitv 
Ethical norms often 
example, receipt of 
government official 
"measure of thanks" 
developments in the 
vary between cultures. For 
shares as gifts by a senior 
in Japan may well be seen as a 
for having progressed corporate 
company or group concerned. 
However anglo-saxon norms would likely consider it 
as a form of bribery, and not as it might be seen in 
Japan - as a "perk" that goes with such a senior 
position. Some of this perceptual difference may be 
attributed to differences between underlying 
cultural norms. 
(For research contributions regarding perceptions of 
EAI within differing cultures see Badran, 1983; 
Agacer, 1987 and Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981a and 
1981b. In turn, these contributions examine 
differing and specific aspects of EAI as seen in 
Egypt, West Germany, USA and the Philippines, 
mindful of possible ethical diversity expressed as a 
sub-set of cultural diversity. ) 
While recognising that cultural norms may indeed be 
different, it must also be recognised that 
differences in themselves do not make one set of 
cultural norms better or worse than any other. 
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But research should be undertaken to see what 
ethical views exist on a number of subjects, 
recognising the cultural norms within which they 
prevail. In particular,, if varying ethical 
perceptions exist in terms of "gifted" shares, might 
they not also exist in terms of external auditor 
independence? 
4.3.3 Cases of impaired EA1 in the UK 
In an ideal Utopian world all would function 
according to plan, and with complete integrity, so 
that there would be no need for the likes of 
(internal or external) auditors. However the world 
is far from ideal, and so there is a need for 
external auditors and, for reliance on their 
professional independence. 
The question then arising is: "Have auditors lived 
up to, and do they currently appear to be living up 
to, the expectations of EAI placed in them, by 
persons who rely on audited statements? " 
one way of addressing the question is to identify 
past or recent instances where EAI has in fact been 
impaired, and/or to list instances where concern 
about EAI has been voiced (whether or not backed by 
proof of actual impairment). 
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Thus, in part answer to the preceding question, the 
following section of the chapter examines some past 
instances of alleged or identified cases of impaired 
EAI in the UK. The paragraphs then following focus 
on expressions of recent concern with EAI in the UK. 
Past instances of impaired EAI--in the U 
One medium of searching for past instances of 
impaired EAI in the UK, is a review of reports 
written by inspectors appointed by the DTI under 
Section 165(b) of the (then) 1948 Companies Act. 
Less recent (quasi-) Judicial reports 
However, DTI reports from the 1970s, offer few 
examples of EAI being "in fact" impaired, a fact 
borne out in (inter alia) the following instances: 
1. Harmood Banner re: London and County Securities 
Limited [1974] 
2. Price Waterhouse re: Peachey Property 
Corporation (1976] 
3. Dixon Wilson re: London capital Group [1975] 
4. Carter Alliban re: Peek Foods Limited [1981) 
Examination by DTI inspectors in these cases, with a 
prima-facie suggestion of impaired EAI, only 
confirmed (Waters, 1986: 16-17], that in their view, 
the relevant auditors had acted independently. 
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Nevertheless, it appears (Waters, 1986: 17) that in 
these cases, the concern of, DTI investigators was 
"more on the inability of auditors to communicate 
their misgivings, rather than on the question of 
whether they were independent in the first place. " 
More recent (quasi-) judicial reports 
Despite severe criticism of EAI in the UK, there 
appears to be few actual instances where legal (or 
similar) processes have confirmed impaired EAI. 
A review of recent UK instances revealed only two 
cases where, according to either a professional body 
or DTI inspectors, EAI may have been impaired. 
As the facts of these cases are themselves of 
interest and share broad parallels with some of the 
situations described in the present research 
questionnaire, they are briefly reviewed below: 
Sieff Davidson re: Garston Amhurst Ltd 
Sieff Davidson (SD) were auditors to Garston Amhurst 
Ltd (GAL), an investment company that went into 
liquidation in October 1989. In addition, SD owned 
the majority of shares in a company, OFMLI whose 
minority interests were owned by some of the 
directors of GAL. Further, the MD of GAL was a non- 
executive director of OFML. 
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An ICAEW disciplinary enquiry held that these inter- 
relationships had put SD "in the position of having 
an interest which might be seen to detract from ... 
independence and objectivity" and SD partners were 
censured. ("Partners at Sieff Davidson censured by 
English ICA" - Accountancy Age, April 25,1991: 2] 
Levy Gee re: Aldermanbury Trust Ltd 
Aldermanbury Trust Ltd (ATL) collapsed in 1988, when 
the DTI appointed reporting inspectors. In their 
report the inspectors criticised ATL's auditors for 
having "failed in a number of significant areas, to 
obtain adequate audit evidence. " The DTI report also 
criticised the relevant audit firm (Levy Gee) for 
failing to act with "objectivity and independence". 
Levy Gee have refuted such criticisms as "distorted" 
and the matter is now subject to further legal 
processes, while the report is reviewed by the ICAEW 
Ethics Committee ("Levy Gee hit back at "distorted" 
criticism" - Accountancy Age, March 28,1991: 1]. 
[Some argue that DTI inspectors' reports do not 
necessarily provide a complete source of observed UK 
cases of impaired EAI, as not all such reports are 
made public IIDTI investigations under fire from 
academics" Accountancy Age, July 11,1991: 13. ] 
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Nevertheless, in the above two cases, it would 
appear that the auditors concerned have at least 
placed themselves in situations where a reasonable 
observer may doubt their professional independence. 
Recent suggestions of impaired EAI 
In addition to the two actual cases identified in 
the previous paragraphs, there have been more recent 
"suggestions" or "accusations" of impaired external 
auditor independence (or objectivity) by UK 
auditors. 
However,, it must be stressed that at this stage, 
these accusations remain totally unproven, and 
continue to be only a basis of enquiry. Notable 
among such cases of "suggested" impaired EAI are: 
1. Stby Hayward re: Polly Peck Int. 
2. Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte re: Polly Peck Int. 
3. Stoy Hayward re: Levitt Group & Polly Peck Int. 
4. Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte re: AGIP (Africa) 
5. Baker Tilly re: Royal Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea Assured Homes PLC ("Ethical guidelines 
breach is denied by Baker Tilly" - Accountancy 
Age, September 27,1990: 11] 
6. Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte re: Mirror Group 
Newspapers and Maxwell Communications Corporation 
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4.3.4 Criticisms of EAI in the UK 
Despite the paucity of confirmed cases of impaired 
EAI in the UK, it (EAI) has been under strong fire 
in recent months. During this period, the press has 
been a forum for much debate on it, and has had 
frequent references to it. Thus, to state there is 
interest and concern with EAI is an understatement. 
While such concern may prove baseless, it is true 
that virtually every week an article on EAI is found 
in the press. The following list is a very limited 
random selection of recent press articles expressing 
concern with (inter alia) current standards of EAI: 
Real audit reform needs statutory regulation 
Letters, Financial Times, December 28,1990: 9 
Blowing the whistle on accountancy 
The Economist, December 22,1990: 16 
Professional self-regulation is more efficient 
than statutory interference 
Letters, Financial Times, December 14,1990: 17 
4. Audit Reform 
The Guardian, December 3,1990: 13 
.. 4 
5. Au 1 ing e auditor 
Editorial, Financial Times, October 191 1990: 18 
6. Great expectations - but auditors fail to deliver 
The Guardian, October 31,1990: 15 
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Current criticism of EAI in--practice 
Criticism of current standards of EAI in the audit 
profession comes from many quarters - academics, 
parliamentarians and financial journalists and are 
to be read in sources as differing as "The Guardian" 
daily newspaper and "The Economist" magazine. 
Parliamentarian criticism 
One ardent critic of the present status in the audit 
profession, and its standards of independencer is 
Austin Mitchell -a Labour MP (and self-appointed 
vigilante of the auditing profession). 
Mitchell's main contention is that despite the 
profession's ethical standards and self-regulation 
procedures, auditors have today become "too 
dependent on their clients". As such, Mitchell 
argues that members of the profession are unable to 
maintain the level of EAI required of them. 
Thus, referring to "opinion-shopping" practices, he 
voices concern with EAI stating that audit firms are 
constantly "going into beauty contests to get new 
business, but the problem with beauty contestants is 
they often go to bed with the judges" ["Mission to 
keep contestants out of judges' beds" - Financial 
Times, December 13,1990: 15]. 
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Mitchell also criticises auditors for, in his view, 
"putting profit before professional independence". 
("Bankruptcies raise questions over auditors" - 
Financial Times Supplement, December 7.1990: V. 
Similar criticisms are expressed by another Labour 
MP - see Cousins, 1990: 10-11. ] 
Press Criticism 
one financial journalist ["Audit Reform". The 
Guardian, December 5.1990: 13] criticises current 
UK practices of EAI stating,, "the most worrying 
concern (is) that commercial pressures make auditors 
more concerned with client service than EAI. 11 
Even "The Economist" magazine ("Blowing the whistle 
on accountancy" - December 22,199o: 16],, an oft- 
perceived defender of the establishment and the 
established, states that auditors "are no longer 
seen to be impartial. " 
In assessing criticism of external auditor 
independence one recognises that financial 
journalists may not be perfect surrogates for the 
users of audited financial statements. However, 
despite limitations, they have been used as such, 
and are at least a good medium to help identify 
issues of concern to audit users. 
140 
[Views of financial journalists have been used in 
empirical studies on business issues. For example, 
Richter, 1976 (in Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981a: 165) 
used financial journalists to see if in their view, 
MAS-provision by auditors impaired their EAI. ] 
Academic Criticism 
Accounting academics have expressed concern with 
EAI. Puxty, Sikka and Willmott (academics from three 
UK tertiary institutions) ["Why the DTI still baulks 
at bringing auditors to book" - The Guardian, 
December 3.1990: 15], enumerate in a joint article, 
the various reasons why they are concerned with the 
status of EAI within the UK auditing profession. 
Government c iticism 
Even the present UK government has expressed its 
discontent with current audit ethics and indicates 
that the DTI "may move to enforce a stricter 
definition of" EAI ("Redwood may act on audit 
ethics" - Accountancy Age, November 8,1990: 1]. 
In that context, the Corporate Affairs Minister, 
stated that the government will look at various 
options once it became "clear what professional 
rules there will be governing" EAI (i. e. after 
further steps to tighten ethical standards are put 
down by the audit bodies themselves). 
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Audit-User Criticism 
Curiously, while criticism of EAI comes from many 
quarters, one seldom comes across such critical 
articles written by the users of audited statements. 
Perhaps journalists act as their spokespersons. 
Does this apparent silence on EAI by users of 
audited financial statements mean that they are in 
fact content with the prevailing ethical standards 
of EAI as seen by them? or, are they concerned about 
this and related issues, but have merely refrained 
from making their views manifest? Inter alia, this 
research attempts to answer that question. 
The issue of EAI presents an interesting profile. on 
the one hand, there are few proven (and recorded) 
cases of external auditor independence actually 
having been impaired in the UK, but, as evidenced by 
the many written references to it, there is 
significant concern about it. Thus, the area of EAI 
lends itself to fruitful examination. 
However, the concern with EAI mentioned above may be 
the result of the fact that what really disturbs 
observers, is not EAI in fact, but rather EAI in 
appearance. For it is on what is apparent to, or 
perceived by people, that they form their beliefs. 
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As such, these serious criticisms of EAI call for a 
close study of the surrounding facts. Further, since 
the phenomenon of independence "in appearance" is 
concerned with thegollective perceptions of the 
users of audited statements (including external 
auditors), any rules covering EAI in appearance 
should be based on such group perceptions. 
Determining areas of concern with and perceptions of 
EAI within various situations are only a first step 
towards a meaningful solution of the external 
auditor independence problem, and are important 
objectives of this research. 
Such research should recognise that peoples' 
perceptions are heavily influenced by their 
individual values and the belief systems to which 
they ascribe. Further, the research must focus on 
perceptions of auditor independence and attempt to 
isolate at least some of the auditor-client 
relationships that are perceived to be of concern. 
In calling for a fresh assessment of the subjectl 
Olson (1980: 80] states that "any standards for 
(auditor) independence must define the types of 
relationships that would cause reasonable persons to 
conclude that an auditor had become an insider. " 
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Having regard to the preceding comments, research 
into external auditor independence is also called 
for on the grounds that it is the central plank of 
the auditing profession. Thus, quite properly, the 
issue is undergoing close scrutiny by the'profession 
itself and other concerned parties. 
Such re-examination and research should open the way 
to remedy areas of weakness within the training and 
formation of accountants themselves and the ethical 
rules that govern them. 
However in order to produce effective results, in 
terms of meaningful rules and guidelines, any 
current re-examination must be based upon a sound 
knowledge of the factors that influence auditor 
independence. Accordingly, a significant part of the 
empirical research offered in this thesis is a 
contribution in that direction. 
The next chapter is (partly) devoted to an 
identification of the specific and individual 
aspects of external auditor independence offered for 
examination in the present research questionnaire, 
and considerations relating to the overall 
development of the questionnaire itself. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH PROBLEM, WATURE AND OBJECTIVES 
The prime purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
basis and nature of the main research problems herein 
addressed and to outline the main objectives of the 
research. To achieve this, the chapter is structured 
within five sections whose respective functions are to: 
1. state the nature of the research problem 
2. describe the basis and nature of the research 
3. state the objectives of the research 
4. present the framework (background) to the research 
explain the use of the research instrument employed 
5.1 Nature of the research vroblem 
Chapter 1 stated that EAI in "fact" and "appearance" is 
the very basis of auditing and that only when the 
auditor is perceived by users of audited financial 
statements to be independent, will his opinion be 
relied upon by them. 
on the other hand, the theoretical analysis of EAI in 
Chapter 2 indicates it to be a multi-faceted feature 
whose "appearance" may not be uniformly seen by all 
persons concerned with it. Thus, what is uncertain is 
whether (groups of) users of audited accounts have 
similar or significantly differing views of EAI. 
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Translating this uncertainty into a practical real- 
life UK context, one notes contradicting views being 
offered by some of the parties concerned with EAI. 
For instance, an Editorial in the Financial Times 
["Auditing the auditor" - October 19,, 1990: 18], 
maintained that recently (or soon to be) implemented 
measures (introduced by the Companies Act 1989), for 
the monitoring of the auditing profession are less than 
fully effective, because they fail "to address the 
central question (of auditing), which relates to the 
independence of the auditor". 
On the other hand, Brandon Gough (the senior partner of 
Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte - the largest firm of 
chartered accountants in the UK), argues that the 
benefits offered to the auditing profession by the 
Single Market, must not be "surrendered in response to 
exaggerated concerns about scale, ... competition or 
independence. " ["Big will be beautiful as Europe opens 
up" - Financial Times, September 13,1990: 12. ] 
Even the government appears to be concerned with EAI. 
In a written reply (on ethics within the auditing 
profession) to the House of Commons in the first week 
of November 1990, the corporate affairs minister, John 
Redwood (Accountancy Age, November 8,1990: 1) stated: 
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"the Secretary of State (for trade and industry) 
will consider whether to exercise the power (in 
the Companies Act 1989) to specify by 
regulations, further disqualifying connections 
(between auditor and client) once it is clear 
what professional rules and guidance there will 
be, governing the independence of auditors. " 
The underlying implication is that there is some 
concern about the independence of auditors in practice, 
and this concern appears to focus on the "connections" 
that subsist between auditors and their clients. 
However, it may be that Brandon Gough is right and 
concerns about EAI are indeed "exaggerated". Thust this 
research is, in part, an attempt to determine those 
(types of) situations that appear to cause concern to 
the users of audited statements. 
Refocusing on the "appearance" of EAI in the UK, one 
notes that it has been criticised by many and on a 
variety of accounts. As three examples only, the 
following references clearly state their authors to be 
less than content with current UK standards of EAI. 
1. Real audit reform needs statutory regulation - 
Financial Times, December 28,1990: 9 
2. Blowing the whistle on accountancy - The Economist, 
December 22,1990: 16 
3. Why the DTI still baulks at bringing auditors to 
book - The Guardian, December 3,1990: 15 
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However, despite a spate of such criticism in recent 
months, the UK audit profession has consistently stated 
that (while it is impossible to professionally or 
legislatively guarantee independence "in fact'@) current 
legislation and professional standards are adequate to 
secure objectivity and independence "in appearancell. 
As examples of the profession's defence of such 
criticism, one may refer to articles written by two 
stalwarts of the UK auditing profession. 
These defendants of the UK profession are Chris Swinson 
(the Managing Partner of BDO Binder Hamlyn) and Brandon 
Gough (the Senior Partner of Coopers & Lybrand 
Deloitte), both firms being one of the six biggest (the 
Big-Six) firms of auditors in the UK: 
1. Auditors' independence and integrity (Swinson) - 
Financial Times, October 26,1990: 19 
2. Big will be beautiful as Europe opens up (Gough) - 
Financial Times, September 13,1990: 12 
Nevertheless, given the manifestly strong debate on 
EAII it must be more than reasonable to ask to what 
extent and which of the preceding views are shared by 
those who use the services of auditors, and if they are 
indeed satisfied with current standards of EAI. These 
are the main research areas presently addressed. 
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5.2 Nature of the research 
Thus, against the background of the above debate, this 
research was conducted to assess how EAI is seen by 
four sample groups (the Research Groups). The first was 
made up of a sample of external auditors (who issue 
audit reports - the Issuer Group). The other three were 
sample groups of persons (bankers, credit managers and 
internal auditors) who use audit opinions (User Group). 
Using the questionnaire methodology this research 
focused on twenty unrelated, individual relationships 
(situations) between auditors and their clients, and 
from among these situations tries to identify those 
that (audit) relevant persons see as a threat to EAI. 
In this respect, the research gives expression to 
research suggestions made both by Berryman [1974: 141 
and Olson (a past AICPA president) [1980: 80), when the 
latter states that Pany standard for professional 
independence must define the types of relationships 
that would cause persons to conclude that an auditor 
had become an insider" and thus in effect lost EAI. 
The research makes an important distinction between 
auditor-client relationships that may merely engender 
an impairment to audit independence, and the actual 
manifestation of EAI having been impaired. 
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The distinction is important, because the research is 
not concerned with how impaired EAI is (or may be) 
manifest, but with Nhy it became manifest (a "positive 
theory" approach), and the environment permitting it. 
For example only, take the virtually impossible and 
hypothetical situation of an auditor who derives 55% of 
his gross income from one client. The auditor has been 
under much pressure (including the threat of loss of 
office) from the client, to persuade him to accept a 
method of recording and presenting some accounting data 
whereas the auditor's judgement dictates otherwise. 
After considering the factors involved, including the 
impact on his fee income if he lost the client in 
question, the auditor succumbs to the client pressure. 
Thus, contrary to his professional judgement, the 
auditor agrees to the requested method of dealing and 
presenting the accounting transactions, without due 
qualification (or reservations) in the audit report. 
This, admittedly hypothetical, situation has two 
aspects. First the environment in which it was possible 
for the auditor's independence to become impaired, and 
second its actual manifestation. The pernicious 
features of both aspects is they are usually obscured 
(at least initially) from public view and knowledge. 
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This is because UK auditors are presently not required 
to divulge the percentage of fee income derived from 
each client, and neither is it possible to instantly 
detect any impairment of EAI when an audited financial 
statement is released to the public. 
At best, such impairment may become evident only in 
some months, when events overtake the company. But even 
then, one cannot really make firm conclusions about the 
auditor's apparent lack of independence. Thus the 
distinction between the environment that engendered an 
impairment to EAI, and the manifestation of that 
impairment is important. 
Consequently, the research is not concerned with the 
manifestation of impaired auditor independence. on the 
other hand, it is concerned with the audit environment 
and auditor/client relationships that permitted or 
encouraged the impairment of external auditor 
independence. 
Such an investigation (of relevant perceptions) may 
well suggest a theory to help predict, inter alia, why 
an individual auditor may be perceived to be not 
independent by users of audited financial statements, 
and perhaps predict the eventual loss of that audit 
contract by the auditor in question. 
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This research is premised on the belief that only 
certain types of auditor-client relationships permit 
(encourage) EAI to become impaired. Relationships other 
than these types do not usually engender such a threat. 
In that vein, UK legislation and/or professional 
guidelines clearly rule out and prohibit certain types 
of relationships between an auditor and his client. For 
example, under no circumstances may an auditor own 
shares in a beneficial capacity in a client company. 
However other relationships that are not specifically 
excluded by law or professional rulings may exist 
between an auditor and his client. Nevertheless, it may 
be that such relationships do not inspire an observer 
to the auditing process with due confidence in the 
professional independence of the relevant auditor. 
Accordingly, the research singles out for examination, 
some auditor-client relationships that are not 
prohibited by legislation and/or professional rulings, 
but which may nevertheless be seen as a threat to EAI. 
Thus, the focus of this research is the nature of 
relationships between auditors and their clients. More 
specifically, the research attempts to uncover the 
nature of relationships that persons associated with 
audited statements see as a threat to EAI. 
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Expressed as more general questions, the overall thrust 
and nature of the research may be stated as: 
1. Do specific auditor-client (relationships) 
situations by themselves ring alarm bells for EAI? 
2. If so,, what are these situations? 
3. Are they presently adequately safeguarded by 
statutory requirements and professional guidelines? 
5.2.1 Aqencv theory basis of the research 
The research is also based on implications that, inter 
alia, flow from Agency Theory (Watts and Zimmermanp 
1986: Chapter 13], a "positive" theory that seeks to 
explain why audits occur. The theory views the economic 
activity of the firm as part of a nexus of contracts 
and contractual relationships. Seen in that light, the 
firm may be regarded as having entered into contracts 
with, inter alia, its employees and suppliers. 
Progressing in that direction, Agency Theory (AT) might 
even be seen as a micro-economic theory which provides 
a rationale for auditing in an economic framework. In 
doing so AT reinforces the pivotal importance of EAI. 
The theory's rationale for auditing lies in its tenet 
that the inherent conflicts between 'principals" and 
"agents" call for agency information to be "monitored" 
and/or confirmed by an "independent" person, and the 
auditor is put forth as that individual. 
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A central plank of agency theory is the contention that 
the very basis on which the services of an auditor are 
engaged, is his independence. Without that professional 
independence the auditor would be of little or no 
value, and have no role to play within agency theory. 
Further, AT contends that even without the backdrop of 
professional ethics or legal statute, auditors would 
be, and hold themselves out to be, truly independent. 
Further, they would see themselves as being so. 
Because, it is argued, if it became evident that an 
auditor were not acting independently, then no 
monitoring contracts would be offered to him, and in 
time he would be unable to earn a living as an auditor. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1981) take exactly this view when 
providing a historically based explanation for the 
practice of auditing and when offering an explanation 
for the prevalence (and continuance) of auditing even 
before it was required statutorily. 
As such, it is an attribution of the theory that, in 
general, auditors are and will remain independent. 
Further, they will so remain in order to establish and 
then exploit (good) "reputation" effects, so as to 
serve their own economic "self-interest"* 
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Equally, AT would maintain, users of audit services 
must see the auditor to be independent, or else they 
would not use his/her services. As such, an underlying 
assumption of the theory is the belief that (in 
general) users of audit services will perceive auditors 
to be truly and completely independent. 
In this respect, agency theory supports the traditional 
professional view, which contends that the auditing 
profession is dependent not only on it being 
independent in fact, but also on it being seen to be 
independent by users of its services. 
While agency theory does not confirm or reject the 
assertion that differential perceptions of EAI may 
exist, it does imply that there will be an identity or 
near-identity of such perceptions, when relevant views 
of auditors and users of their services are compared. 
In other words, in situations where due regard has been 
had for relevant legal and professional requirements on 
EAI, there should be no significant differences of 
opinion in the way in which it is seen by these two 
(audit associated) groups. However some previous UK 
empirical evidence indicates that non-auditors do have 
differential perceptions of EAI [Firth, 1980 and 1981] 
when compared to those held by professional auditors. 
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Another construction of AT [DeAngelo, 1981b and Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986: 318) holds that the size of an 
audit firm is likely to be positively correlated with 
the stand it takes on auditor independence issues, so 
that larger audit firms are "more likely to be 
independent" than firms of a smaller size. 
If so, this increased likelihood of independence is 
possibly also to be seen in varying EAI views between 
auditors from differing (Big-Six vs. nonBig-Six) sizes 
of audit firms. 
In fact, some prevailing commercial practices do tend 
to support the preceding AT derived construction. For 
example, note the requirement sometimes seen in loan 
covenants requiring the borrower to use the services of 
a specified auditor (or at least one of a set of 
specified auditors) to audit its annual statements. 
If all auditors were viewed equally and uniformly (and 
they are in terms of professional qualifications and 
statutory licensing) then such terms in loan covenants 
would be redundant and rarely witnessed. However such 
terms do exist within loan covenants, and as a resultf 
it is logical to maintain that some differences must be 
seen amongst firms of auditors and their individual 
characteristics. 
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In part, such differences may be attributable to the 
fact that auditors from varying firm sizes may 
themselves have differing perceptions on the nature of 
EAI (a form of acculturation). 
In that sense, agency theory can also be drawn on to 
explain how varying perceptions of EAI (as held by 
auditors from different sizes of audit firms) may 
influence auditor choice. In fact, it may be that an 
audit firm's standing in the league of audit firms acts 
as a surrogate (guarantee) for professional EAI. 
Further, as Big-Six auditors provide audit opinions on 
the accounts of the majority of listed companies (see 
Briston and Perks, 1977 and Briston, 1979], which in 
turn generate a significant part of the UK's GNP, it is 
pertinent to determine if there are significant 
differences of perception between auditors with a Big- 
Six affiliation and auditors not so affiliated. 
Accordingly, based on the agency theoretic implications 
relating to perceived EAI being functionally associated 
with audit firm size, and considerations offered in the 
previous paragraph, one thrust of the research concerns 
itself with determining if differing views on EAI exist 
between samples of auditors from Big-Six and nonBig- 
six audit firms. 
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5.3 Research objectives 
As stated in Chapter 2, the continued existence of the 
audit profession's reporting function is dependent on 
it maintaining the appearance of total professional 
independence. 
Thus, in order to determine how this independence is 
viewed by groups concerned with EAI and audited 
financial statements, the overall general objective of 
this research is to statistically analyse (compare and 
contrast) views held by the (previously noted) research 
groups, in relation to EAI within specified audit 
situations. 
As such, a major objective of the research is to 
empirically examine whether there is indeed a general 
consensus of (group) opinion on EAI, between the Issuer 
Group and (in turn) each one of the three User Groups. 
consequent to AT implications, another objective of the 
research is to empirically examine and test for similar 
consensus within the Issuer Group only - on the basis 
of auditors from Big-Six and nonBig-Six auditing firms. 
Thus, following previously noted implications derived 
from AT, the principal objectives of the research may 
be stated more expansively as: 
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1. To determine if, significantly differing perceptions 
of EAI exist, firstly-between, the Issuer Group and 
each of the User Groups in turn, and secondly within 
the Issuer Group itself. 
2. Should such differences be revealed, to attempt to 
explain them by hypothesising that these differences 
arise from one or all of the following phenomena: 
a. the identification of differing group constructs (or 
factors) underlying each group's overall perceptions 
of EAI 
b. the identification of differing importance (weights) 
attached to key aspects of EAI by-the Issuerýand 
User Groups (i. e. differing group models of EAI) 
c. the identification (within each research group) of 
differing personal features that appear to be of 
relevance in explaining group views on EAI. 
However, in order to first better consider the nature 
of EAI,, an ancillary objective of the research is to: 
1. Assess how EAI is seen by all the Research Groups 
within the specified, situations. 
2. Determine if there isýconcern with EAI within these 
situations by the User Groups. 
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In summary, one might state that the above research 
objectives have four distinct underlying dimensions, 
each of which are considered, in turn, in the paras 
immediately following. These four dimensions are: 
1. Differential (considered in Chapters 10 and 11) 
2. Factor (considered in Chapter 12) 
3. Discriminating (considered-in Chapter 13) 
4. Personal characteristics (considered in Chapter 14) 
The differential dimension 
This research dimension identifies from the twenty 
researched audit situations, those where: 
1. Users of audited statements see EAI significantly 
differently from those who provide audit services 
2. Big-Six auditors see EAI significantly differently 
from nonBig-Six auditors 
3. Partners in audit firms see EAI significantly 
differently from non-partners in the same audit 
irms. 
Expressed in null hypothesis terms, the above may be 
stated in relation to the individual EAI aspects 
considered within each of the twenty audit situations 
as: 
HO-1: There are no significant differences between 
practising auditors and each of the three other 
respondent groups. 
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HO-2: There are no significant differences between 
auditor respondents with a Big-Six affiliation 
and those with a nonBig-Six affiliation. 
HO-3: There are no significant differences based on 
a partner/non-partner rank basis in regard to 
respondents in audit firms (size disregarded). 
considering group views from a differential dimension 
allows one to also judge them on an "expectation gap" 
basis. Accordingly, in those situations where such gaps 
are significantly different (and negative) between the 
views of individual audit-user groups and the issuer 
group, they may be regarded as a quantified measure of 
individual aspects of this expectations gap. 
The factor dimension 
In the event that significant group differences are 
unfolded, it is necessary to determine possible reasons 
why this may be so. 
Thus, the statistical application undertaken with a 
factor dimension in mind, is premised on the basis that 
one possible reason why these differences unfold is to 
be found in the fact that each group brings to bear a 
different and varying factor framework or set of 
underlying constructs when they consider EAI issues. 
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Should such meaningfully identifiable factors be 
revealed as a result of the appropriate statistical 
procedure (Factor Analysis), then it would be of 
benefit to the audit profession in that future revised 
ethical pronouncements may be developed or revised on 
the basis of a full knowledge of such group factor 
constructs. 
The discriminant dimension 
Should significant group differences emerge with 
respect to some or all of the twenty audit situations 
presented for consideration, it will also be pertinent 
to determine-those situations that best "capture" most 
of the individual group variations. 
This dimension is achieved by applying the statistical 
technique known as Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) 
to the underlying responses. LDA results in a linear 
model which incorporates and duly weights those 
situations (EAI aspects) that have good distinguishing 
features within the particular groups considered. 
Successful development of such models with good group 
predictive ability, will help reveal those specific 
aspects of EAI by which views of each of the three user 
groups may be best distinguished from those of the 
issuer group. 
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The Personal characteristic-dimension 
However, on the basis that differing views between 
groups may have more to do with the underlying personal 
characteristics of the members within each group, this 
research dimension explores for possible reasons for 
group differences in varying group patterns of personal 
characteristics (such as age, education, experience, 
familiarity with audit opinions, etc. ). 
Consequently, in order to assess the impact of such 
personal characteristics on group views of EAI, they 
are all assessed in concert using the multiple 
regression statistical technique. 
Should the relevant r-squared statistic (multiple 
coefficient of determination) of the model reveal high 
explanatory power (in terms of explaining variation 
between groups), it indicates that the model's 
predictive ability using the (duly weighted) personal 
characteristics indicated is good. 
Results flowing from these multiple linear regression 
models will highlight those personal characteristics 
that may be regarded as formative when shaping EAI 
views, and should corrective action be required in a 
personal context, one may focus on only the identified 
aspects of the regression model. 
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5.4 Research rrame and background 
The need for EAI has long been recognised in the 
auditing literature. References to auditing go back as 
far as 1200 A. D., and even then, mechanisms existed to 
monitor and foster EAI [Watts and Zimmerman, 1981: 13]. 
The issue continues to remain important in the UK. The 
ICAEW's "Guide to Professional Ethics" CICAEW, 1987: 9] 
states that "independence is a concept fundamental to 
the accountancy profession. It is essentially an 
attitude of mind characterised by integrity and an 
objective approach to professional work. " 
To assist its members, the ICAEW highlights in the 
explanatory notes to the above mentioned guide, a 
number of relationships (associations) that would 
usually be considered undesirable in terms of EAI. 
The broad sets of these relationships, when assessed 
from the auditor's position, relate to the following: 
1. Undue Fee Dependency (Set 1) 
2. Close Personal Relationships (Set 2) 
3. Financial involvement with or in a client (Set 3) 
4. Conflicts of interest (Set 4) , 
Each of these sets are illustrated, as on the following 
page, by examples of situations that may threaten EAI. 
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1. Undue fee-devendencv 
Examples within this set include the derivation of 
too great (material) a part of a firm's professional 
income from a client or group of connected clients. 
2. Close Personal relationships 
Examples within this set include personal 
relationships between the auditor and the client, 
such that the relationship can affect objectivity. 
They may arise through blood connections, marriage, 
or indeed through strong friendships. 
3. Financial involvement with/in clients' affairs 
Examples within this set include the holding of 
beneficial shares in audit clients, giving to or 
taking from clients of most loans, and acceptance of 
goods/services on terms more favourable than to the 
clients' employees. Acceptance of undue hospitality 
by the auditor from the client is also illustrative. 
4. Conflicts-of interest 
Examples falling under this set include, with 
relation to audit clients, the provision of other 
services, the holding of, a previous appointment by 
the auditor in a company now audited and the 
preparation of accounting records for public (but 
not private) companies. 
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When developing the research situations stated in the 
questionnaire, each situation was designed so that it 
was fairly readily recognised as belonging to or coming 
from one of the preceding four sets of auditor-client 
relationships. The purpose in doing so was to be able 
to "house" individual situations, should they prove to 
be statistically indicative in one way or another. 
(The perceived association of each of the twenty 
questionnaire situations with one of the four ICAEW 
factors was judged by a classificatory exercise 
conducted using 44 MBA students at City University, 
London (see Chapter 6). Good classifying concordance 
was observed for all twenty situations. ] 
Using this four set classifying approach on the twenty 
situations, permits one to draw generalisations from 
results more meaningfully than if the situations were 
not readily seen to be connected in any way. Thus, the 
I'leitmotif" of this research can be regarded as the 
four sets of relationships identified in ICAEW [1987). 
Thus, it is true to state that in addition to having 
regard to an underlying sense of commercial realism, 
the twenty research situations were developed with due 
cognition of the four classification sets structured 
within ICAEW (1987]. 
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5.5 Research methodolocry and-instrument used 
By definition, empirical research is based on 
observation (experiment) and not theory. Thus, it was 
concluded that the optimal way of observing what really 
transpires in the "real world" (in an EAI context) was 
to ask the views of persons who functioned in it and 
who would also normally be concerned with EAI. 
Kerlinger [1973: 411] considers the questionnaire 
survey to be the most appropriate method to determine 
the views of people. He states that "survey research 
focuses on people, the vital facts of people, and their 
beliefs, opinions, attitudes, motivations and 
behaviour. " 
Thusýafter considering alternative research approaches, 
and recognising that it was "beliefs, opinions, ... and 
attitudes" that were sought in this research, it was 
concluded that the analytical questionnaire survey 
method was most appropriate in this instance. 
Further, as it was not possible to enquire about 
perceptions based on specific real-life audit 
situations, the facts contained in the twenty 
questionnaire audit situations were designed to 
parallel, as closely as possible, actual or anecdotal 
audit relationships and/or environments. 
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Consistent with the presentation of facts grounded in 
reality (or near-reality), respondents were asked to 
give their views on much the same basis. Thus, they 
were asked to state their responses (per questionnaire 
completion instructions (Appendix B. Vol. 11: 248]) "an 
the basis of what you expect WOULD really happen, and 
NOT on the basis of what you consider should happen. " 
Furthermore, the decision to employ the questionnaire 
methodology was reinforced by the natural convergence 
of perceptual concepts integral to the Brunswick [1952] 
Lens (BL) model and the former. In its simplest form, 
the model holds that perceptions are the judgements of 
specific stimuli as processed by individual judges. 
The natural convergence between the BL model of human 
information processing (especially per Libby, 1981: 6) 
and questionnaire methodology comes about because: 
1. the respondents to a questionnaire can properly be 
regarded as the judges envisaged by the model - for 
it is they who assess or decide on the facts 
provided within (or without) the questionnaire 
2. the preceding facts can also be appropriately 
considered as the specific stimuli or cues that the 
judges are asked to assess 
168 
the responses given by respondents can rightly be 
considered a measured reflection of the result (or 
perception) of the relevant stimuli, after having 
I been processed by the judge(s) in question. 
This component classification provided by the Brunswick 
Lens model also provides the basis for the next three 
chapters, all of which are devoted to matters arising 
from the use of the questionnaire methodology. 
Thus, in Brunswick model terms, Chapter 6 is devoted to 
an examination of matters that are mainly concerned 
with the relevant stimuli (cues) placed for judgement - 
in other words, the facts contained in each of the 
twenty individual situations that questionnaire 
respondents were asked to judge. 
In similar terms, Chapter 7 is devoted to a discussion 
of matters that are mainly concerned with the judges 
(respondents) used in the research, particularly their 
choice and usage in the research. 
Of no less importance are the contents of Chapter 8, 
which is devoted mainly to clarifying matters that 
arise from the responses provided by the respondents to 
the questionnaire - i. e. in Brunswick Lens model terms, 
their judgements. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE: 
FORX AND CONTENT 
In applying the Brunswick Lens paradigm referred to in 
the previous chapter, this chapter considers and 
examines each of, the cues (the individual situations) 
presented for due assessment by the judges (the 
respondents to the questionnaire). 
As such, the purpose of this chapter is to amplify 
details related firstly to the basic development of the 
questionnaire (i. e. form, in Section 6.1) and secondly 
to those EAI aspects examined in each of the twenty 
researched situations (i. e. content, in Section 6.2). 
6.1 Questionnaire development 
As the main thrust of the research was to obtain views 
of EAI in 
ýertain 
auditor-auditee situations, two 
criteria were set for inclusion of a situation in the 
questionnaire. 
The first was that the situation must bear some real- 
world quality and be one that provokes attention in the 
literature. The second was that it should rather easily 
be "housed" in one of the four EAI classifying sets of 
the ICAEW (1987] referred to previously (Chapter 5.4). 
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Additionally, most of the twenty questionnaire 
situations have provoked some empirical attention 
[Lavin 1974; Pany and Reckers 1980 and 1984; Firth 1980 
and 1981] or are based on anecdotal and/or reported 
experiences of auditors and audit users. Equally, they 
were developed on the basis that each fell (primarily) 
into one of the four classifying sets suggested by the 
ICAEW [1987]. 
Development versions of the questionnaire were pre- 
tested formally (in groups) and informally (on an 
individual basis) and discussed with academics and 
auditing professionals concerned with EAI. Thus, the 
final questionnaire reflected the fruits of discussions 
with, and evaluation by academics at City University 
Business School and the London technical partners of 
four major firms of chartered accountants. 
In addition, a pilot study using a development version 
of the questionnaire was conducted. The pilot study was 
done with the acknowledged and much appreciated help of 
119 qualified accountants from several UK offices of a 
Big-Six firm of accountants. As a result of their 
participation in the pilot study, and in order not to 
permit any form of pre-knowledge to influence final 
responses, this firm was precluded from offering 
respondents to the final questionnaire. 
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Thirty situations (variables) were presented in the 
pilot questionnaire. However, after pilot-testing only 
twenty were considered optimal for retention in the 
final questionnaire. 
In addition to judging EAI in the thirty situations 
presented in the pilot questionnaire, pilot-respondents 
were also asked to state if in their view any of the 
situations presented, or terms used in the pilot 
questionnaire were ambiguous or required clarification. 
While some pilot-respondents did comment on that score 
for some situations, there was no overall consistency 
of comments across situations. Nevertheless, the final 
questionnaire reflected additions, deletions and other 
improvements indicated as a result of the pilot study. 
6.1.1 Questionnaire design considerations 
It is clearly impossible to examine real or factual 
auditor-client situations, where there may be concern 
with*EAI. Such details are almost always private, and 
not available for study by academics and the public. 
Equally, assuming it were possible, it would be 
somewhat futile to compare the views held by 
individuals or groups on their overall composite 
perception of EAI. 
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Rather, the view was taken, that it is more pragmatic 
and fruitful to examine views of external auditor 
independence within or as circumscribed by specified 
scenarios or "situations", as they are termed in this 
research. 
Thus, the final questionnaire [Appendix B, Volume II: 
247-257) outlined (by briefly describing) 20 individual 
and unconnected situations (relating to an auditor and 
his client), that may be perceived to influence or 
impact on external auditor independence. 
As the research was not intended to (nor could it) be, 
a comprehensive study of EAI, the twenty questionnaire 
situations do not reflect every possible situation that 
may engender impaired external auditor independence. 
Rather the research concerns itself with EAI only 
within the confines of the twenty questionnaire 
situations. 
Further, the research recognises that while the facts 
of the twenty research situations are not specifically 
prohibited by legal and/or professional rules in the 
UK, many professional auditors would not allow 
themselves to be involved in situations such as those 
outlined in the questionnaire and take specific steps 
to ensure that this is so. 
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6.1.2 Stimulus assessment-exercise, 
Each of the questionnaire situations was designed to 
trigger off a particular and single stimulus, which may 
be seen as a form of (potential) pressure on EAI. Thus 
while each situation was unique, they were also 
developed on the basis that they could easily be 
classified within one of the four classifying sets as 
stated in the Ethical Guidelines of the ICAEW [1987]. 
In order to confirm the consistency of the perceived 
stimulus intrinsic to each situation, 44 MBA (Finance) 
students at City University (most of whom had had some 
practical and/or academic accounting exposure), 
classified each of the twenty situations within one of 
the four ICAEW sets, using only the questionnaire 
information. While individual classification was by no 
means identical, there was broad agreement that the 
situations fell into the classifying sets as follows: 
SET 1: Fees 
Situations 5,12 and 18 
SET 2: Personal Relationships 
Situations 1,9F 17l 19 and 20 
SET 3: Financial Involvements 
Situations 2,4,61 71 8,14 and 16 
SET 4: Conflicts of Interest 
Situations 3,10,11,13 and 15 
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The precise stimulus inherent in each situation was: 
Sitn. Variable Examined 
1. A prolonged tenure by the auditor. 
Indebtedness by the client to the auditor's 
associated management consulting company. 
3. Provision of certain accounting services by the 
auditor to the audit client. 
4. Existence of an auditor-beneficial trade 
relationship between the auditor and a client. 
5. Presence of a level of insecurity of office by 
the auditor, given a competitive audit 
environment. 
Indebtedness by a client to the auditor for the 
previous year's audit fees. 
7. Existence of a tenant-landlord relationship 
between the auditor and an audit client. 
8. ownership of trustee shares in a small listed 
company by a partner in the audit firm who serve 
as auditors. 
Employment as managing director of the (former) 
partner in the company's (continuing) auditors. 
10. Application of severe pressure by the audit 
client on the budget for audit costs. 
11. Application of severe audit completion (time) 
pressure. 
12. Dependence by an audit firm for about 10% of its 
fee income on the firm's only listed client. 
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13. Provision of management consulting services by a 
firm of auditors to an audit client, the 
0 consulting services generating annually about 
40% of the audit fee for the firm of auditors. 
14. The existence of I'lowballing" by an audit firm. 
15. The dual functioning by a partner in a firm of 
auditors, as director of an investment trust and 
as audit partner responsible for the company in 
which the trust holds a "not material" interest. 
16. Retention by the local office of a Top Ten 
auditing firm as auditors to the largest employer 
in a given area. 
17. Previous employment as finance director by an 
audit client of a firm of auditors, the partner 
not being involved with its audit. 
18. The generation of 20% of the billing of the 
local office of a Top Ten firm from an audit 
client of the firm. 
19. The chairmanship of a client of an audit firm 
being held by a life peer who is a leading figure 
in the City of London and a director of several 
Io 069 PLCs with much political clout. 
20. The existence of a fraternal relationship 
between a partner in a firm of auditors and the 
managing director of one of the firm's audit 
clients, the audit for which the brother 
concerned has no responsibility whatsoever. 
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6.1.3 situations: rationale for and resPonses to 
The questionnaire introduction gave details about the 
purpose of the research, a promise of confidentiality, 
and due instructions for completion. It also provided a 
definition of EAI. This definition was given to ensure 
that all respondents were using the same conceptual 
basis when responding. Further, respondents were asked 
to use that definition when responding. 
Additionally, as it was important to ascertain each 
respondent's personal views, they were asked to ignore 
any ethical rulings and/or professional guidelines of 
which they were aware when responding and do so only on 
the basis of personal opinion. 
The major part of the questionnaire was designed to 
assess respondents' views within the twenty situations, 
each of which reflected differing aspects of an 
auditor-auditee relationship andýwhich may suggest the 
possibility of impaired EAI. In general, all twenty 
situations were ones which relevant UK audit bodies 
would deem to be not necessarily harmful to EAI. 
Respondents were asked to judge each situation in turn, 
and to then indicate (on the numbered scale given for 
each situation) the level of confidence that they would 
have in the relevant auditor(s) acting independently. 
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While it is possible to state with some certainty if an 
auditor has acted with due EAI or not after the fact - 
before the fact, this is well nigh impossible. In this 
case, only judgements about the likely independence of 
the auditor can be made, and in asking for degrees of 
confidence relative to the auditor, the questionnaire 
recognised this. 
In other words, the questionnaire recognised that 
before an auditor provides his opinion on a set of 
financial statements, only judgements can be made on 
the probability of him acting in an independent manner. 
Probability in this context can be expressed using the 
degrees of confidence as its surrogate. Thus no 
confidence at all in the auditor's independence would 
be a surrogate expression of him not being independent, 
and complete confidence in his independence would be a 
surrogate expression of him being independent. 
As such, an alternative way of capturing respondents 
views on probable independence was to ask them to 
assess and register their degree of confidence in the 
auditor acting independently in each of the given 
situations. The higher the degree of confidence, the 
higher the probability of the auditor's independence, 
with confidence acting as a surrogate for EAI. 
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on this basis, the questionnaire asked respondents to 
merely state the "Level of Confidence" they would have 
in the relevant auditor acting independently in each of 
the situations. 
At the end of the relevant questionnaire section (after 
respondents had provided their responses to all twenty 
situations) respondents were posed a single question 
relating to EAI in the overall audit environment. This 
question was asked only in general terms and sought the 
respondents, views unrelated to any specific facts. 
The question read [Appendix B, Volume 11: 254): 
"What do you consider to be the Minimum Level of 
Confidence (MLC) in the independence of external 
auditors that users of audited financial statements may 
Justly demand? Circle your response at the appropriate 
numbered level on the scale alongside. " 
The same response scale as that for the twenty 
situation questions was provided for this MLC question. 
The benefit of posing this general question was that it 
provided an individual yardstick, by which one could 
evaluate responses between individual respondents. 
Completed questionnaires showed no evidence of 
responses to the twenty situations being amended as a 
result of the response to the general question on EAI. 
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6.1.4, Response scale considerations 
some previous similar research [Lavin, 1976; Firth 
1980] has researched EAI only on a dichotomous basis. 
In such research, respondents classified the external 
auditor in each of the situations presented for 
examination, as being in their view "independent" or 
"not independent". However,, while dichotomous responses 
provide data about the direction of each respondent's 
views on EAI, within the specified situations, they do 
not provide data about the intensity of these views. 
To remedy this deficiency, this research also sought to 
quantify respondents' intensity of views on EAI, a feat 
achieved by respondents registering their responses on 
the numbered scale given for each of the situations. 
For purposes of this research, the actual responses 
given by respondents were termed the "raw responses" 
while these "raw responses" as reduced by the same 
respondent's MLC,, were termed the "refined responses". 
Thus a negative refined response indicated that in that 
instance, the respondent had less confidence than 
his/her stated MLC in the independence of the relevant 
auditor. Equally, a positive refined response indicated 
that in that case the respondent had more confidence in 
the auditor's independence than his/her MLC. 
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By inference then, negative refined responses indicated 
a doubt, concern or gap, with EAI, while positive 
refined responses indicated no such doubt, reservation 
or concern. Equally, the strength of negativity or 
positivism on individual refined responses indicated 
the degree of concern evoked with or assuredness 
provided for EAI in each situation. 
By establishing individual refined responses in every 
situation and for each respondent, it was possible to 
assess each respondent's views, using his/her own 
personal base as the appropriate yardstick and as these 
personalised views were, considered more revealing, the 
research focused on and used only the refined responses 
derived for each situation. 
The choice of statistical operations available for use 
on information obtained through empirical enquiry is 
governed by the type of scale assigned to the data. 
Hence some consideration of the nature of data provided 
by the scale used in this research is called for. 
The scales in Section 1 of the questionnaire [Appendix 
B, Volume II] required respondents to select one of 
seven confidence levels in the auditor's independence. 
They were 7-point scales commencing with 0 (NONE), and 
ending with 6 (TOTAL) and so were ordinal in nature. 
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However, the response scales were presented in such a 
manner so as to ensure that (where applicable) the 
physical distance between preceding and following 
measurement points were exactly equal. As such, the 
scales reflected interval-scale properties so that the 
relevant values were amenable to addition or 
subtraction (Bund Jackson, 1983: 3]. 
Consequently, while the response scales used were 
ordinal in nature because they conveyed information 
about rank or order, they also possessed cardinal 
qualities by virtue of the fact that they reflected 
interval-scale properties. 
The nature of the response scale used becomes important 
given that parametric tests require that the relevant 
values analysed come from (at least) an interval scale, 
whereas nonparametric tests require (at least) an 
ordinal scale, the values of which must have an 
underlying continuity and be independently determined 
(Siegel, 1956: 31]. 
Thus, as the response scales that were used in this 
research are best described as ordinal-interval scales, 
both parametric and nonparametric tests were (available 
for use and) employed on the situational and MLC 
responses provided when completing the questionnaire. 
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6.2 Questionnaire content 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to 
explain the rationale underlying the inclusion of each 
of the twenty research situations in the questionnaire. 
In doing so, some of the more detailed findings arrived 
at by other empirical researchers when examining views 
of situations based on similar facts are presented. 
The twenty research situations are considered in sets 
that, with a slight variation, reflect the four EAI 
sets identified by the ICAEW [1987). Situations falling 
into each set are discussed in the following paragraphs 
and the factors themselves are: 
1. The Reliance Factor 
This factor refers to the auditor's reliance on the 
client firstly to be appointed as auditor in the first 
place and secondly for his continuance in office. This 
factor also recognises that no matter what the level of 
fee dependency on the client, at least to that extent, 
the auditor is economically reliant on the client. 
2. The Relationship Factor 
This factor includes those auditor-client relationships 
which, because of the circumstances on which they are 
predicated (e. g. familyr previous professional 
connections etc. ) may pose a threat to EAI. 
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3. The Pressure Factor 
This factor refers to situations 
of pressure (e. g. budget or time 
on the auditor and which, though 
prime or ultimate intention, may 
external auditor to sacrifice hi 
independence. 
where specific forms 
pressure) are levied 
that may not be the 
effectively cause the 
s professional 
4. The Involvement Factor 
This factor refers to those situations where the 
auditor's independence may be impaired because of his 
involvement (primarily financial), no matter how such 
involvement arise, with or in the affairs of the audit 
client. 
In turn, the following paragraphs consider, within 
their appropriate classifying factor, as indicated 
above, each of the twenty auditor-client (situations) 
relationships described in the present research 
questionnaire. 
6.2.1 The reliance situations 
One of the more important micro-level criticisms with 
external auditor independence stems from the auditor's 
reliance on his client. That reliance extends not only 
to the initial engagement, but also to the auditor's 
annual re-appointment. 
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The impact of that reliance is made more real because 
the client provides fee revenue to the auditor. indeed, 
in some cases, the extent of that revenue can be an 
important consideration to the auditor, in terms of his 
(economic) life and standard of living. In turn, each 
of the two types of reliance (identified above) are 
considered in this chapter. 
Reliance for (re-)appointment 
Concern within this issue arises from the fact that 
auditors are (in practice) almost always appointed by 
the boards of client companies, and continue in office 
only at the behest, and with the approval of these 
boards. 
Even though the Companies Act 1989 (Sec. 385) states 
that a company's auditors are to be appointed by its 
shareholders at a general meeting of the company, in 
practice, there is often little or no involvement in 
that process by shareholders, the entire matter being 
(effectively) dealt with by the board. 
Thus, auditors owe not only their first appointment but 
also their continued office, to the directors. Further, 
if theýboard be so minded (within limitations and after 
due process) the auditor may be excluded from being 
reappointed. 
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Directors thus have effective power to "hire" and 
"fire" auditors. As such, is it reasonable to expect 
directors not to take cognition of the auditor's 
reliance on them, or, is it more reasonable to expect 
them to exert some form of pressure on auditors, on the 
basis that "he who pays the piper calls the tune" - 
especially knowing that if the piper refuses to play 
the desired tune, it is within their power to end the 
association and seek out a piper who will? 
In audit terms, the analogous processes are a mix of 
"tendering" and "opinion shopping", whereby the board 
terminates the engagement of the auditor, mainly 
because he refuses to be as "pliable" as required, and 
the audit is then put to tender, with the board letting 
it be known what their preferred accounting method, on 
one or several relevant accounting issues, is. 
Against such practices, Mitchell complains that "with a 
suitable firm selected, the directors ask shareholders 
to rubber-stamp their decision. Shareholders are kept 
in the dark. No details about the tenders ... are 
given. " ("Bankruptcies raise questions over auditors" - 
Financial Timesr December 6.199o: 13]. In his view 
then, the basic issue is that inevitably, and in due 
course, auditors become "indebted" to the (board of) 
directors of the companies they audit. 
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Accordingly, Mitchell contends that there are severe 
pressures placed on the independence of auditors, as 
they owe their very appointment as auditors to the 
Board, and to that extent, become reliant on it. 
Further, as may be expected, that reliance increases as 
its relative importance in ielation to the auditor's 
overall client and fee portfolio also increases. 
For such reasons, it is argued, the auditor acquires an 
interest in the continuance of the client and, on that 
basis it is also argued, auditors will never be really 
be independent of their clients. Further, given that 
directors are agents of the shareholders, and that 
auditors are appointed to report on accounts presented 
by the same directors, a conflict element must arise. 
So it is stated "no amount of new standards will 
persuade investors to trust figures, unless they know 
that accountants have no interest in buttering up the 
managers of the companies they audit. " ["Blowing the 
whistle on accountancy" - The Economist, December 22, 
1990: 16] 
The Guardian states "that the obvious answer is to make 
auditors of ... companies truly independent of (their) 
clients through appointment by an outside body. " 
("Audit Reform" - The Guardianj December 5,1990: 13] 
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Pearson and Ryans researched this issue in the US using 
four groups associated with audited statements. Two 
groups were CPAs from Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight firms. 
The other two were users of audited statements, being 
either Chartered Financial Analysts (CFAs) or holders 
of a Certificate in Management Accounting (CMAs). 
In the context of management exerting pressure on the 
auditor, Pearson and Ryans [1981-82: 5] determined: 
"that over 70% of each of the four groups agreed 
with the statement that boards of directors of 
publicly-held companies should have audit 
committees consisting of outside independent 
board members as a means of assuring 
independence. Additionally, over 50% of each 
group registered their belief that audit fees and 
other arrangements should be determined by the 
board of directors/audit committee and the CPA 
firm, as a means of assuring CPA independence. " 
However, given that auditors are very often appointed 
by the board (or a committee of it), this research 
might have proved more fruitful had it asked: "Should 
CPAs be appointed by a totally neutral organisation; 
i. e. one not at involved with the client? " 
Having been appointed auditor, one of the more real 
threats faced by him is the possibility of being 
replaced by another. No doubt, the extent of the threat 
is governed by the availability of, and degree of 
competition between, alternative auditors in the market 
[Shockley, 1981: 787 and 1982: 136; Lindsay, 1989: 5). 
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Lindsay [1989: 16) determined that "members of two 
important user groups perceived auditors who operated 
in highly competitive environments ... as having a 
higher likelihood of acquiescing to a client's 
demands. " For these groups, the degree of competition 
was an important factor in the exercise of EAI. 
In similar vein, Shockley [1981: 786] tested the 
hypothesis that "CPA firms operating in an environment 
characterised by a high level of competition are 
perceived as having a greater risk of losing their 
audit independence than are CPAs operating in a low- 
I competition environment". 
Shockley tested this hypothesis between and within four 
groups (and sub-groups) associated with the issue or 
use of audited financial statements (including CPAs). 
His results (Shockley, 1981: 791] revealed that, 
overall, respondents from all the four research groups 
perceived "that higher levels of competition increase 
the risk of independence being impaired"., 
As such, it is quite likely that this perceived threat 
assumes greater significance, and more than a touch of 
reality, when there are very good "commercially" 
pragmatic reasons for the replacement of a company's 
current auditors. 
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Such pragmatic reasons might well include the need for 
a uniformly associated set of auditors throughout the 
clients group's sphere of operations, as it is a widely 
held view that there are efficiencies and economies to 
be derived from the appointment of the same set of 
associated auditors across an enterprises, operations. 
Such a recent example is seen in the appointment of 
Price Waterhouse as the (only) worldwide auditor for 
Dalgety Plc, the company having formerly used the audit 
services of Price Waterhouse, Touche Ross and KPMG Peat 
Marwick McLintock for specific parts and locations. 
In making the announcement, the Finance Director stated 
"having three auditors was not a very efficient way of 
operating" and at the same time noted the'trend for 
companies to cut down to just one firm of auditors for 
their worldwide operations ("Dalgety appoints Price 
Waterhouse" - Accountancy Age, March 7,, 1991: 2]. 
A further example is seen in the appointment of PMM as 
auditors to Hoare Govett, following the latter's 
acquisition by Security Pacific. The change was held as 
"a move designed to bring about a more efficient 
centralised (audit) system worldwide" ("Audit Switch" - 
Accountancy Age, March 31,1988: 2), as PMM were 
already auditors to Security Pacific. 
190 
The trend to one set of auditors is evidenced even 
within the area of bank and financial institution 
audits, where the practice of joint audits has 
prevailed for many years. Canadian law [Bank Act, 1980) 
requires banks to be audited by two auditors jointly. 
One such recent example is the appointment of Price 
Waterhouse as the sole auditor to Nationwide Anglia 
Building Society, in preference to either of the two 
joint auditors (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte and Touche 
Ross) previously engaged by the Society ("Nationwide 
drops auditors" - Accountancy Age, June 20,1991: 2]. 
A second such instance is seen in the retention by 
National Westminster Bank Plc of Peat Marwick McLintock 
as sole auditors to the bank, displacing Ernst & Young 
who previously acted with PMM [IIE&Y lose Natwest audit" 
- Accountancy Age, February 7,1991: 2). 
As still more evidence to suggest that even Big-Six 
firms are not immune to competition in the trend to 
rationalise audit costs and reassess the practice of 
joint-auditors, one more instance is offered. For 
example, note the removal of Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
as a joint auditor to Standard Chartered Bankr in 
favour of the continuing sole auditor (PMM) ["Solo 
Audit" - Accountancy Age, August 11,1988: 2]. 
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Auditors themselves are known to have made public their 
desire to audit their clients' activities in all the 
countries where the clients operate. For example, in 
1989 Ernst & Young made a presentation to PA Consulting 
Group for their "worldwide audit assignments" ["Merger 
is last straw as Ernst lose PA audit" - Accountancy 
Age, August 3.1989: 1]. 
Considering the above comments and (recent) facts, and 
the reliances showed in them, Situation 5 was developed 
to examine perceptions of the threat to EAI when there 
is insecurity attached to the auditor's tenure and (by 
suggestion) a competitive audit environment. 
Fee reliance (nationally) 
There are other aspects of the reliance of an audit 
firm upon its audit client. Reliance is restricted not 
only to the first appointment, for, once appointed, the 
client is the source of a continuing (but varying) 
proportion of the audit firm's total income. 
Even a cursory observer would be alarmed if that 
proportion were more than 50%. Thus guidance offered 
(ICAEW, 1987: 20] states: "a practice, ... should 
endeavour to ensure that the recurring fees paid by one 
client or group of connected clients do not exceed 15% 
of the gross fees of the practice ... ". 
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Obviously the intent of the guidance is to avoid 
auditors from becoming reliant on one particular 
source for a significant part of their fee income. But 
at what point does a proportion of fee income become 
materially significant to the practice concerned? 
In general, the ICAEW sees amounts in excess of 15% as 
being the cut-off point. But could that point be seen 
by audit-users to be closer to 10%? Lueck [1986: 54] 
notes that German expression to the Eighth Directive 
allows for "the financial dependence of an auditor vis- 
a-vis a client (to be) questioned when more than 10% of 
the auditor's billings depend on a single client. " 
However in the words of a partner in one of the smaller 
firms of Chartered Accountants in Londont "even 6% can 
be an influential proportion when times are tough ... 
as they are right now. " [Private Interview- April 12, 
1991. ] This suggests that the proportion itself may 
vary with economic conditions and (perhaps) firm-size. 
UK empirical research conducted by Firth [1980: 465] 
with three groups concerned with EAI (CAs. Financial 
Analysts and Bank Loan Officers) determined that a 
relationship where the firm received 1115% of its gross 
fees from one client" was seen as non-independent by at 
least (roughly) half the respondents from each group. 
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In total, only about 20% of respondents considered the 
auditor to be independent in the situation. Respondents 
took that view despite the fact that the SEC and the 
professional UK and US audit bodies would (normally) 
view the auditor to be professionally independent in 
that situation. 
Later research by Firth [1981: 184] examined how 
certain auditor-auditee relationships influenced 
lending decisions by bankers. The bankers were asked to 
assess various auditor-auditee relationships and state 
the amount of loan they would grant under each 
relationship and the totally independent one as well. 
In a situation identical to the one above (i. e. 15% fee 
dependency), the mean loan granted by bankers was 
significantly less than that granted by them under an 
"independent" relationship. This would suggest that 
even a 15% fee dependency relationship was one that 
tended to cause concern with EAI and reduce confidence 
in the lending decision. 
Similar research conducted by Dykxhoorn and sinning 
[1982: 337-347] in Germany examined perceptions of EAI 
within 17 specified auditor-auditee relationships. One 
such was based on audit fee dependencies of varying (5, 
10,25,50, and 75) percentages. 
194 
Their research was conducted within German banks (in 
West Germany) and examined the views of (49) Loan 
Directors and (31) Investment Directors. Inter alia, 
they determined that at a 10% fee dependency more than 
80% of the respondents from both groups perceived the 
relationship to be independent. However, at a 25% fee 
dependency the comparable group fell to at least 30%. 
Unfortunately they did not examine views based on a 15% 
fee dependency, as that might have been used as an 
appropriate yardstick in the UK. However, in the same 
research study, Dykxhoorn and Sinning concluded that 
perceptions of EAI significantly affected the loan 
decisions of the banker respondents used therein. 
Mindful of the preceding findings and those in Firth's 
(1980] research, where most respondents appeared 
concerned when 15% of an auditor's fee income was 
derived from one client, Situation 12 was developed 
precisely to assess how dependence by an audit firm for 
only lot of its total fee income on the firm's only 
listed client was seen by the research respondents. 
Fee reliance (locally) 
It is not uncommon for national London-based firms of 
auditors to operate on the basis of (smaller) local 
offices throughout the UK. 
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Thus, it is quite possible that while an individual 
audit client accounts for a significant proportion of 
the local firm's fee income, it constitutes an 
immaterial proportion in total national terms. 
Nevertheless, given that individual local audit offices 
deal with their clients on a basis that is not governed 
by national considerations, it may be that perceptions 
of auditor-auditee relationships are essentially 
governed by local and not national considerations. 
Against the preceding possibility, Situation 18 
examined how EAI was perceived when 20% of the fee 
income of the local office of a Top Ten firm came from 
one client, but nevertheless accounted for less than 1% 
of the firm's national billings. 
Thus, Situations 18 and 12 are very similar. The only 
main difference between them is the percentage of fee 
revenue generated from the client in question. 
Situation 12 is one where the firm generated fee 
revenue of 10% of its total revenue (5% less than the 
cut-off limit suggested by the ICAEW's guide) from its 
only listed client. In contrast, Situation 18 is one 
where the proportion of revenue generated is 20% in 
local office terms, but only 1% in national terms. 
196 
6.2.2 The relationship situations 
When auditors view or treat their clients on a non- 
arms length basis, then it is likely that their EAI may 
I become impaired. Thus, it is of benefit to identify and 
examine situations that may cause auditors to drop 
their arms-length defence. Analyses [Shockley, 1982; 
DTII 1986 and Waters, 1986] suggest that such 
situations may arise as a consequence of (inter alia): 
1. the auditor having held office for a significant 
number of years (Length of Tenure). 
2. the cross-transfer of personnel from the auditor to 
the client and vice-versa (Personnel Cross-Overs). 
9 3. the presence of family ties (Family Relationships). 
the effect of the personal prestige, position or 
power of client chairmen or other senior officers 
(Human Psycho-Dynamics). 
Each of these possibilities are considered in relation 
to a situation in the research questionnaire. 
Length of Tenure 
once appointed, auditors 
indefinitely. Indeed, in 
appointed to office each 
and with little or no at, 
original (or continuing) 
can legally remain in office 
some cases they are re- 
year without much question, 
tempt to reassess their 
appointment. 
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In such cases, in time, it is alleged, conflicts of 
interest develop because auditors-develop "cosy" 
relationships with the managements of these clients - 
relationships which may very well reduce (impair) their 
professional audit integrity, objectivity and 
independence. 
While stating that "close friendships" may indeed cause 
a threat to EAI, the ICAEW [1987] guidelines do not 
offer a precise explanation of what may constitute such 
a relationship. Hence audit practitioners are required 
to interpret the phrase "close friendships" according 
to their own personal yardsticks. 
Nevertheless, if the guidelines tend to frown on "close 
friendships" only, one inference must be that 
friendships that are not close, are ethically and 
professionally in order. 
As stated, the formal guidance offered in this context, 
to auditors by the ICAEW is less than precise. However 
it does state that: 
"Personal relationships can affect objectivity. 
There is a particular need, therefore, for a 
practice to ensure that its objective approach to 
any assignment is not endangered as a consequence 
of any personal relationship. 
By way of example, problems may arise where the 
same partner or senior staff member works for a 
number of years on the same audit ... 11 (ICAEWv 1987: 21] 
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When developing his conceptual model of EAI, Shockley 
[1982: 137] considered the possibility that this issue 
(length of time an auditor has been in office - i. e. 
tenure) may affect the risk of impaired EAI. 
Shockley's model indicates both positive (in terms of 
beneficial effects caused by the provision of MAS) and 
negative (in terms of possible harm to the audit) 
causality on EAI, of an auditor's extended tenure. 
In its report assessing the US audit profession, the 
Senate Committee on Governmental operations [US Senate, 
1976: 21] called for "a mandatory change of accountants 
after a given period of years", stating that: 
"long association between a corporation and an 
accounting firm may lead to such close 
identification of the firm with the interests of 
its client's management, that truly independent 
action by the accounting firm becomes difficult" 
In comparable UK terms, the DTI states that: 
"it is arguable that in situations where there is 
a long standing relationship between a client and 
a firm of auditors, standards of objectivity and 
independence may not be as strict as might 
otherwise be the case. " [DTI, 1986: 31). 
Thus,, in order to avoid such a situation the DTI 
suggests that one "approach might be to require a 
change of auditors at regular intervals, so as to limit 
the scope for any identification of interests between 
auditors and management. " [DTI, 1986: 311. 
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Proponents of such suggestions argue that since, in the 
rotating scenario, the auditor's tenure would be fixed, 
his incentive to resist pressure from management would 
be considerably enhanced. 
Equally, these proponents suggest, that when new 
auditors are appointed to an audit, they would usually 
bring a fresh perspective (and viewpoint) to the client 
and the relevant audit. Simplistically expressed, the 
basic underlying justification for that view is the 
belief that "new must be better". 
However, on the other hand, the CAR [1978: 109) 
determined that according to their studies of 
substandard performance by auditors, "several of the 
problem cases were in fact first or second-year 
audits". The Commission's view was that it may well be 
there is a higher audit risk associated with new audit 
clients, rather than ones of long-standing. 
Further, in the Commission's view, there might even be 
a reduction of audit risks once an auditor becomes 
well acquainted (over time) with the operations of 
a client. Accordingly, it concludes that "if a 
relationship between audit failures and new clients 
does exist, rotation would increase the problem and be 
detrimental to users. " [CAR, 1978: 109]. 
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In summary then, the basis for any possible association 
between a lack of independence and auditors of long 
standing, is the view that over long periods of time, 
"close personal relationships" could or do develop, 
between the auditor and the management of the client. 
[In practice, one must not ignore the fact that many 
firms do rotate both partners and staff on clients, 
some firms rotating the second partner each yearll) 
In empirical terms, Shockley (1981: 785-800] conducted 
research into the effect of tenure (5 or fewer years, 
contrasted with more than 5 years, of holding office) 
on perceptions of EAI. 
Shockley's research was conducted amongst four groups 
associated with (or the use of) audited statements. 
1. Partners in Big-Eight CPA firms. 
2. Partners in other CPA firms 
3. Commercial Loan Officers 
4. Financial Analysts. 
The only group where significant effects for the tenure 
factor were evident was with the Loan Officers. All 
other groups indicated tenure not to be a significant 
determining factor. Interestingly, some respondents 
actually perceived an increase (rather than a decrease) 
in EAI, as the tenure increased. 
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Thus,, there is evidence of a two-way significance 
related to the tenure factor. As such, Shockley (1981: 
798) advises caution in interpreting his result, 
stating: 
"The non-significance of the tenure factor ... 
must be interpreted with caution. Individual 
analyses indicated that of the 36 subjects who 
found the tenure factor significant, 17 weighted 
it in the direction opposite to the hypothesised 
negative effect. " 
In examining perceptions of EAI in the situation where 
"an audit partner has been in sole charge of a large 
audit (taking up to 3 months of the partner's time) for 
the past ten years", Firth (1980: 451-466] determined 
that tenure (in and by itself) did not appear to be an 
EAI influencing factor, because at least 78% of all the 
research groups perceived that auditor-auditee 
relationship as being independent. 
A comparable study by Bates et al [1982: 60-63] 
investigated the effect of varying lengths (and forms) 
of auditor-client affiliation on auditing judgements. 
The results showed that auditing judgements made by the 
group of auditor respondents that were not subject to 
rotation, were more generous towards their clients. In 
contrast to Firth's [1980] findings, the overall 
indication was "that auditor judgements do appear to be 
affected by long-term auditor-client relations. " 
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Against that background, Situation 1 was developed to 
examine views of EAI when the auditor has held office 
for an extended time (15 years). Thus, given varying 
views on this aspect of EAI, it was of interest to see 
how it was seen by issuers and users of audit reports. 
Personnel Cross-overs (audit firm to audit client)- 
Another possible means of breeding and concurrently 
manifesting a possible "cosy-relationship", between 
auditor and client is, the appointment of partners (or 
senior audit staff) as Directors of audit clients. 
Exceptionally, the reverse process whereby senior 
client staff are employed by the audit firm may obtain. 
In fact, it is not uncommon for senior staff in audit 
firms to become officers of the clients they previously 
helped to audit. Indeed, some enter auditing in the 
hope that it will provide such an opportunity and (it 
is alleged) certain firms are very disposed to such 
arrangements, fostering them to the extent possible. 
Such fertilisation by the audit firm is not without 
merit from the client's view. The transferring auditor 
will have usually audited the client's financial system 
and, records. In doing so, he would have acquired a good 
knowledge of the client's MIS and learnt many of the 
unique aspects and problems of, its operations. 
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Additionally, he would be able to offer the client the 
breadth of his experience with other systems and 
businesses - factors not readily available to the 
client, but ones that are certainly of benefit to it. 
However the negative implications are that the threat 
to independence in such situations arises by virtue of 
the fact that the current work, results and decisions 
of such former senior audit staff are now required to 
be audited by former (and usually) less-senior staff. 
On that basis, some concerned analysts ask how 
objective can the ensuing audit be, and can the audit 
staff impartially consider the explanations offered by 
their former partners or audit managers? 
In fact, there is some limited basis for a justified 
measure of concern. some auditing cases (Escott v. 
BarChris for instance) "have revealed instances of 
audit staff members accepting false accounting 
representations" from senior financial staff of audit 
clients, such staff having previously been employed by 
the audit firm in question [CAR, 1978: 100]. 
In this context, the CAR [1978] looked at the issue of 
Executive Search and Placement -a service most large 
audit firms offer their audit clients and non-clients. 
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To clarify, the term "placement" refers to finding 
employment for professionals terminating their 
employment in the audit firm, with an audit client. The 
term "executive search" covers employment services 
other than placements. 
In the view of the Cohen Commission, "there is a 
potential for conflicts (of interest) arising from 
executive search and other personnel recruitment 
service. " However, the commission also believed that 
"the adverse implications of this particular 
independence problem are easily outweighed by the 
benefits of the present manpower development 
structure. " [CAR, 1978: 101-102). 
While the phenomenon of placement is certainly present 
in the UK, no published research is at hand to quantify 
its extent. one relatively recent UK example is to be 
seen in the appointment of Michael Armitage (a former 
Binder Hamlyn partner) as the Group Finance Director of 
Eurocopy PLC, which continues to be audited by staff 
from Armitage's former Binder Hamlyn office. ["Partner 
Quits" - Accountancy Age, August 18,1988: 2]. 
More recently (July 1991), one notes the appointment of 
Kathleen O'Donovan, a former London audit partner with 
Ernst & Young, as the Finance Director of BTR Plc. 
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It is reported that while with Ernst & Young, O'Donovan 
was involved with the audit of BTR for 13 years, the 
last two as the audit partner responsible for it [11BTR 
chooses female auditor for FD11 - Accountancy Age, June 
20,1991: 2]. 
While the guidelines of both the ICAEW and the AICPA 
refer to the situation where an officer of a client, 
becomes a partner in the firm auditing the client, they 
appear to be relatively silent on the reverse (a former 
audit partner becoming an officer in an audit client). 
However, interpretation of the ICAEW's and AICPA's 
position, shows that, in general, employment or 
directorships in audit clients by former audit partners 
(or senior staff) is ethically acceptable. 
Nevertheless, acceptance is based on the proviso that 
the partner sever all financial relationships with the 
firm so that no leverage is available to him, by which 
he may influence his own personal income via profits of 
the firm, and in addition he must clearly hold himself 
out to be no longer associated with his former firm. 
The AICPA [1978: 4447] makes a distinction between the 
decision to engage an employee and the putting forward 
of a short-list of highly recommended candidates. 
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The AICPA's view is that if the client takes the final 
decision to hire a candidate, and the audit firm's role 
is confined to merely putting forward a list of very 
recommended names, then no impairment of independence 
is likely to prevail. 
However, given the merits of a client engaging staff 
previously engaged on its audit (and who would 
therefore already be cognitive of the client's 
financial systems), one wonders how persuasive such a 
distinction really is. Is it one that is easily made by 
users of audited accounts? 
Imhoff's (1978] research on this aspect of EAI in the 
US, sought to evaluate the potential external auditor 
independence problems posed to continuing auditors by 
CPAs from these firms accepting employment with one of 
their clients. The research was conducted with selected 
users of audited financial statements and (a nonrandom 
sample of) CPAs in local US offices of only two Big- 
six f irms. 
Thus, recognising any consequent inherent limitations, 
the research revealed that, within a given time frame, 
23% of audit staff had left employment with their audit 
firm, and of them, 20% had taken up employment with a 
client. 
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Imhoff's research also determined that the severity of 
the independence problem was different for the two 
groups, and that the rank (supervisor or non- 
supervisor) of the auditor, and the length of time 
elapsed between auditing the client's records and later 
employment by the client (time interval), were factors 
influencing the severity with which impact on EAI was 
seen by both groups. In both cases users were more 
sensitive to rank and elapsed time than the auditor 
group. 
Firth's [1980: 451-466] study of facts similar to those 
of Situation 9, showed that of the four groups studied, 
at least 65% of each group, and 71% of all respondents 
together, perceived the situation to be an independent 
auditor-auditee relationship. 
on that basis, employment by an audit client of a 
former partner from its firm of auditors, is generally 
not seen as a threat to EAI by these groups of persons 
concerned with it. However, bankers used as respondents 
in a later study by Firth [1981: 179-188], registered 
their willingness to grant significantly lower loan 
facilities based on a relationship of this nature, than 
when compared to the comparable loan granted on an 
"independent auditor-client relationship". To that 
extent, these findings echo those of Imhoff [1978]. 
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Against the preceding considerations, Situation 9 was 
developed to assess perceptions of EAI where a (former) 
partner in the company's (continuing) auditors is 
appointed as MD of an audit client. 
Personnel Cross-overs (Audit--client to-audit firm) 
Audit firms are not only the occasional providers of 
personnel for their clients. They are (sometimes) also 
the recipients of personnel from their clients. 
The AICPA [1986: 4411] addresses concern with this 
phenomenon indirectly when it states that the 
independence of a member (or a firm in which he is a 
partner) shall be impaired if a report is made on 
statements and if: 
"during the period covered by 
statements, during the period 
engagement, or at the time of 
opinion, (an auditor) or his 
connected with the enterprise 
management or an employee" 
the financial 
of the professional 
expressing an 
firm ... was 
as a ... member of 
In further clarification, the AICPA [1986: 4419-5] 
states when citing cases where EAI would be impaired in 
appearance, that this does not apply to an auditor (or 
his employee): 
"solely because he was formerly associated with 
the client in any capacity .... if such employee has disassociated himself from the client and 
does not participate in the engagement for the 
client covering any period of his association 
with the client', 
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According to the German Stock Corporation Law (1965)f 
an auditor is prohibited from auditing a company if he 
had an employee-employer relationship with it during 
the three years prior to his appointment as auditor. In 
practice, this generally means "responsible and 
continuing" employment of the auditor by the client for 
these three years [Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981: 98]. 
The Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
CICAA, 1984: 23062] also recognises the possibility of 
impaired EAI in such circumstances, when it states: 
"No person ... shall personally take part in the 
exercise of the reporting function in respect of 
a client if, during the period in respect of 
which the report is to be made or at any time in 
the twelve months prior to the first day of the 
period in respect of which the report is to be 
made, the person or a near relative has been an 
officer .... partner or employee of the client" 
The ICAEW provides for the possibility of staff moving 
from employment with a client to engagement as a 
professional with the audit firm, declaring that: 
"No one should personally take part in the 
exercise of the reporting function on a company 
if he has, during the period upon which the 
report is to be made, or at any time in the two 
years prior to the first day thereof, been an 
officer (other than an auditor) or employee of 
that company" (ICAEW,, 1987: 24]. 
While there is no hard evidence of significant movement 
of staff from clients to firms in the UK, there is a 
growing trend for firms to absorb staff from sources 
other than their own trainees or other audit firms. 
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For example, many audit firms have set up specialised 
financial services departments, often (but not always) 
within their consulting divisions, to provide advice on 
the increasing complexities of the financial markets. 
To staff such specialised departments audit firms have 
had to recruit staff from outside sources. 
For instance, Price Waterhouse recently appointed a 
senior banker from the Bank of England to be chairman 
of their world regulatory advisory group for banks and 
other financial institutions. On occasions, audit firms 
have even resorted to hiring staff from their clients, 
and there is a growing trend of them recruiting staff 
from the Tax and VAT Departments of the Government. 
An example of this is seen in the case of a former 
Inland Revenue regional controller joining Price 
Waterhouse as head of a new division assisting 
companies facing tax investigations ["Revenue defector" 
- Accountancy Age, February 25,1988: 2]. 
Situation 17 was presented for consideration against 
the background of varying periods of the critical 
employer-employee relationship -3 years in Germany and 
in effect, 2 and 3 years respectively in Australia and 
UK. In the US it appears to be the period covered by 
the relevant audit report. 
211 
Thus,, Situation 17 was presented in order to see if its 
facts evoked a measure of concern with respondents, 
given that the ICAEW would (normally) see nothing 
ethically repugnant in them. 
Familv Relationships 
Professional auditing bodies recognise that the 
existence of close family ties between the auditor and 
the owner and/or a senior officer of the audit client 
may pose a threat to the independence of the auditor, 
and so can be perceived as a provocation to EAI. 
The matter is specifically recognised by the ICAEW, 
when it states in notes to its guidance document that: 
"Such (EAI) problems can also exist in situations 
of close friendship or relationship by blood or 
marriage ... 11 (ICAEW, 1987: 21] 
However, guidance given by the ICAEW [1987: 19] is 
intended to be less than fully definitive, on the basis 
that "guidance ... cannot be all embracing and it is 
for members to use their own. good sense in applying the 
spirit of the guidance". 
The parallel guidance on the issue offered to auditors 
in Ontario (Canada) by the ICAO, is very similar to 
that offered by the ICAEW, with the ICAO also 
refraining from offering any precise formal guidance on 
particular or specified close relationships. 
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The ICAO's guidance, found in its Professional Conduct 
Rules, which in terms of "close relationships" and 
rules on "objectivity" (used as a more pragmatic 
synonym for independence by ICAO), in Rule 204 states: 
"Where one or more close relatives of a member, 
even if not having the same home as the member, 
holds a material interest in any organization, 
the member and his firm, is unlikely to have the 
appearance of objectivity" [ICAO, 1982: 608) 
As does the ICAEW, the ICAO [1981: 608] refrains from 
offering guidance on specified close relationships 
stating that, "the facts in each case determine whether 
or not there appears to be an acceptable degree of 
objectivity, " while indicating the readiness and 
willingness of its professional conduct committee "to 
give rulings in individual cases. " 
In contrast, the AICPA's approach is to provide precise 
guidance based on hypothetical situations and so. its 
Professional Standards CAICPA, 1986: 4437] distinguish 
close relationships on the basis of "spouses and 
dependent persons" and "nondependent close relatives". 
It further distinguishes such relationships on the 
basis of whether or not they are "audit sensitive". In 
general, its view is that close relationships with 
audit sensitive persons impair the appearance of EAI. 
The relevant AICPA [1986: 4419-7) ruling states that: 
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"members must be aware that it is impossible to 
enumerate all circumstances wherein the 
appearance of a member's independence might be 
questioned by third parties because of a (close) 
family or dependent person relationships. " 
Hence the AICPA (1986: 4419-7] advises its members to 
assess all the relevant factors in order to determine 
whether: 
"a reasonable person aware of all the facts, and 
taking into consideration normal strength of 
character and normal behaviour under the 
circumstances, (would) conclude that the 
situation poses an unacceptable threat to the 
member's objectivity and appearance of 
independence" 
Additionally, in order to provide even more formal 
guidance on this issue, the AICPA [1986: 4419-7] goes 
on to state that: 
"the independence of a member and his firm is 
impaired with respect to the enterprise if: 
1. A proprietor, partner, shareholder, or 
professional employee, any of whom are 
participating in the engagement, has a close 
relative who: 
a: can exercise significant influence over the 
operating, financial, or accounting policies 
of the client; 
b: is otherwise employed in a position where the 
persons activities are audit sensitive; 
c: has a financial interest in the client that is 
material to the close relative and of which 
the proprietor, partner, shareholder, or 
professional employee has knowledge. 
2. A proprietor, partner, shareholder, or 
managerial employee, any of whom are located 
in an office participating in a significant 
influence over the operating, financial, or 
accounting policies of the client. " 
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Quite clearly, the issue of close personal 
relationships does not lend itself to clearly defined 
rules. However, while the ICAEW offers minimal formal 
guidance on it, the AICPA is more forthcoming in 
clarifying EAI problems of this nature. 
Indeed, the AICPA offers a pertinent question and 
answer based on facts similar to those of Situation 20. 
The question relates to a situation where the brother 
of a partner in an audit firm "is a stockholder and one 
of three vice-presidents of a closely held" company, 
the firm being located in the same locale as, and 
acting as auditors to, the relevant corporation. 
Clarifying EAI considerations in this situation, the 
AICPA states that "the appearance of independence is 
lacking since the relationships between the member and 
his brother are presumed to be so close as to suggest 
that the member may not be objective in his 
examination" (AICPA, 1986: 4437]. 
Firth [1980: 451-466] examined perceptions of EAI in a 
similar situation, where the Controller (a non-elected 
financial employee) of a company was the brother of the 
partner in the firm auditing the company's accounts, 
and the controller's brother was "the partner in charge 
of the audit". 
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Firth's research showed that for this situation, a 
minority of (at least) 13% of the groups surveyed felt 
the situation reflected an independent auditor-auditee 
relationship. [UK auditing bodies would certainly 
consider the relationship to be non-independent. ] 
However, Situation 20 differs from Firth's (preceding) 
situation in two important respects: 
1. In Firth's situation the relationship is assessed 
around the client's controller, whereas the present 
situation relates to the client's Managing Director. 
2. In Firth's situation the partner responsible for the 
audit, is the controller's brother, whereas in the 
present situation, the audit partner is a partner of 
the MD's brother, and the brother takes no part in 
the audit. 
In the same study, Firth [1980: 463] assessed views of 
EAI in a relatively similar situation reflecting a 
family relationship, except that: 
1. the family relationship assessed was that of a 
brother-in-law (not brother), with a senior employee 
of the audit client being so related to a partner in 
the firm auditing the company's accounts. 
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2. the partner responsible for the audit was not the 
brother-in-law of the senior employee of the client. 
3. the senior employee was not "directly involved in 
the financial affairs" of the client,, being employed 
as its Sales Director. 
In relation to this situation, Firth determined that at 
least 80% of all the research groups he surveyed 
perceived the relevant relationship to be independent. 
However, consistent weak concern with EAI was noted 
across all groups, with at least 10% of each putting 
forth a "not independent" opinion on the relationship. 
Against that background, Situation 20 was developed to 
judge how concerned respondents might be with an 
auditor-auditee relationship with indications of a 
close personal (fraternal) relationship between the 
partner of the client's auditor and the client's MD. 
Human Psycho-Dynamics 
Even if one ignores the alleged "vulnerability's of the 
auditor caused by the basis on which his initial and 
annual appointments are made, and the threat posed by 
close or family relationships, one must recognise that 
as individual human beings, auditors also reflect human 
qualities, features, weaknesses and characteristics. 
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on that basis, it must be reasonable to expect some 
auditors to stand in awe of persons wielding dominant 
power; whether such power be a reflection of financial 
success and acumen, political standing or any other 
factors. 
The ICAEW recognises just such a potential threat to 
EAI when it states that "problems may arise where ... 
work is being done for a company dominated by one 
individual" CICAEW, 1987: 21). 
The question then arises as to how auditors respond to 
such persons holding important positions with audit 
clients and/or powerful positions in society. 
In this regard, Waters (1986: 17] states that a lack of 
auditor independence can often be caused by factors 
much more subtle "than the obvious cases of pressure 
from directors". 
In support Waters offers remarks made by Sampson Marks, 
a partner in Citroen Wells, (auditor to many of the 
private companies run by John Stonehouse, who at that 
time was a former PMG, respected politician, MP and an 
apparently successful businessman) to DTI inspectors 
appointed to examine the affairs of the failed London 
Capital Group in 1974. 
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Referring to his relationship with Stonehouse, Sampson 
Marks stated (in his defence): 
"When one is dealing with somebody who, through 
government posts, one had assumed to be a person 
of integrity ... a person who had been so 
responsible that he had been given ministerial 
posts, it did not occur to one that monies were 
being used for improper purposes. " 
In this context Waters [1986: 17] contends that "the 
auditor's keen eye was dimmed by preconceptions about 
and familiarity with a company director". 
A similar instance is that of (the late) Robert Maxwell 
and Pergamon Press Limited, which was effectively 
controlled and dominated by him. In the late 1960s the 
company was the subject of a DTI enquiry under Sec. 
165(b) of the (then current) Companies Act 1948. Having 
assessed the relationship between Maxwell and Chalmers 
Impey (now part of Kidsons Impey) auditors to 
Pergamon Press Limited at the time the inspectors 
state the company's auditors "should not have been 
satisfied by Mr. Maxwell's ever ready explanations and 
that they (Chalmers Impey) failed to rumble him. " 
Elsewhere, the DTI Inspectors' report goes on to state: 
"In considering Chalmers impey's position it 
should be remembered that ... Mr. Maxwell enjoyed 
an enviable reputation in the City of London and 
the political world, and seems to have been able 
to overwhelm almost everyone with whom he had 
dealings by the force of his personality. Even 
now some scientists and academics ... believe they cannot deal with anyone other than Mr. 
Maxwell over the question of learned journals. " 
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Such acceptance and trusting of senior corporate 
personnel is not a phenomenon restricted to the era of 
the sixties and seventies. Even now there is concern in 
this direction. For example, at a recent seminar on 
"Avoiding Corporate Failure",, Barbara Mills, head of 
the Serious Fraud office, "called upon auditors to 
resist pressure from strong-willed chairmen and chief 
executives" (i. e. resist pressure on EAI) to concur 
with creative sets of accounts ["Auditors blameless 
says report" - Accountancy Age, June 6,, 1991: 3]. 
While ethical codes refer to the more tangible aspects 
of EAI, it would be impractical for them to make 
comments (other than in the most general of terms) on 
the more involved aspect of the human dynamics that 
also influence such matters. As such, it is of 
consequence to see how respondents view such human 
dynamics and Situation 19 is an attempt to do just so. 
Against such considerations, Situation 19 was developed 
to see how potential audit relationships (environments) 
not formally addressed in relevant guidance, are seen 
by the research groups. The situation was developed to 
test for the possibility that questions such as the 
relative strength of the auditor vis-a-vis a powerful 
and respected client chairman may figure in one's view 
of when and how EAI is impaired. 
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6.2.3 The pressure situations 
It is a naive and somewhat simplistic-view to expect 
auditors to be free of all forms of pressure when 
performing their professional duties. For, as the audit 
profession in many countries is presently structured, 
auditors must run their organisations and offices on a 
sound economic and commercial basis in order to remain 
operating. 
Thus, auditors must be concerned with economies when 
purchasing materials and (inter alia) must be concerned 
with managing cash-flow efficiently. They must also be 
concerned with efficiency and productivity, client 
satisfaction and, in the final analysis, they must be 
concerned with retaining clients. For without clients, 
the auditor has no professional purpose. 
In general, users and beneficiaries of audit services 
have recognised the threat such considerations place on 
auditors, and in the main appear to have been satisfied 
that auditors have not fallen victim to such pressures. 
Recently however, there has been strong criticism of, 
and concern with, certain pressures encountered by the 
auditor in fulfilling his professional duties 
("Bankruptcies raise questions over auditors" - 
Financial Times, December 7,199o: Supplement V]. 
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Such pressures tend to be of two broad categories. 
Firstly pressure from the client, in the form of 
"client pressure" and secondly pressure from the 
immediate society (community) in which the auditor 
operates, in the form of "social pressure". 
Some of the more common forms that client pressure (and 
responses to it) may assume are: Excessive Time 
Pressure and Excessive Budget Pressure. social pressure 
may assume a variety of forms, often garbed in the form 
of considerations of (pressure from) the surrounding 
society, or elements of it (Community Pressure). 
There appears to be some basis for these concerns, both 
in the US and the UK. In the US, the CAR (1978: 94] 
stated that the "relationship between management and 
the auditor needs to be modified substantially to 
provide more support for the auditor's independenceOll 
In the UK, the Labour MP, Austin Mitchell, maintains 
that a major problem with the audit profession is that 
"audit firms are too dependent on their clients" 
["Mission to keep contestants out of judges' beds" - 
Financial Times, December 13,1990: 15). Hence the next 
three segments are devoted to an analysis of the nature 
of, and empirical assessment of the underlying extent 
of, concern with the above pressure factors. 
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Excessive Time Pressure 
It is not unknown for some audit clients to exert 
strong pressure on their auditors by requiring them to 
complete their professional duties within a highly 
limited time period. Such pressure is usually referred 
to as "time pressure", and denotes both the influences 
and the attempts, to reduce time spent on the audit. 
one possible basis for such time pressure is a widely 
held belief (more prevalent in the US than the UK) that 
efficient corporate financial management is manifest in 
an extremely prompt release of its audited financial 
results, shortly after the company's fiscal year-end. 
Further, in the belief that perceptions of such 
efficient financial management positively influence a 
company's share price, auditors of some listed 
companies are sometimes additionally pressured by the 
senior management in these companies to release 
complete audited results within extremely limited time 
intervals after the company's year-end. 
However, there is insufficient evidence to confirm a 
direct causal relationship between these time-related 
phenomena. Timely financial reporting is of course 
desirable, but it is unclear if, by itself, undue speed 
in the issuing of audited results is of any merit. 
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Indeed, "empirical investigations indicate that share 
prices are rarely affected by the issuance of annual 
reports" [CAR, 1978: 119). This finding is consistent 
with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which contends 
that, on publication of audited corporate data, it 
transpires that the market has almost always already 
taken regard of the information so presented. 
Thus, in an effort to conform to the wishes (pressures) 
of the client, audit partners sometimes exert 
significant pressure on their staff to complete audit 
procedures faster than practically possible, or with 
less diligence than that professionally required. 
If this is a continuing phenomenon, then considerations 
other than professional thoroughness have been regarded 
by the partners concerned, and in so doing their EAI 
(and that of their staff) may well have been impaired. 
Thus, if time pressure is unreasonable, it places a 
strain on the auditor's professionalism, causing him to 
"cut corners" and in so doing to (perhaps) cast aside 
an independent and impartial attitude of mind towards 
the client's affairs. The CAR (1978: 115] states that 
"although there are other factors, the Commission 
believes that excessive time pressures are one of the 
most persuasive causes of audit failures. " 
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In the relevant words of the Commission (CAR, 1978: 
116]: 
"closely related to budget pressures imposed by 
the public accounting firm are client (imposed) 
time pressures that sometimes cause the auditor 
to subordinate judgment to unreasonable demands 
and, therefore, to compromise independence. " 
No published results appear to be available for the 
presence of such phenomenon in the UK, but the Cohen 
Commission in the US,, stated that 1156% of respondents 
still in public practice had signed for completing 
audit steps (not covered by another compensating audit 
step) when they had not performed the work" (CAR, 1978: 
116]. 
The commission believed this audit deficiency to be the 
"most serious, for it reflects on the auditor's own 
control system for the audit. " It concluded that 
"elements of the business environment such as arbitrary 
time deadlines affect the quality of the audit, place 
unnecessary stress on the auditor's independence, and 
should be changed" (CAR, 1986: 94). 
Against the preceding background, Situation 11 was 
developed and presented in order to assess how any 
threat to professional EAI is perceived within the UK 
audit environment, in a situation where there is 
intense audit completion pressure being levied on the 
auditor by the client. 
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Excessive Budget Pressure 
Another type of pressure (closely related to time 
pressure) a client may exercise on the auditor is that 
of fee pressure - specifically intense pressure to 
operate under a very restricted fee (and time) budget 
for the audit. 
Manifest in its most extreme form, such pressure 
assumes the form of a questioning of, and resistance 
to, even the most efficiently priced and optimal audit 
fee. In audit terms, such pressure is referred to as 
budget pressure. 
However, given that audit costs are an element of 
overhead, and good financial management dictates that 
all overheads be contained to their lowest optimal 
levels, a certain level of budget pressure is in fact 
healthy, and should not necessarily be perceived as a 
negative phenomenon in terms of external auditor 
independence. 
Thus while realistic fee (and time) budgets are 
important and to be welcomed, unacceptable consequences 
arise if less than economical fees cause audit hours to 
be thoughtlessly reduced, without regard to the effect 
on audit quality. Similar views are expressed by a 
Working Party of the ICAEW (1986: 78-79) which states: 
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"Current competitive pressures may lead to practices 
which could jeopardise independence and compromise 
technical performance. These pressures represent a 
threat which has grown in importance in recent years-" 
However such pressures appear to have been present in 
the US for some years now. Indeed, to an extent they 
may have become institutionalised within the auditing 
profession there, for an introductory text book on 
auditing [Stettler, 1970: 36] even alerts potential 
auditors to the fact that budget "pressure is always 
present and is often severe. " 
In summarising its views on the issue, the Cohen 
Commission (CAR, 1978: 116-118) states that: 
"it is reasonable to assume that excessive 
competition producing low fees can cause 
unrealistic budgets, and that such budgets can 
increase substandard performance ... When a budgeting system induces behaviour such as 
signing off for work not performed or performing 
work but not recording the time for billing 
purposes, that budgeting system is producing 
conduct that is the opposite of the goals of a 
budgeting system and is inconsistent with 
professional auditing standards. " 
Against the foregoing, Situation 10 was developed in 
order to assess if the application of excessive budget 
pressure by the client was seen as cause for concern by 
the four research groups, and if so, to quantify the 
absolute and relative concern of each group. 
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Communitv Pressure 
The ICAEW describes a practice as being "all the 
offices carrying on the practice of accountancy within 
Great Britain, Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man under the same or similar name" [ICAEW, 1987: 
20). 
In doing so, it gives implicit recognition to the fact 
that, at times, local considerations and priorities of 
an office within a national practice, may"not always be 
the same as those of the latter, and as such, the 
matter warrants attention in a professional context. 
Further implicit recognition of the importance of local 
considerations and criteria is made evident in the 
ethical guidance document issued by the ICAEW [1987: 
20], wherein it is declared that: 
"in circumstances where a member is dependent for 
his income on the profits of any one office in a 
practice and the gross income of that office is 
regularly dependent on one client or a group of 
connected clients for more than 15% of its gross 
fees, a partner from another office of the 
practice should take final responsibility for any 
(audit) report made ... on the affairs of that 
client". 
Thus, given the practice structure of the audit 
profession in the UK, it is not uncommon for a firm of 
auditors located in smaller non-urban areas, to act as 
auditors to, in local terms, a very large and important 
local business organisation (almost always a company). 
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In many cases, such companies are the largest employer 
in the area, and consequently the employment, lives and 
economic activities of a large number of persons in the 
area, are dependent upon and integral to the financial 
success and well being of the company in question. 
In fact, such dependencies are not limited only to the 
employees of the company in question, but extend to all 
those whose economic activities (and lives) are, to one 
extent or another, governed by and related to the needs 
of these employees (i. e. the economic ripple effect). 
Thus,, the ramifications of adverse comments on the 
business affairs of a local client may often have wide- 
reaching financial and socio-economic effects. Aware of 
the local ramifications his comments may raise, a local 
auditor may unduly consider the consequences of any 
adverse audit report he may finally determine for a 
local client, and to that extent, local considerations 
may have some leverage over opinions arrived at by 
local audit firms. 
If however, as implicitly recognised by the ICAEW, 
ultimate responsibility for the local audit were taken 
by staff from a(n) (associated but) non-local office, 
then scope for such. local considerations will be 
reduced. 
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Such pressure presents an interesting feature because, 
in such circumstances, the auditor himself does not 
stand to benefit from any deviation from ethical 
standards. 
The benefit would appear to devolve primarily on the 
members of the local community with whom the auditor 
works and lives - giving basis to the view that such 
"altruistically" inspired thinking assumes some place 
in the auditor's thinking and behaviour. 
Referring to the possibility of such a situation 
obtaining, moizer [1991: 401 presents this aspect of 
the external auditor independence issue in the 
following words, 
"Auditors should report truthfully irrespective 
of the consequences. To what extent auditors do 
ignore the consequences of their actions is 
impossible to answer, because the data to the 
answer the question is unobtainable. However, it 
has to be allowed that ... on certain, admittedly 
rare, occasions an auditor may prefer to report 
dishonestly from entirely altruistic motives 
(i. e. taking account of the interests of others 
rather than the auditor's own self-interest). " 
Against such considerations and background, Situation 
16 was developed to assess if respondents are concerned 
with external auditor independence, in a situation 
where the local office of a Top Ten firm in a small 
I 
provincial town, acts as auditor to the largest 
employer in that area. 
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6.2.4 The involvement situations 
The ICAEW recognises that financial involvements by its 
members with audit clients can pose a threat to their 
professional independence. Its guidance on the matter 
I 
CICAEW,, 1987: 21] is brief, stating (inter alia): 
"Financial involvement with a client may affect 
objectivity (and) ... can arise in a number of ways. " 
However the position held by the AICPA is offered in 
much greater length in its Ethics Section 100 CAICPA, 
1986: 4391-4452], with the document's essential stand 
being encapsulated in Rule 101, which (inter alia) 
states that: 
"Independence (of an auditor) will be considered 
to be impaired if ... during the period of his 
professional engagement, or at the time of 
expressing his opinion, he or his firm ... had or 
was committed to acquire any direct or material 
indirect financial interest in the (audited) 
enterprise ... 11 
An analysis of the relevant sections of the ethical 
positions of both institutes suggests that two of the 
more important methods by which such (direct or 
indirect) financial involvements might arise are: 
1. the auditor acquiring a financial interest in the 
audit client 
2. the auditor entering into commercial arrangements 
with the audit client 
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Thus, in order to avoid financial involvements of 
either type, auditors are normally required to refrain 
from acquiring a pecuniary interest of whatever sort in 
their clients and, from entering into relationships 
with their clients on a commercial or similar basis. 
The auditor acguiring a financial interest in the audit 
client: 
Examination of this type of threat to EAI shows that an 
auditor may acquire a (direct or indirect) financial 
interest in his client through a number of means, some 
of the more important ones being: 
1. Financial indebtedness (client to auditor) 
2. Financial indebtedness (client to auditor's MAS arm) 
3. Ownership of trustee shares (auditor in client) 
4. Directorship (by the auditor) in an investment 
trust owning shares in a client of the auditor 
5. Auditor's acquisition of an indirect financial 
interest in the client as a resulting of lowballing 
Financial indebtedness (client to auditor). 
One indirect (and involuntary) means by which an audit 
client may become materially indebted to the auditor is 
through the non-payment of audit fees due to him. In 
this case, if the amount(s) is(are) material, then EAI 
may be impaired if more than one year's fees remain 
unpaid to the auditor, when the audit report is signed. 
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For, in circumstances such as these, unpaid amounts of 
that nature take on some of the features of a (short- 
term) loan, and so it may reasonably appear that the 
auditor is providing working capital for the client. 
more critically, it may be that the receivability of 
amounts due to the auditor will depend on the nature of 
the auditor's report on the client's statements. Thus, 
the ICAEW and AICPA (normally) prohibit auditors from 
granting loans to, or taking loans from, their clients. 
with minor exceptions, the ICAEW prohibits loans to (or 
from) the practice and/or those closely related to a 
partner in it, from (or to) clients. Its basic position 
is summed up in the ruling that "a practice should not 
make a loan to a client, nor guarantee a client's 
borrowings, nor ... accept a loan from a client or have 
borrowings guaranteed by a client" [ICAEW, 1987: 23]. 
Also with minor exceptions, the AICPA states that EAI 
is impaired if, during the audit engagement, or at the 
time of issuing his opinion, the auditor or his firm 
"had any loan to or from the (audited) enterprise or 
any (of its) officers, directors, or principal 
stockholders. " one such exception is the allowance for 
loans "made under normal lending procedures, terms and 
requirements" CAICPA, 1986: 4413-4414]. 
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In particular, the issue of continued non-payment of 
fees to the auditor is addressed in the AICPA's Ethics 
Ruling No. 52 on "Independence, Integrity and 
objectivity" when it states (assuming materiality to 
both client and auditor) that "at the time a member 
issues a report on a client's financial statements, the 
client should not be indebted to the member for more 
than one year's fees" (AICPA, Professional Standards,, 
Vol. 2: ET Section 191.104]. In contrast, the ICAEW 
offers no ruling based directly on such circumstances. 
Consequently, against that background, Situation 6 was 
developed in order to assess if, in a situation where 
there was indebtedness by a client to the auditor for 
the previous year's audit fees, concern was expressed 
by the four research groups-with regard to the quality 
of EAI contained therein. 
Financial indebtedness (client to auditor's MAS arm) 
Companies in difficulties often request (or are obliged 
to take) MAS from their auditor's consultancy arm. In 
order to allow for such instances, some audit firms go 
to great lengths to establish consulting arms that are 
(related through common ownership, but nevertheless) 
distinct entities functioning quite autonomously. [For 
example,, see "SEC recognises Andersen's split" - 
Accountancy Age, August 30,1990: 2. ] 
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Rightly, such organisational barriers are erected in 
order to obviate even the most remote possibility of 
executive or managerial involvement in the affairs of 
the client by the audit firm itself. 
As such, there is no permanent pooling of staff 
resources for (audit and consultancy) assignments, 
(though permanent transfers may occur), and in effect 
"Chinese Walls" are erected between the auditing and 
consulting arms of the firm. 
Regrettably, on occasions the consulting and advisory 
services come too late, and for that or another reason, 
they do not result in a turn around of the company. A 
creditors' liquidation is usually the enforced result. 
A by-product may be that consulting fees incurred often 
remain unpaid to the consulting arm of the audit firm. 
It appears that neither the AICPA nor the ICAEW offer 
any clarification about EAI in the situation where 
material fees are unpaid by a client to an organisation 
closely associated with (but separate from) the 
auditor. Are the above circumstances to be viewed in 
the same way as unpaid fees to the auditor? If so, are 
they also a threat to the independence of the audit 
firm, given that material unpaid audit fees can 
constitute a threat to EAI? 
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Thus,, it is of interest to see how material consulting 
fees, when unpaid to the consulting arm of the relevant 
audit firm, are viewed both by the issuers and users of 
audit reports. Against that background, Situation 2 was 
developed in order to assess how such circumstances 
were seen by each of the four research groups. 
ownership of trustee shares (auditor in client) 
The area in which this issue falls is "the financial 
involvement with or in the affairs of clients. " In this 
regard, the ICAEW distinguishes between an auditor 
owning shares on a non-beneficial (trustee) or 
beneficial basis and in private or public companies. 
US and UK ethical requirements prohibit the auditor 
from holding shares in private or public companies 
audited by them (or in their group companies) on a 
beneficial basis. However, in the UK only, auditors are 
permitted to hold shares in companies audited by them, 
on a trustee (non-beneficial) basis. 
The ICAEW's position with regard to auditors holding 
trustee shares in public companies audited by them is: 
"A practice should not have as an audit client a 
public company if a partner in the practice, or 
the spouse of a partner, is a trustee of a trust 
holding shares in that company and the holding is 
in excess of 10% of the issued share capital of 
the company or of the total assets comprised in 
the trust" (ICAEW, 1987: 21]. 
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The guidance document goes on to state that, in 
general, and in situations other than those described 
above, a partner who is a trustee (or the spouse of a 
trustee) of shares in an audit client, should where 
possible not personally take part in the audit. 
Further, in these instances, such shareholdings should 
be disclosed in either the accounts themselves, or the 
directors' or audit report. 
The ICAEW's position with regard to the auditors (or 
their spouses) of private companies holding trustee 
shareholdings in them is similar. Firstlyt they require 
such shareholdings to be similarly disclosed (as 
above), and secondly where possible, a review of the 
files in the companies should be undertaken by a 
partner other than the one holding the trustee shares. 
Applying the above guidance to the facts of Situation 
81 it would appear that the ICAEW's position sees 
(prima-facie) nothing ethically distasteful in terms of 
EAI. 
That view is based on the fact that the client in the 
situation is a publicly listed company, in which the 
percentage of shareholding owned by the auditor as 
trustee,, is less than 10% (i. e. 7%). 
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However, the AICPA maintains a different stand on the 
matter, and suggests that any holding (even less than 
10% of the total issued) of non-beneficial shares in a 
publicly quoted company by its auditor, impairs EAI. 
Thus Situation 8 is presented to ascertain if the views 
of respondents were more in accord with the distinction 
made by the ICAEW in the UK, or those of the AICPA. 
The holding of trustee shares by an auditor in a 
company audited by him or his firm is not only allowed 
according to corporate law and audit ethics, it occurs 
in reality - e. g. 1987 accounts of M. J. Gleeson Plc, a 
listed company in which a partner from the company's 
auditors discloses holdings of trustee shares in it. 
The issue of an 
client has been 
first study was 
Eight and nonBb 
in Industry and 
Loan Officers - 
auditor holding trustee shares in his 
examined by Firth [1980 and 1981]. The 
conducted amongst two auditor (Big- 
g-Eight) groups, and a group each of CAs 
Commerce, -Financial Analysts and Bank 
the user groups. 
This study first listed a series of auditor-auditee 
relationships, one of which related to a partner in an 
audit firm holding, as trustee, 10% of the issued 
shares of a company audited by his firm, with the 
partner himself taking no part in the audit. 
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Respondents were then asked to indicate if, in their 
view, they perceived the auditor to be independent or 
not. Significant concern with EAI was registered by 
user groups in this situation, with at least 60% of the 
groups regarding the auditor as "not independent". 
Firth's 1981 study however was conducted with UK 
bankers only. It then asked how their perceived 
assessment of EAI in each relationship influenced their 
lending decision, when compared to a relationship in 
which the auditor was independent. 
Firth's study indicated that the mean loan advanced by 
banker respondents under the trustee situation 
described above, was significantly lower (@ . 10). The 
mean loan advanced for an independent relationship was 
E9.7m and E7.3m for the trustee situation. 
The above results suggest that those banker respondents 
who participated in this study registered a level of 
concern with external auditor independence in such a 
trustee situation. However such concern is inconsistent 
with the ethical position maintained by the ICAEW/ICAS 
in the UK. Further, it should be noted that even though 
the holding of trustee shares by the auditor is 
ethically accepted by the ICAEW and ICAS in the UK, in 
the US it is not acceptable by the AICPA or the SEC. 
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Additionally, such trustee situations have also been 
criticised [Stamp, 1977] in the UK. As such, the 
situation begs the question asking why this UK - US 
difference prevails, and is it a difference that users 
of audited statements in the UK accept. 
Against the preceding considerations, Situation 8 was 
developed in order to assess attendant views on EAI, as 
perceived by respondents from the research groups, when 
ownership of 7% of the shares issued by a public 
company are held, in a trustee capacity, by a partner 
in the audit firm acting as auditors to the company. 
Directorship (by the auditor) in an investment trust 
owning shares in a client of the auditor 
The ICAEW's guide is clear in relation to the holding 
of offices (e. g. directorships) in audit clients by a 
company's auditor. It states: 
"no one should personally take part in the 
exercise of the reporting function on a company 
if he has, during the period upon which the 
report is to be made, or at any time in the two 
years prior to the first day thereof, been an 
officer (other than auditor) or employee of that 
company" (ICAEW, 1987: 24]. 
However, the guide does not provide a comprehensive and 
definitive ruling on the ethics prevailing when the 
auditor is a director of an investment trust, and it is 
the trust that holds an interest in a company, of which 
the same trust director is also auditor. 
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In Situation 15, to the extent that the investment 
trust has an (immaterial) interest in the financial 
well being of the company referred to therein, and the 
partner responsible for that company's audit is also a 
director of the investment trust, it may be construed 
that the auditor has an indirect financial interest in 
the financial well being of his client (the PLC). 
Thus,, Situation 15 relates to "financial involvement 
with or in the affairs of clients" by the auditor,, with 
the auditor holding an indirect involvement (through 
trust directorship) in the operational affairs of his 
client. 
Nevertheless, if allowance is made for the fact that 
the holding of shares by the investment trust in the 
public company is "immaterial", both to the investment 
trust and the company as well, then, to that extent, 
the relationship may be permitted (but not encouraged) 
by the ICAEW. The AICPA's stand is similar, with Rule 
101 of its Ethical Rules [AICPA, 1986: 4417) stating 
that: 
"a member or a firm of which he is a partner or 
shareholder shall not express an opinion on 
financial statements of an enterprise unless he 
and his firm are independent with respect to such 
an enterprise. Independence will be considered to 
be impaired if for example ... during the period 
of his professional engagement, or at the time of 
expressing his opinion, he or his firm ... had or 
was committed to acquire any direct or material 
indirect financial interest in the enterprise. " 
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(The issue of an auditor owning shares in clients 
remains alive. For example, see Re: Brebner Allen & 
Trapp,, "Auditors held shares in client subsidiary" 
Accountancy Age, July 18,1991: 2. ] 
The issue of a director of an investment trust being 
auditor to a company in which the trust has an interest 
has been examined empirically by Lavin [1976 and 1977] 
and Firth [1980]. 
Lavin (1976 and 1977] assessed views held on EAI in a 
situation similar to Situation 15. He asked respondents 
to assess EAI in a situation where a partner in a firm 
was a member of an investment club with an immaterial 
amount of stock in a client, and the same partner was 
responsible for that client's audit. 
Lavin's 1976 research was conducted in the US and 
assessed the views of CPAs (both in and out of public 
practice) - the accountant group, and bank loan 
officers and financial analysts - the user group. 
Lavin's 1977 US study was conducted only with financial 
analysts in brokerage houses as the research 
respondents. In addition to assessing the auditor- 
auditee relationship for the 12 situations presentedi 
brokers were also asked to give an investment decision 
for the company, based on the facts provided. 
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Lavin's results from this [1977) study showed that 88% 
of the respondents indicated the auditor would be 
independent in such a situation. Further, this 
situation was one of two where respondents perceived 
the auditor's independence as having little significant 
effect on their investment decision. Thus, for this 
situation, it would appear respondents were not much 
disturbed by potential threats posed to EAI. 
However, Lavin's 1976 study was conducted not only with 
research financial analysts from brokerage houses and 
loan officers from banks (the user groups), but also 
with CPAs from within and without public accounting. 
The general approach and basis of this 1976 study was 
the same as Lavin's 1977 study. 
The respondents to the 1976 study showed that in 
general, the auditor in this situation would be 
considered independent. Curiously though, whereas at 
least 84% of both user groups concluded so, 'only 63% of 
the CPA group indicated likewise. 
Another curiosity emerging from the study was the 
contrast arising from the fact that whereas about 65% 
of industry or a nonBig-Eight affiliated CPAs saw the 
auditor to be independent in the situation, only 29% of 
CPAs with a Big-Eight affiliation considered the same. 
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This would indicate that the ethical standards expected 
of Big-Eight auditors appear to be higher than those 
expected by accountants in industry or those by 
auditors in nonBig-Eight firms. 
Firth's [1980] study was conducted amongst two auditor 
groups (Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight) - the auditor 
groups, and a group each of CAs in Industry and 
Commerce, Financial Analysts and Bank Loan Officers - 
the user groups. 
The study first listed a series of auditor-auditee 
relationships, the facts of one of which were very 
similar to the one above studied by Lavin. 
In the comparable situation presented by Lavin, the 
partner was a member of an investment club, whereas in 
Firth's 1980 study the partner was a director of an 
investment trust. Further, whereas in Lavin's study the 
investment club held shares of an amount stated to be 
"immaterial" in the audit client, in Firth's study the 
trust held 10% of the shares in the audited company. 
A final point of contrast remains between comparable 
situations in Lavin's and Firth's studies. In Lavin's 
studies the auditor was responsible for the company's 
audit, but in Firth's study he played no part in it. 
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Having been presented with the relevant facts, Firth's 
respondents were then asked to indicate if, in their 
view, they perceived the auditor to be independent or 
not. significant concern with EAI was registered by 
user groups in this situation, with a maximum of only 
39% of any group regarding the auditor as independent. 
Against the preceding background, the facts of 
Situation 15 were developed in order to assess'how 
research respondents view the threat to EAI, given the 
dual functioning by an audit partner both as a director 
of an investment trust and as the partner responsible 
for the audit of a public company in which the same 
investment trust holds an immaterial interest. 
Auditor's acquisition of an indirect financial interest 
in the client as a consecruence of I'lowballing" 
While it is not unusual for some clients to exert 
significant budget pressure at all times, there is 
additional fee pressure that the auditor may encounter 
when the audit market is highly competitive. 
As such, this form of pressure is probably most evident 
when there is keen competition for audit work, to the 
extent that the auditor is required to devise novel 
methods of responding to it, one such response being 
the practice of I'lowballing". 
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According to this practice, first year (or initial) 
audits are tendered for at significantly below 
projected audit costs, on the basis that these initial 
"losses" will be more than recouped in later years, 
either through audit activities, or the provision of 
other advisory services to the client, or both. 
There is no accepted position of the extent of 
competition in the audit profession. Regretfully, the 
UK has seen no detailed examination of these issues, as 
have been considered by the Metcalf Subcommittee of the 
US Senate (US Senate, 1977] or the Cohen commission 
appointed by the AICPA (1978: 121] in the US, or the 
Adams [CICA, 1978] or Macdonald [CICAr 1988] Committees 
appointed by the CICA in Canada. 
Consequently, there are conflicting suggestions of the 
extent of competition in the UK audit market. Intense 
competition on the one hand ["Auditors cut prices in 
scramble for clients" - Evening Standard,, June 17, 
1991: 29] and suggestions of cosy 11oligopolistic" power 
on the other ["Escaping Lightly" - The Guardian, 
February 27,1990: 11]. However, given the current 
shrinkage in the UK audit market, caused by the current 
(July 1991) recession, there are more reasons to 
indicate strong competition than those of a more 
settled and orderly market. 
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Lowballing can be seen as the auditing equivalent of 
the "loss leader" concept derived from the retail 
world. In the retail world, sale of a loss leader is 
usually accompanied by the concurrent sale of other 
profitable items. In the auditing world however, 
lowballing is premised on the future sale of auditing 
or other services, on a super-normal profit basis. 
one interpretation of the facts of lowballing suggests 
that once a lowballing audit firm has issued its 
report, it acquires a vested interest in the 
continuation of the client. An interest expressed in 
the hope that the client will indeed remain functioning 
and continue in business. That hope is based on the 
fact that if the firm wishes to bill its client in 
future time-periods, then the client must in fact 
remain in business for those time-periods, or else no 
billing will be possible. 
on that basis, is it unreasonable to conclude that an 
auditor that has lowballed, will not then be influenced 
and motivated to extend and protect the life of the 
client? To that extent also, may one argue that the 
auditor has now become involved in the financial 
well-being of the client? Such involvement is clearly 
prohibited by the ICAEW (1987] and, it would thus 
appear, should be similarly prohibited. 
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Lowballing is not just a mere theoretical concept. In 
the view of one financial columnist ["An uncertain 
future for a former safe career" - Financial Times,, May 
16,1991: 19], current competitive conditions in the UK 
audit market "are not helped by the ferocious price 
competition, one manifestation of which is lowballing. 11 
An alleged recent instance of lowballing in the UK 
relates to the audit of the Prudential Assurance 
Company PLC, acquired in 1991 by the London office of 
Price Waterhouse [IIPW offered Prudential cut-price fee 
to win audit" - Accountancy Age, May 2,, 1991: 1]. 
The article alleges that Price Waterhouse "offered 
financial services giant, Prudential Assurance a E900k 
discount on the proposed (audit) fee in order to win 
the prestigious audit appointment. " (For some instances 
of lowballing in the US see DeAngelo, 1981: 114. ] 
There is much debate about the impact-of lowballing on 
EAI. At a May 1991 symposium on auditing, Theresa 
Graham, Chair of the London Practitioner Board, stated 
that "audit independence does not go hand in hand with 
lowballing. 11 However, Michael Lickiss, then ICAEW 
president, "felt it was the right of members to charge 
what they want, to who they want. " ("Audit 200111 - 
Capital Account, July-August 1991: 13. ] 
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While a minority of audit firms have publicly declared 
their strong opposition to lowballing, some observers 
believe the practice to be quite prevalent and current 
in the UK for at least five years now ("Age of the all- 
purpose salesman" - Financial Times,, August 27,, 1986]. 
Further, there is evidence to suggest lowballing is not 
confined to Big-Six firms. Top-10 firms have criticised 
Big-Six firms for alleged lowballing, and they in turn 
have been criticised by even smaller firms for the very 
same practices ["Pannells accused of discounting 
hypocrisy" - Accountancy Age, May 23,1991: 1]. 
The issue of I'lowballing" has been researched by 
various commissions and committees. In Canada, the 
Adams Committee concluded lowballing was undesirable 
and recommended changes to the CICA ethical rules to 
prohibit the practice [Johnston et al, 1980: 261]. 
In examining lowballing the Cohen Committee expressed 
concern with the practice and recommended that "the 
Ethics Division of the AICPA should consider this 
problem" [CAR, 1978: 1231]. The SEC (1978] also voiced 
concern with it in ASR 250, requiring disclosure of 
"fee arrangements where the accountant has agreed to a 
fee significantly less than a fee that would cover 
expected direct costs in order to obtain the client-" 
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However, a 1986 report prepared by a working Party of 
the ICAEW (and thus not the ICAEW's official view) 
states: 
'fit is difficult to specifically identify ... 
(lowballing) behaviour given the fixed-cost 
versus marginal-cost structure of audit firms, 
and the fact that temporary spare capacity in 
firms can make the practice worthwhile. " ["Report 
of the Working Party on the Future of the 
Audit" - ICAEW, 1986: 84]. 
By contrast, these remarks do not appear to be 
extremely critical of lowballing, and may even tend to 
suggest that it is a normal and acceptable competitive 
response of the auditing environment. However, it may 
be that the users of audited financial statements 
perceive otherwise? 
Against that background, Situation 14 is certainly 
topical and consequently, its facts were developed to 
assess how respondents may be concerned with the 
phenomenon of I'lowballing". 
The auditor entering into commercial arranaements 
with the audit client: 
In addition to becoming financially involved with his 
audit client by (inter alia) means as detailed above, 
an auditor may also become financially involved with 
his client by entering commercially-based contracts 
(e. g. MAS) as opposed to professionally-based contracts 
(e. g. pure audit services) with the client. 
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Thus,, in addition to offering a professional service, 
many auditors also operate commercially inspired 
enterprises, and so to that extent must function with 
due regard for good commercial practice. Consequently, 
the auditor is obliged to operate, maintain, equip and 
furnish his offices on the basis of sound and efficient 
commercial principles. 
If such commercial arrangements are entered into by the 
auditor with non-clients, it-is agreed that no threat 
is posed to professional independence. However, if such 
arrangements are entered into with audit clients, then 
EAI may become suspect and appear to be threatened. 
Two commercial transactions that the auditor must enter 
into in order to provide his services, -is to rent (or 
buy) the premises from which he runs his practice and, 
secondly to purchase printing and stationery supplies, 
so he may prepare and then issue printed documents. 
Thus, Situations 4 (purchase by the auditor of printing 
and stationery supplies from an audit client) and 7 
(renting by the auditor of office premises from an 
audit client) were designed to assess how a trade 
relationship, between the auditor and his client, is 
seen in terms of external, auditor independence, by 
respondents from each of the four research groups. 
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Purchase by the auditor of Printing and stationery 
supplies from an audit client on specified terms 
The ICAEW recognises that the "acceptance of goods or 
services from a client ... by a partner, his spouse or 
minor child or by the staff of the practice save on 
terms no more favourable than those available to the 
generality of the employees of the client" may be a 
threat to EAI (ICAEW, 1987: 23]. Thus, when volumes 
warrant it, the auditor should not be denied the 
benefit of volume or trade (e. g. wholesale) discounts. 
In the facts of Situation 4 (which per anecdotal 
evidence parallel fact), it is unclear if the wholesale 
discount is offered to the auditor on the basis of the 
estimated volume of purchases to be made by the auditor 
(a situation that would not prima-facie threaten EAI - 
as presumably the auditor should have no difficulty in 
attracting the same discount from another stationery 
supplier), or as a "special incentive" in order for the 
auditor to purchase his printing and stationery needs 
from the (client) stationer concerned. 
If the latter ("special incentive") prevails,, then it 
would appear that the auditor concerned has put aside 
the ICAEW's guidance on EAI and chosen to act in a 
manner whereby his independence may well in fact be 
threatened. 
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Equally, on that basis, the ICAEW's guide would show 
that such an auditor-client relationship is effectively 
prohibited. 
Against that background, Situation 4 was developed and 
presented for research assessment by the four research 
groups, because of its believed closeness to fact, and 
to assess if users of audited financial statements 
would indeed grant the auditor in this situation a 
measure of commercial pragmatism, without being 
concerned about the loss of his professional auditor 
independence. 
Renting by the auditor of office premises from an audit 
client 
The facts of Situation 7 state that the lease entered 
into between the auditor and his client is on an 
arms-length basis, but in real-life it is likely that 
it would be virtually impossible to state with absolute 
certainty, whether or not the lease has been drawn up 
on that basis. 
As such, there is nothing intrinsically repugnant to 
external auditor independence in the facts of Situation 
7, which fall under considerations headed "financial 
involvement with or in the affairs of clients" (ICAEW,, 
1987: 21]. 
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Furthermore, to the extent that an element of the 
client's income is dependent on the auditor concerned, 
there is an enforced (and involuntary? ) involvement in 
the affairs of a client. While such involvements may be 
rare, they are not without precedent. For example, a 
real-life instance of this type of situation is seen in 
a lease agreement entered into between Price Waterhouse 
and its (then) client Peachey Properties Plc. 
In such situations, a matter that must then also be of 
significance is the willingness of the client to renew 
the lease with its auditor, upon the expiry of the 
lease, and the like renewal intentions of the auditors. 
one can only surmise about such facts in the present 
instance as they are not provided. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that such considerations may influence 
auditors to adopt (or not) an independent stance in the 
context of their professional dealings. 
The SEC and the auditing bodies both in the UK and US 
would deem an auditor who managed a building owned by 
an audit client of his to be non-independent. Such an 
arrangement is quite clearly regarded as a commercial 
I 
transaction and so would be ethically unacceptable. 
However the auditing professions in the US and UK do 
not appear to speak with one voice on a lease 
relationship such as that presented in Situation 7. 
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Subject to the specific facts of course, UK auditing 
bodies would likely declare that the details of this 
situation reflect an independent auditor-client 
relationship. 
However, in US terms, the AICPA would most likely find 
that this situation to be one with a non-independent 
auditor-client relationship. This view is based on the 
clarification provided by AICPA, which relates to the 
reverse situation, (i. e. the auditor leasing space to 
the client) and states that: 
"the leasing of property to a client creates a 
commercial business relationship beyond the 
normal professional relationship, resulting in an indirect financial interest in that client (and 
as such the auditor's) independence would be 
considered impaired if the members' indirect 
financial interest in (the) client is material to 
the member" [AICPA, 1986: 4447-4448]. 
As such, this type of issue, the lease-renting of 
offices between auditor and client, has been of concern 
to other researchers [Firth, 1980; Lavin 1976 and 1977; 
and Dykxhoorn and Sinning 1981a and 1982]. 
Lavin (1976 and 1977) assessed views held on external- 
auditor independence in a very similar situation where 
the auditor rented only 25% (as opposed to the 30% 
stated in Situation 7) of a building owned by the audit 
client. 
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Lavin's (1976 and 1977] research was conducted in the 
US, and assessed the views of CPAs (both in and out of 
public practice) - the accountant group, and bank loan 
officers and research financial analysts - the user 
group. His 1976 research showed that in this situation, 
at least 60% of the user groups surveyed indicated the 
relevant auditor to be independent, whereas 68% of the 
accountant group indicated the same. 
Thus Lavin's 1976 study revealed US concern with EAI in 
such a (lease) situation - with at least 30% of 
respondents expressing a concern with underlying EAI- 
Lavin's 1977 research was very similar to the 1976 
study and was conducted among 74 research financial 
analysts from brokerage houses. With regard to the same 
situation, 60% of respondents determined the auditor to 
be independent - though 40% did not. Equally, this was 
one of the three situations studied by Lavin (1977] 
which revealed no consensus among the analysts. 
By the same token, this auditor-auditee relationship 
caused concern with respondents in as much as the mean 
loan they would grant under it was significantly lower 
than that granted on an independent relationship. Based 
on a5 point decision scale (1 to 5). the mean loan 
facility granted on an independent basis was 3.15, 
while that based on the lease relationship was 2.41. 
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Thus,, both the studies conducted by Lavin indicate 
strong concern with such a lessor-lessee relationship 
between the auditor and client, wherein the auditor 
rents 25% of a client-owned premises. 
In similar vein, Firth (1980] studied EAI views in 
exactly the same situation as the one above, but with 
UK respondents. His study was conducted amongst two 
external auditor groups (Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight) - 
the external groups, and a group each of CAs in 
Industry, Financial Analysts and Bank Loan Officers - 
the user groups. 
Firth's study showed that at least 90% of each of the 
two auditor groups, and at least 69% of the three 
audit-user groups stated that, in their view, the 
situation reflected an auditor that was independent of 
his client. 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1981b and 1982] also studied 
views on EAI in an identical situation in (then West) 
Germany. Their 1981 study was conducted amongst two 
sets of "Wirstchaftsprufer" (WP - licensed corporate 
auditors in Germany). The first set of WP had acted (or 
were acting) as auditors to German subsidiaries of US 
corporations, and the second set had not had such 
exposure. 
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In the above study, 76% of all WPs indicated that they 
perceived the auditor to be independent in a situation 
identical to the one examined studied by Lavin [1976 
and 1977]. However 93% of the first set of WPs examined 
by Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1981b] and 89% of the second, 
shared the view that the auditor was independent. 
Whereas Dykxhoorn and Sinning's 1981b study was 
confined to WP (audit opinion issuers), their 1982 
study was limited to directors of loan and investment 
departments in financial institutions (some users of 
audit opinions). 
The 1982 study was undertaken in Germany and asked the 
two groups for their views of EAI, within a (lease) 
situation, identical to that of Firth (1980]. The study 
showed that at least 71% of both groups considered the 
auditor to be independent in that situation. 
Comparing the two studies by Dykxhoorn and sinning 
(1981b and 1982], it is fair to state that about 20% 
fewer of the-user groups (compared to the issuer 
groups), considered the auditor to be professionally 
independent in these circumstances. It is of equal 
import to note that in general, Situation 7 would be 
declared as reflecting an independent auditor by the UK 
professional bodies. 
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Against that background and discussion, Situation 7 was 
developed and presented for assessment in order to 
assess if the research respondents were concerned with 
EAI in the situation. If so, they may also perceive the 
need for a more rigid code of audit behaviour -a code 
which would permit no commercial dealings at all (even 
at arms-length) between an auditor and his client. 
In addition to trade-based commercial relationships, 
there is another type of service-based relationship 
that auditors may enter into with their clients. Far 
more controversy and concern with EAI is provoked by 
the latter type of relationship than the former. 
However, it is possibly no exaggeration to state that 
the largest single area of concern with EAI (and 
consequently the most studied) is the provision of 
nonaudit services by auditors to their clients. - 
In broad terms, there are really two types of nonaudit 
services. The first type encompasses the provision of 
accounting or accounting-type services (e. g. writing up 
the underlying accounting records). The second type 
includes the provision of consultancy advice and/or 
services related to, resource acquisition and/or 
utilisation or, the design and/or implementation of 
systems. 
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However, in general, when the term MAS is used, it 
refers mainly to the second type of nonaudit service - 
i. e. the provision of management advisory (consulting) 
services by the auditor to his client. 
However, both types of nonaudit services require the 
auditor to take no part in the client's executive 
decision making. such decision making is reserved 
exclusively to and for the management of the client. 
In general, the first type of MAS is rendered by 
auditors to their smaller-sized (private) audit 
clients, while the second type of MAS is rendered by 
auditors to their larger-sized (public) clients. 
In essence, provision of both types of nonaudit 
services is only one sort of a commercial transaction 
between an auditor and his client. As such, it may be 
judged no differently than (say) an auditor renting 
premises or computer resources to his client. When EAI 
is viewed in that light, the provision of nonaudit 
services creates an involvement by the auditor with the 
client, and so would be ethically unacceptable. 
However, in addition to these (commercial) nuances, the 
provision of MAS causes concern to audit-report users 
on grounds that (when provided) the auditor may then: 
260 
Have to audit his own decisions and recommendations. 
2. Become personally involved in the client's results. 
3. Develop a conflict of interest in preserving the 
interests of the client and users of accounts. 
4. Lose objectivity by developing the same perceptions 
as the client, a desirable feature in MAS terms. 
S. Become even more economically reliant on the audit 
client in question (because of MAS derived fees). 
The Economist ("Blowing the whistle on accountancy" ,- 
December 22,1990: 16] expresses its concern thus: 
"Auditors say they already have the terror of 
malpractice suits to keep their calculators on 
the straight and narrow. Better to remove the 
temptation altogether, ... by banning auditors from providing such (MAS) services to the 
companies they check. 
Accountancy firms can continue to hawk consulting 
and the like to non-auditing clients. After all, 
nobody objects to a referee playing for a team in 
a match that he is not supervising. " 
[See also "Play or Score - not both says Collum" 
(Finance Director of SmithKline Beecham PLC) - 
Accountancy Age, July 11,1991: 4] 
However, previous research has identified no major 
concern with concurrent provision of some forms of 
advisory services to clients. For example, tax 
planning, tax return preparation and filing [Rosenbaum, 
1968] and provision of computer resources [Lavin, 
1974), did not cause concern with EAI to audit users. 
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on the other hand, provision of accounting (or 
accounting-type services) by the auditor has been found 
to be of concern (to some extent) to audit-users 
[Titard, 1971; Hartley and Ross, 1972 and Lavin, 1974]. 
This is also true of the rendering of consultancy (i. e. 
the second) type of MAS, whose provision has been 
determined as causing concern to the users of audited 
financial statements [Briloff, 1966; Hartley and Ross, 
1972; Lavin, 1974 and Shockley, 1981]. 
Nevertheless, some contrary UK evidence is provided by 
the results of a relatively recent survey undertaken by 
the ICAS (1987]. The survey was conducted amongst the 
chairmen of the Top 1000 companies in the UK, 571 of 
whom replied to the brief questionnaire on EAI. 
of these 571 respondents, 73% of respondents did not 
"believe that auditor's independence is prejudiced by 
the provision of management consultancy services to 
audit clients". 
In fact, 80% of them did not "see any need for detailed 
legislation on" EAI in terms of conflicts of interestj 
and the vast majority (91%) of respondents to the 
survey indicated that "auditors should be allowed to 
provide additional (advisory) services" (i. e. MAS). 
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Accordingly the following paragraphs of the chapter 
singles out for study within the context of external 
auditor independence, the provision by the auditor to 
his audit client, these two main types of Management 
Advisory Services. 
. 
Provision of accounting (or accounting-type) services 
The ICAEW and the ICAS in the UK, and the AICPA and the 
SEC in the US, recognise that the provision of 
accounting or accounting type services by the auditor 
to an audit client can often present a threat to EAI, 
and accordingly have issued relevant clarifications on 
the matter. 
In terms of the UK professional auditing bodies, such 
services are categorised under the ICAEW's (1987] set 
of considerations relating to "Conflicts of Interest", 
and in particular to conflicts that may arise through 
the "provision of other services to audit clients" 
(ICAEW,, 1987: 24]. 
In this context, the ICAEW (1987: 24) guide states: 
"whilst it is right that members should provide, 
for audit clients, other services beyond 
performing the audit, nevertheless care must be 
taken not to perform executive functions or to 
make executive decisions. These are the duties of 
management. In particular members should beware 
lest, in providing such services they drift into 
a situation in which they slip across the 
border-line of what is proper. " 
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Interestingly though, the guide does not provide clear 
guidance of where the border-line lies. Nevertheless, 
to a large extent the AICPA and the ICAEW voice the 
same views in relation to the provision of accounting 
services by the auditor. 
The ICAEW prohibits in all but "exceptional 
circumstances", the provision of such accounting 
services for public (i. e. exchange listed or traded) 
companies. 
Likewise, in endorsing requirements of the SEC, the 
AICPA gives substance-to a similar prohibition for SEC 
regulated (public) corporations in the US, and 
concurrently implies that such services may be provided 
to and for non-SEC regulated corporations, by 
stipulating that: 
"when a client's securities become subject to 
regulation by the SEC ... , responsibility for 
maintenance of the accounting records, including 
accounting classification decisions, must be 
assumed by accounting personnel employed by the 
client. The assumption of this responsibility 
must commence with the first fiscal year after 
which the client's securities qualify for such 
regulation" (AICPA, 1986: 4413]. 
Thus, in effect, both Institutes permit with caution, 
the provision of other accounting services (in addition 
to the audit) to companies whose shares are not 
publicly listed (private companies) or SEC-regulated. 
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However both institutes insist that in all situations, 
the auditor must ensure that the relevant client has a 
full understanding of, and accepts full responsibility 
for, any auditor-prepared financial statements. 
In such circumstances, the AICPA states-that "the CPA 
must discuss (all) accounting matters with the client 
to be sure that the client has the required degree of 
understanding" of such matters [AICPA, 1986: 4413]. 
The AICPA rationalises its above position CAICPA, 1986: 
4412-4413] on the basis that its: 
"members are skilled in, and well accustomed to, 
applying techniques to control mechanical 
accuracy, and the performance of the 
record-keeping function should have no effect on 
application of such techniques. 
With regard to accounting judgements, if third 
parties have confidence in a member's judgement 
in performing an audit, it is difficult to 
contend that they would have less confidence 
where the same judgement is applied in the 
process of preparing the underlying accounting 
records. " 
Unlike the ICAEW, the AICPA does provide some guidance 
as to when the provision of accounting services can 
assume an executive role. It states CAICPA, 1986: 
4413]: 
"a member performing accounting services for an 
audit client must ... retain the appearance (emphasis applied) that he is not virtually an 
employee,, -and therefore lacking in independence 
in the eyes of a reasonable observer. " 
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In sharp contrast, German auditors are totally 
prohibited by a directive of their Chamber of Auditors, 
from offering "bookkeeping services for audit clients" 
(Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981b: 98]. Thus, perhaps 
because of a lack of (and conflicting) professional 
guidance, this issue has been much researched 
empirically [Lavin, 1976 and 1977; Firth, 1980 and 
1981; Dykxhoorn and Sinning 1981b and 1982]. 
These studies sought EAI views in a situation similar 
to that of Situation 3, i. e. one where: "in addition to 
the audit, an auditor provides for the audit client, 
accounting services which includes maintaining basic 
accounting data and, preparing financial statements. " 
Lavin's 1976 US study sought views on EAI in this 
situation, on the one hand from CPAs (1. in/out of 
practice 2. Big-Eight/nonBig-Eight) - collectively the 
accountants group, and on the other from loan officers 
in finance institutions and research financial analysts 
in brokerage houses - collectively the users group. 
The study revealed that it was not so much the users 
that were concerned with EAI in this situation, but the 
accountants. At least 53% of both user groups felt the 
auditor would be independent in the situation. But, 
only 36% of the accountants group so concluded. 
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Even within the accountants group, there were wide 
variations on the issue. Whereas 12% of accountants 
with Big-Eight firms concluded as above, the comparable 
statistic for accountants in nonBig-Eight firms was 
more than four times greater - 52%. 
This may well be explained by the fact that it is 
likely that a higher proportion of Big-Eight firm 
clients are SEC-regulated, so that their auditors are 
in no way permitted to offer them accounting services. 
Equally, it is likely that a higher proportion of 
clients in nonBig-Eight firms are nonSEC-regulated, so 
that their auditors may (and do) offer them accounting 
services. 
If so, the livelihood of many auditors from nonBig- 
Eight firms is more closely related to the provision of 
accounting services to clients, than their Big-Eight 
counterparts (where this is less likely to be the 
case). 
on that basis, one may perhaps anticipate a somewhat 
natural reluctance within the former group to see an 
impairment to EAI in this situation, for so doing may 
(perhaps) prejudice their continued offering of such 
services. 
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Lavin's comparable study in 1977 was based on only the 
responses received from the financial analysts who 
participated in his 1976 study the year before. 53% of 
respondents to this study did not find the auditor's 
EAI to be threatened in one similar to Situation 13. 
Nevertheless, there was some general concern with EAI, 
as the mean loan granted by these analysts under that 
auditor-client relationship, was significantly lower 
than that granted under a deemed independent situation. 
Firth 1980 and 1981 examined the same situation with 
respondents from three auditor groups (Big-Eight, 
nonBig-Eight and Industry/Commerce) and two user groups 
(Analysts and Loan Officers). In total, only 23% of 
respondents to Firth's 1980 study indicated the 
situation to be independent in EAI terms. 
While the results obtained by Lavin [1976 and 1977] 
were to an extent repeated in Firth's 1980 study, in 
some ways their results were quite different. 
The wide variation (in degree and direction) between 
Big-Eight and nonBig-Eight auditors in Lavin's (1976] 
study was also seen in Firth's study. However a 
minority of Big-Eight (41%) and a majority of nonBig- 
Eight auditors (88%) saw the auditor as independent. 
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While a majority (>53%) of users in Lavin's study saw 
the auditor as independent, this was not so for the 
Firth [1980) study. In that study, 15% of analysts and 
23% of loan officers saw the auditor as independent. 
Further, the results obtained by Firth [1981], in terms 
of the mean loan that bankers would advance under this 
relationship, were significantly (@ . 05) lower than 
that advanced under a deemed independent relationship; 
and to that extent are consistent with Lavin's 1977 
f indings - 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1981b and 1982) examined much 
the same situation in the context of EAI with duly 
informed and/or associated respondents in West Germany. 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning's 1981b study showed that the 
majority (58%) of the German State Licensed Auditors - 
"Wirtschatspruefer" (WP) surveyed by them, considered 
the auditor not to be professionally independent in 
this situation. 
Within this WP group, 75% of those associated with the 
audit of German subsidiaries of Us corporations (and so 
more likely to be associated with a Big-Eight firm) saw 
the auditor to be not independent, whereas only 52% of 
WPs not so linked, saw the auditor as such. 
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(While the chi-square statistic for this difference was 
not found to be significant (@ . 05). Dykxhoorn, and 
sinning advise caution when interpreting these results, 
as (a small) sample size may have influenced them. ) 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning's 1982 study examined the effect 
of perceived EAI in the same situation. This survey was 
conducted amongst directors of loan and investment 
departments in selected German financial institutions. 
In addition to registering their view as to the 
independence (or otherwise) of the auditor in the 
situation, respondents were also asked to indicate (by 
reference to a scale) the extent to which their 
assessment of the perceived auditor independence would 
influence an underlying financial decision. 
Interestingly, even though an auditor-client 
relationship, such as that described in the situation, 
would be prohibited in Germany, more than 70% of both 
groups (loan and investment directors) of respondents 
declared the auditor to be independent therein. 
Further, as may be expected, the perceived financial 
decisions for both groups of respondents were affected 
by their underlying perceptions of the relevant 
auditor's independence. 
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The study (Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1982: 344] also noted 
that "the perception that auditors lacked independence 
... had a more pronounced negative effect",, than the 
positive perception had on the positive effect, for the 
related financial decision. 
In other words, these researchers determined that the 
financial decisions of those who use audited statements 
"tend to be more negatively affected when (they) 
consider the auditors to lack independence, than 
positively affected if they consider the auditors to be 
independent" (Dykxhoorn and Sinning,, 1982: 344]. 
Two inferences can be made from the positions of the 
ICAEW and AICPA. First, that the EAI issues underlying 
public companies are presumably different from those of 
private companies. Second, that there is a frontier in 
terms of providing accounting services, after which the 
auditor is a client-administrator and so EAI will be 
impaired. 
Further, given the variation in prescribed ethical and 
professional rules between UK public companies (or SEC 
regulated corporations in the USA) and private 
companies, it is of interest to see how that variation 
is seen by both issuers and users of audit reports in 
the UK. 
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Against the preceding background, Situation 3 was 
developed and presented for assessment in order to 
determine whether the distinction held out by the UK 
and US accounting professions between an auditor 
rendering basic accounting services to public as 
opposed to private companies, is also upheld by UK 
users of audited financial statements and others so 
concerned. 
The provision of consultancy advice-related to resource 
utilisation or the design and implementation of systems 
Provision of MAS by auditors to audit clients has been 
an issue within auditing and the subject of much study, 
both theoretically (Carmichael and Swieringal 1968; 
Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Nichols and Pricel 1976 and 
Shockley, 1981] and empirically (Schulte, 1965; Dermer 
et al, 1971; Titard, 1971; Reckers and Stagliano, 
1981a; Shockley, 1981; Scheiner and Kiger, 1982; Pany 
and Reckers, 1984 and Knapp, 1985] by many authors. 
The case-for the provision of MAS by the auditor is 
summed up in the following extract from the Cohen 
Commission (CAR, 1978: 95] which states that: 
"An audit requires considerable knowledge about a 
company, its operations, and its industry. 
Providing MAS for an audit client may increase 
the auditor's understanding and knowledge and 
prove advantageous in conducting the audit. The 
auditor is also better situated than other 
consultants to provide MAS: 
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He is known by management, and his knowledge of 
the company may make him more aware of consulting 
needs and opportunities". 
The case against the provision of MAS by the auditor is 
essentially that the auditor who does so is then more 
likely to become involved with the audit client, and in 
time will (perhaps) develop a personal interest in its 
success. If he does so, the auditor then sets aside his 
independent "state of mind" - (the quality that is 
vital to assure his professional EAI). 
The fundamental argument against the provision of MAS 
is stated by Mautz and Sharaf [1961: 155] in the 
following words: 
"once advice leading to business decisions is 
given, a mutuality of interest between the 
consultant and the company begins to develop. He 
(the auditor) now has an interest in that 
company, a financial interest based on his 
prestige as a successful advisor; and this 
interest differs not in kind but only in degree 
from that of a full-time employee". 
Recent UK statistics confirm that the provision of MAS 
continues to constitute an important part of the total 
fee income derived by Big-Six auditors in the UK 
[Accountancy Age, June 6,1991: 1]. The statistics show 
that (in their most recent year-ends) these firms 
relied on the provision of MAS for an important (if not 
significant) percentage of their total fee income. 
These ranged, from about 16% (for both Ernst & Young and 
Touche Ross) to 50% (Arthur Andersen). 
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Opponents of MAS provision by auditors to audit clients 
claim that if such provision were restricted only to 
non-clients, then there would be no concern with EAI. 
However, assessed against the above statistics, it 
would not be unreasonable for observers to be concerned 
with EAI when some (or all) of the MAS derived revenues 
of auditors were to come from their audit clients. 
While the AICPA and the ICAEW do prohibit the provision 
of certain types of MAS by auditors, in general they 
have not prohibited their members from offering MAS to 
audit clients. Their view is that each situation must 
be assessed on its own facts, and by inference, do not 
see MAS-provision as necessarily being a threat to EAI. 
The SEC also prohibits like provision of certain types 
of MAS activities. In fact, at one time the SEC were 
clearly concerned with the effect that the provision of 
MAS by a company's auditors had on EAI, and as a 
consequence introduced ASR 250 to address that concern. 
ASR 250 required SEC-registrants to disclose in their 
proxy statement the services provided to the company 
during the last fiscal year by its principal 
independent auditor, and the percentage relationship 
that fees for nonaudit services bore to the audit fees, 
individually if over 3% and (in all cases) in total. 
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Further, ASR 250 required such MAS-recipient companies 
to disclose whether the board or the audit committee 
had approved, in advance, each professional service 
provided by its auditors, and if they (the board) had, 
prior to such contracting, considered its possible 
effect on the auditor's professional independence by 
the performance of such services. [Within a US context, 
a 1979 AICPA publication entitled "Public oversight 
Board Report: Scope of Services by CPA firms" gives an 
extensive list of references, relating to the provision 
of various types of MAS offered by an auditor to its 
client. ] 
However, even the SEC became sceptical about the 
usefulness of the requirements contained in ASR 250 
(SECF 1982], as they were subsequently withdrawn by ASR 
341, because "the detailed nonaudit services disclosure 
required by that provision were not of sufficient 
utility to investors to justify continuation of the 
disclosure requirement. " 
The matter also appears to be of current concern to the 
present UK government. Thus, in the light of the above 
experiences, it is highly relevant to note that it is 
very seriously contemplating use of an enabling clause 
in the Companies Act 1989 to issue regulations, similar 
to those contained in ASR 250 issued by the SEC. 
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The regulations, if approved and implemented, will 
require the financial statements of companies to 
disclose all fees paid by a company (or its associated 
organisations) for nonaudit work to its auditors (and 
their associates) [IIDTI forces disclosure of non-audit 
income" - Accountancy Age, May 2,1991: 1]. 
By way of contrast, one notes that UK local authority 
auditors appointed by the Audit Commission and company 
auditors in France and Germany are prohibited (by law) 
from providing all types of MAS to their audit clients. 
Previous empirical research into the concurrent 
provision of MAS and statutory audit has produced 
varying results and differing conclusions. 
Schulte's [1965] study in the US examined "the 
compatibility of management consulting and auditing". 
In that context, he looked at the views of three major 
groups using audited statements. His three groups were: 
1. Research financial analysts in brokerage firms 
2. Commercial loans and trust officers in banks 
3. Investment officers in financial institutions 
His study showed that questionnaire respondents from 
the very large banks and brokerage houses were much 
less concerned by this issue, than other respondents. 
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Schulte explained this result by suggesting that 
employers of respondents from large institutions, are 
more likely to be audited by a Big-Eight firm, where it 
is generally considered that the staffing of MAS and 
audit services are kept separate and distinct. This, 
isolation of MAS and audit staff, he suggests, may 
account for the manifest reduction in concern with EAI. 
Dermer et al [1971] empirically examined the issue in 
Canada. Their respondents came from seven important 
groups, ranging from fund and portfolio managers to 
investment counsellors and brokers. Their findings 
showed a large majority (60%) of respondents had not 
been faced with this issue in real life. Asked to 
consider the issue, 50% of respondents stated they had 
"mixed feelings" (reservations) on it. A minority (16%) 
stated the two services were definitely inconsistent. 
However, 60% of respondents indicated that the 
concurrent provision of both services by the auditor 
did not affect their confidence in the EAI. Still, the 
comparable views of 26% of the respondents. were 
adversely affected and 14% were left undecided. 
As did Schulte, the Dermer study found that audit-firm 
size was important when judging the compatibility of 
the concurrent provision of MAS and audit services. 
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In the same year as the Dermer study in Canadal Titard 
(1971] published the results of similar us research. 
Within this context, Titard sought to examine the views 
of 200 audit report users, with reference to 33 types 
of MAS that an auditor may provide to his audit client. 
Some caution with Titard's findings are in order, as' 
they may have contained some bias arising as a 
consequence of the underlying survey being restricted 
to users of audited financial statements in only the 
very large financial institutions. 
Nevertheless, Titard determinedIthat under such 
circumstances, 49% of respondents stated that at least 
one of the 33 MAS identified would in fact inhibit EAI, 
while 42% of them did not believe such an inhibition 
would occur. A small but notable minority (9%) offered 
no opinion at all. Overall, Titard concluded I'MAS and 
the appearance of EAI was not a serious problem for the 
(US audit), profession at" that time. 
Reckers and Stagliano's (1981b] paper offered findings 
within this context on EAI "as perceived by financial 
analysts". The respondents to this study were two 
groups of what the authors termed "more sophisticated" 
(50 financial analysts) and "less sophisticated" (50 
MBA in Finance) students. 
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The research assessed perceptions of EAI in situations 
where varying aggregate percentages (8 to 51) of a 
company's audit fee, were also generated by the auditor 
providing various types of MAS to the client. However, 
within these varying situations, the revenue generated 
from any one type of MAS was always limited to an 
amount less than 12% of the total audit fee. 
The authors concluded that neither research group was 
"particularly disturbed" by concurrent provision by the 
auditor of both audit and MAS. They also concluded 
that, in general, the "more sophisticated" group had 
consistently greater confidence in the independence of 
the auditor, (even when MAS generated more than 30% of 
the audit fee) than the "less sophisticated" group. 
Shockley's [1981] study assessed views of EAI against 
four sets of considerations, one of which was MAS- 
provision by the auditor to his client. This research 
was conducted amongst auditors (from Big-Eight and 
nonBig-Eight firms), commercial bank loan officers and 
financial analysts in important financial institutions. 
The overall results of the study confirmed that the 
provision of MAS was seen as a major-EAI determining 
factor by all groups. Further, he determined that 
nonBig-Eight auditors levied more importance (concern) 
to the provision of MAS than did Big-Eight auditors. 
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The basis of Pany and Reckers' (1984] study was the 
provision of MAS services proscribed by the SEC 
Practices Section of the AICPA, compared with those 
that are not. 
Contrary to the findings of Shockley [1981], this study 
suggested that the distinction between whether MAS was 
provided by the auditor by the audit department itself, 
or a separate and distinct MAS department associated 
with it, was significant. In cases where this was not 
so, perceptions of EAI were adversely affected. 
The results of thi s study also indicated that 
respondents had neither extreme confidence in, nor 
extreme concern with, the level of EAI when nonaudit 
services were also provided. 
The results offered little clear evidence to suggest 
that those MAS proscribed by the AICPA, were regarded 
as significantly more damaging to EAI than other forms 
of MAS (not so proscribed). 
The study by Knapp [1985] examined how certain 
contextual factors, one of them being provision of MAS 
by the audit firm, in auditor-client conflicts, 
affected the perceived ability of the auditor to resist 
client pressure (i. e. EAI). 
280 
In particular, the study tested the hypothesis that 
users of audited financial statements will perceive 
that the client management is more likely to obtain its 
preferred (accounting) resolution in a conflict when 
the auditing firm provides a significant amount of MAS' 
to the client, as opposed to providing no MAS at all to 
the audited client. 
The results with regard to the preceding hypothesis 
were not conclusive. Provision of MAS was found to be 
statistically significant at . 001, however the total 
amount of overall variance explained by it was minimal. 
Thus,, it appears that the provision of a significant 
amount of MAS by an audit firm, only slightly increases 
the apparent likelihood of a conflict being resolved in 
favour of the client. 
Studies of the above kind continued to be undertaken in 
I 
the US during the 1980s, however for the first time the 
results of similar research conducted in the UK were 
published in that decade. 
Firth conducted a UK-based empirical assessment of 
audit-user perceptions of EAI when the auditor also 
provided MAS to his audit client, and published his 
findings in Firth (1980 and 1981]. 
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These surveys assessed EAI views of respondents 
concerned with the issue, based on a series of auditor- 
client relationships. One such relationship was where 
"a professional accounting firm provides MAS to a 
company which it also audits. The MAS arm and the audit 
arm of the audit firm are separate autonomous units. " 
Firth's 1980 and 1981 studies judged views of the 
preceding situation with respondents from three CA 
groups (Big-Eight, nonBig-Eight and Industry/Commerce) 
and two user groups (Analysts and Loan officers). More 
than 60% of all respondents to the 1980 study perceived 
the auditor to be "not independent" in this situation. 
This perception was marked in respondents from the two 
user groups, where at least 61% of each group declared 
the auditor to be likely not independent, and less 
pronounced in the accountant groups, where this view 
was shared by a maximum of only 41% of those groups. 
The findings of Firth [19811 were an extension of the 
1980 study. In the 1981 study, respondents were also 
asked to indicate the impact such a relationship would 
have on a financial decision based on audited accounts, 
supported firstly by an independent auditor-client 
relationship, and secondly on a series of auditor- 
client relationships described and presented for study. 
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In this situation (provision of MAS), the impact of the 
relationship was significant at . 01, and while the mean 
loan offered on an independent auditor-client basis was 
10.6 units, the mean loan based on the above basis 
(i. e. auditor providing MAS) was only 8.6 units. 
The position of auditors providing MAS to their clients 
is worth close study. Some, like the Metcalf Committee 
[US Senate, 1977] or Austin Mitchell ("Mission to keep 
contestants out of judges beds" - Financial Times, 
December 13,1990: 15]. ask that "the provision of non- 
audit services to audit clients be curtailed" or at 
best completely prohibited. 
on the other hand, important members of the UK audit 
profession, like Martin Scicluna, chairman of the 
ICAEW's Auditing Committee, argue that: 
"preventing auditors from providing ancillary 
services, such as consulting to audit clients, 
would cut off an important source of advice for 
many companies" ["Professional self-regulation is 
more efficient than statutory interference" - 
Letters, Financial Times, December 14,1990: 17]. 
The limited empirical evidence is persuasive. When more 
than 61% of audit users indicate that the auditor is 
likely to be not independent when MAS are also 
provided, (even when the audit and MAS providing arms 
are operated autonomously), then there is strong 
suggestion of concern with EAI in the UK [Firth, 1980]. 
283 
However, contrary views are derived from the Chairmen 
of some of UK's Top 1000 companies. In answer to the 
question "Do you believe that auditors' independence is 
prejudiced by the provision of management consultancy 
services to audit clients? ", posed in the ICAS [1987] 
survey, at least 70% of these company chairmen (in each 
of the four quartiles) replied in the negative. 
Such views are also supported by opinion from the US, 
where the Cohen Commission stated that "with the 
exception of the Westec case, ... (their) research has 
not found instances in which an auditor's independence 
appears to have been compromised by providing other 
(MA) services" (CAR,, 1978: xxviii-xxix]. 
Against the preceding background, Situation 13 was 
developed and presented for assessment so as to judge 
how EAI is viewed in a situation where auditors to a 
major PLC have provided it with MAS over past years, 
related billings being about 40% of the audit fee. 
The prime purpose of this chapter was to provide a 
discussion of considerations underlying, and the 
rationale for presenting for assessment each research 
situation. The next chapter presents considerations 
relating to details of the respondents who provided 
their views of EAI in the 20 questionnaire situations. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE RESEARCH GROUPS AND RESPONDENTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide details of 
the groups and respondents that participated in the 
research and the rationale underlying use of these 
particular groups. Expressed in Brunswick Lens model 
terms, this chapter can be seen as a clarification of 
the judges used in obtaining the relevant perceptions 
(i. e. those individuals who were asked to respond to 
the research questionnaire). 
The chapter has two major sections. The first section 
presents the rationale for assessing the external 
auditor independence views of each of the four groups 
who participated in this research, and details of the 
main criteria required from all groups of respondents. 
The second section states, for respondents from each of 
the four groups, the basis on which their participation 
was achieved. 
7.1 Group considerations 
The auditor's report puts the auditor in touch with the 
public at large. Accordingly, it would be interesting 
and relevant to establish views based on a sample of 
the entire public. However this is undoubtedly very 
difficult and highly impractical. 
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Instead, selected surrogate groups were used as 
respondents to the final research questionnaire. Four 
distinct groups (one of which provided two sub-groups) 
were selected to act as respondents. 
Use of the four groups as respondents to the 
questionnaire, was determined by the fact that they 
either report on or use audited financial statements. 
Thus, store is placed by them on the audit report and, 
in doing so, the independence of the relevant auditor. 
Additionally, two important criteria were also laid 
down for the use of respondents from all four groups: 
1. Respondents should be reasonably familiar with the 
work of auditors, and their relationships with 
audit clients. 
2. Respondents should belong to a clearly recognisable 
and homogeneous group. 
Having regard to the above criteria, the following four 
groups, who came from one of two functional categories, 
were selected for use as respondents to the research 
questionnaire. 
I. Audit Report Issuers Category 
la. Auditors in Big-Six firms 
lb. Auditors in nonBig-Six firms 
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II. Audit ReDort Users Category 
2. Bank credit/loan officers. 
3. Credit Managers. 
4. Internal Auditors. 
The following paragraphs present the rationale for the 
use of each group, and subsequent paragraphs details 
relating to respondents within each group. 
External Auditors 
External Auditors (EAs) issue audit reports, and as 
such their views on their own professional independence 
are of course very important and essential as a basis 
of comparison with comparable views of other groups. 
The participation of EAs to this research was pivotal, 
because it was their views of their independence that 
was contrasted with the same views of each of the other 
groups. 
In addition, EAs from both Big-Six and nonBig-Six firms 
were used. Use of EAs from both these sizes of audit 
firms, gives recognition to Pearson's (1979: 186] 
suggestion, wherein he states: 
"it should be noted that in any future research 
project that utilises CPAs (auditors) as 
subjects, researchers would be wise to recognise 
that the CPA population cannot always be viewed 
as one homogenous group. Big-Eight CPAsI 
perceptions are sometimes different from nonBig- 
Eight CPAsI perceptions. " 
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Bankers 
Bank credit officers, or bankers (BAs), are frequent 
users of audited statements when extending loan or, 
credit facilities to customers. In doing so, they place 
reliance on the auditor's report and in that sense, are 
no different from other credit-granting persons or 
organisations. As such, bankers can be seen in the same 
standing as creditors, and so form a good surrogate 
group for providers of funds generally. 
Credit Manaqers 
Respondents for the third research group were sought in 
the form of Credit Managers (CMs) whose views were 
sought because CMs often make important credit 
decisions in industry, trade and commerce - partly- 
basing their decisions on the audited financial 
statements of the credit applicant. 
In doing so, CMs implicitly assume EAI and would 
therefore normally be expected to be concerned with EAI 
and disposed to assist with research into it. 
Internal Auditors 
The fourth group of respondents was Internal Auditors. 
IAs' views are a good basis for comparison with those 
of EAs, as there is much Commonality of approach and 
purpose in their professional work. 
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Indeed, often and increasingly EAs rely on the work of 
IAs - and this feature in itself provides good basis 
for a comparative study of the two groups' views of EAI 
- said to be the only distinguishing feature between 
EAs and IAs. 
Further, like EAs, IAs hold professional independence 
very-important and in extremely high regard. Indeed, 
the very first of the Professional Practice Standards 
of the IIA - UK is on independence, stating that IIIAs 
should be independent of the activities they audit". 
However, unlike EAs, IAs are not required to be 
independent of the organisations for whom they audit. 
Thus, ýit is argued, it is professional independence - 
the research subject - that distinguishes IAs from EAs. 
if so, it is important that both groups' perceptions on 
EAI be known. 
7.2 Respondent considerations 
While sample respondents for the professional auditor 
and banker groups could have been obtained from 
professional membership lists, the incremental benefits 
derived from so doing, did not warrant the incremental 
expenditure of resources (time and money). Insteadi 
respondents for these two groups were obtained as 
detailed below. 
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External Auditors 
Respondents for the EA research group came in the form 
of qualified auditors employed in the London offices of 
five major firms of chartered accountants, who arranged 
for completion of the questionnaires by suitable 
respondents, and so assisted with the research. Two of 
these firms were Big-Six firms, and the other three, 
while nonBig-Six firms, ranked in the Top Ten UK firms. 
Bankers 
similarly, respondents for the banker group were 
provided in the form of loan/credit officers in the 
employ of six major UK banks, who also very kindly 
assisted with the research by arranging for suitable 
respondents to the questionnaire. Three of the six 
banks participating in the research were clearing 
banks, while the other three were important non- 
clearing banks. 
Credit Managers 
CMs from whom questionnaire completion was requested 
were all 490 UK-resident Fellow Members of the ICM. 
Their selection was made by reference to the ICMIs 
(then current) List of Members. The ICM was established 
in 1939, its purpose being to assist its "members to 
acquire the most advanced Credit Management skills and 
knowledge of the most up-to-date credit techniques-" 
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The ICM has over 4500 members in total, spread over 
four grades of membership, the highest being a Fellow 
(FICM). Institute rules require that Fellows must: 
1) be at least 30 years of age and have been a 
member of the ICM for not less than seven years, 
have been in an executive position and had the 
direction and control of credit staff for not 
less than seven years, 
satisfy the ICM Council that his or her experience 
and standing are sufficient to justify admission as 
a fellow. 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Fellows of the 
ICM hold firm views on EAI, distilled by years of 
experience with and reliance on audited statements. 
Questionnaires to this group were sent out together 
with a covering letter (First Request) from the ICM's 
Chairman, informing the recipient that the Institute 
was assisting with the research and inviting his/her 
co-operation in completing the questionnaire attached. 
Those who had not returned the questionnaire after the 
first request, were sent a "Second Request" from the 
Chairman, asking them to return the completed 
questionnaire. No further requests were sent to Fellows 
who had still not returned the questionnaire. 
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Internal Auditors 
(IAs) were selected from among only Full Members of The 
Institute of Internal Auditors - UK (IIA - UK). Again, 
selection was made by reference to the institute's 
(then current) List of Members. 
The IIA - UK is a part of the International Institute 
of Internal Auditors and the only UK professional body 
for IAs. Its main objectives are "to represent all IAs 
and to further the advancement of Internal Auditing.,, 
The IIA - UK's most senior membership category is Full 
Members, though all members must uphold its Code of 
Ethics, Article 7 of which declares that "members shall 
adopt suitable means to comply with the Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing", and 
the first of these relates to independence. 
Full Members are those who (having passed the 
Institute's examinations) "have direct jurisdiction 
over Internal Auditing activities, or are actively 
engaged as Internal Auditors. " 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that they would hold 
firm and relevant views on professional independence - 
particularly EAI, distilled by years of involvement 
with auditing and association with audited statements. 
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IAs work in the private and public'sectors, but most 
interface between them and EAs occurs in the private 
sector. Hence the research focused only on Full Members 
of the IIA-UK employed in the private sector by PLCs or 
their subsidiaries, except those in the financial 
services sector. This was because views from that 
sector were already reflected by the banker group. 
Questionnaires were sent to the 500 duly selected (as 
above) members of the IA group with a "First Request" 
from the President of IIA-UK, informing the recipient 
that the Institute was participating with this research 
into external auditor independence, and inviting 
co-operation by completing the questionnaire attached. 
Those members who had not returned the questionnaire 
after the initial request, were sent a further request 
(Second Request) from the President of the IIA-UK, 
asking them to complete the questionnaire. This request 
produced a further set of responses, and no further 
questionnaire completion requests were sent to members 
who had still not returned completed questionnaires. 
Respondent Participation 
Final'statistics showed that the questionnaire was 
responded to by a total of 707 respondents, the ' 
composition of which was as follows on the next page: 
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External auditors: (Big-Six 72) (nonBig-Six 51) 123 
Bankers: (clearing 55)(non-clearing 33) 88 
Credit managers: (early 172) (late 73) 245 
Internal auditors: (early 179) (late 72) 251 
Total respondents: 707 
The response rates for the two postal groups were 50.0% 
(245/490) for the CM group, and 51.3% (251/489) for the 
IA group. Per Babbie (1990: 183) these rates excluded 
"all questionnaires that could not be delivered" and,. 
were acceptable for study, as Babbie [1990: 182] holds 
"a rate of at least 50% is ... adequate for analysis. " 
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the 
rationale used for research usage of each research 
group, so as to confirm their relevance and 
appropriateness when studying EAI. This was completed 
in the first section of the chapter. The second section 
of the chapter described how, within each group, 
questionnaire respondents were obtained. Thus this 
chapter provided the relevant background details of 
each research group and respondents belonging to it. 
In summary, this chapter concerned itself with 
providing details of the judges used in the EAI 
perceptual exercise. In continuing the application of 
the Brunswick Lens paradigm, the next chapter concerns 
itself with the provision of relevant details 
(attributes) attached to the responses provided by the 
judges used in this research exercise. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SOME ATTRIBUTES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe some of the 
attributes attached to the responses derived from the 
completed questionnaires. In Brunswick Lens model 
terms, this chapter may be seen as a revelation of some 
of the main features underlying the "verdicts" or 
"judgements" provided by the "judges".. As such, the 
chapter does not describe the responses themselves 
(done in the next chapter) but focuses more on their 
intrinsic nature'. 
The reason for presenting this discussion of the nature 
of the responses is based on the facts that; 
1. limitations attached to the results themselves will 
restrict the validity of any results achieved from 
statistical treatment of them 
any statistical treatments applied to the responses 
must be in accord with the nature of the responses, 
, 
as not all statistical treatments lend themselves to 
all types of response data. 
In considering both the above facts, this chapter has 
two main sections. The first section is devoted to a 
discussion of the underlying nature of the responses 
and related statistical possibilities. 
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The second section of the chapter concerns itself with 
the detection of a feature that may limit the 
interpretation of those responses derived from the 
mailed questionnaires used in the research - i. e. non- 
response bias (NRB). 
8.1 Nature of the responses 
In considering the underlying nature of the responses, 
this section of the chapter focuses on the following 
issues: 
1. Their "refined" nature 
2. Their "statistical" nature 
The "refined" nature of the responses 
As previously noted, this research recognised that 
external auditor independence is a multi-faceted issue, 
and so rather than seek views of it in pure abstract 
terms, sought views of (it as held by respondents in 
the four research groups) within specified auditor- 
client situations, the circumstances of which were 
described as succinctly as possible. 
The rationale employed was that it is more useful to 
obtain views of EAI with regard to specified possible 
and/or potential provocations to it (stimuli), rather 
than generalised views of the subject, with little 
practical significance. 
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Previous similar research (Lavin, 1974] examining 
perceptions of EAI within clearly described situations 
suffered from the weakness that it allowed for 
judgements to be provided only on a ("independent" - 
"not independent") dichotomous basis. In other words it 
did not allow for expression of intensity. 
Later research (Pearson, 1979] attempted to address 
this weakness by seeking responses on a 7-point scale 
(as is the case in this research) by asking for 
responses on an "agree" (positively numbered) or 
"disagree" (negatively numbered) basist and so allowing 
for their underlying intensity to be registered, by 
indicating the extent of agreement or disagreement. 
However, Pearson did not allow for the fact that 
responding individuals may themselves have different 
numeric weights attached to the scales. In other words 
no provision was made for individual interpretation of 
the response scale provided. 
Accordingly, in addition to requesting respondents to 
provide their underlying degree of confidence 
(intensity), they were also asked to provide their own 
personal yardstick (using the same response scale) of 
the Minimum Level of Confidence (MLC) in EAI that they 
consider may be reasonably demanded or expected. 
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The consequence of obtaining each respondent's MLC was 
that it allowed for their responses to each situation 
to be judged against the standard or level that they 
had personally put forth. Thus, in this research, the 
actual responses provided to the questionnaire are 
considered the "raw" responses, while raw responses as 
reduced by the relevant individual respondent's MLC are 
considered the "refined" responses. 
Equally, a negative refined response indicates a 
dissatisfaction or concern with EAI whereas a positive 
refined response-denotes a lack of (negative) concern, 
or perhaps even an assurance with EAI. Further, as 
refined responses contain within them a personalised 
expression of each respondent's view both on EAI within 
a particular situation but also his own expectations as 
to EAI, this research focuses only on the refined 
responses and raw responses are not considered further. 
The "statistical" nature of the responses 
It is important to consider the underlying statistical 
nature of the responses obtained from completed 
questionnaires, as it is that feature that determines 
the appropriateness (or otherwise) of applying 
particular statistical tests. In other words, the 
nature of responses governs the choice of statistical 
tests to which they may be validly applied. 
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By ensuring that the response scale employed for this 
research revealed ordinal-scale and interval-scale 
data,, the responses accordingly derived reflected 
properties attributable to both ordinal-scale and 
interval-scale data. 
Thus,, the response data obtained was amenable to both 
parametric-tests (appropriate for interval-scale data) 
and non-parametric tests (appropriate for ordinal-scale 
data). 
Further, comparison of the results of significance 
tests derived from parametric (t-test) and non- 
parametric tests (Mann-Whitney), tended to corroborate 
each other in the-vast majority of instances - 
suggesting appropriate and valid usage of both 
parametric and non-parametric tests (as conducted in 
some of the following chapters). 
8.2 Non-resRonse bias 
As the views of the credit manager and internal auditor 
groups were sought through a mailed questionnaire, 
their responses were examined for non-response, bias 
(NRB), a feature that may arise in any mail survey 
because not all those questioned respond. This (non- 
response) may be because only those with an empathy for 
or negativity against the research subject respond. 
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If that is the case, the responses of those who have 
responded will contain a bias, and in assessing the 
results of research conducted through mail 
questionnaire surveys, it is important to test for and 
confirm the absence of NRB. 
An approach often used 
when testing for NRB is 
is premised on the that 
(respondents who do not 
more requests) are very 
(respondents who reply, 
requests). 
(and employed in this research), 
the "surrogate method", which 
belief that non-respondents 
reply at all - despite two or 
similar to late-respondents 
but after two or more 
on that basis, confirmation of no significant 
differences between the late-respondents and the early- 
respondents (those who reply upon the first request), 
one may infer no significant differences between 
respondents and non-respondents, with the research 
findings being unlikely to contain elements of NRB. 
The methods employed to test for NRB are as suggested 
by Wallace and Mellor [1988: 136] and Wallace and Cooke 
(1990]. Though the former suggest that "non-parametric 
tests may be more efficient, and more appropriate" when 
testing for NRB, the responses of these two groups were 
tested for NRB using both types of tests. 
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The parametric test used to test for NRB was the t- 
test. The non-parametric tests used to test for NRB 
were the Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
In this research, responses of those of the two mail- 
surveyed groups who replied to the first request (early 
respondents) were compared with those of the same group 
responding to the second request (late respondents). 
only two completion requests were made for both groups. 
Further, in judging NRB, responses related not only to 
the main questionnaire were judged, but also responses 
related to the few biographical details requested in 
Section 3 of the questionnaire (Appendix B). 
Parametric (t-) test (IAs and CMs) 
Main ctuestionnaire responses 
Identical results were obtained for both relevant 
groups (IAs and CMs), when refined responses were t- 
tested. Such findings suggest strong evidence of 
freedom from NRB within these responses. 
Biographical responses 
With the exception of two features, the same t-test 
results were obtained for biographical responses of 
both groups. The two excepted features were, frequency 
with which use made of audited statements and 
familiarity with the process of issuing audit opinions. 
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Nonparametric (M-W and K-S) tests (IAs and CMs) 
Two non-parametric tests, the Mann-Whitney U-test (M- 
W) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test were also 
applied to both (early and late responding) sets of 
(main questionnaire and biographical) responses for the 
IA and CM groups. 
main questionnaire responses 
In terms of refined responses, both nonparametric tests 
indicated much the same results. In fact this was 
consistently true for the credit manager group. 
In terms of the Internal auditor groupr this was also 
so with the exceptions of Situations 13 and 20 for both 
tests, and Situation 12 for the M-W U-test only. As 
such, allowing for these limited exceptions, the non- 
parametric tests findings suggested that both 
respondent sets for both groups were essentially drawn 
from the same population. 
However, with respect to the Internal auditor group 
only, the result for the K-S test for Situation 12 only 
did not confirm the comparable result indicated by the 
M-W U-test. Equally, the data only very marginally 
failed to meet the pre-established (5%) significance 
level for the K-S test with reference to Situations 13 
and 2 0. 
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Biographical responses 
With regard to the biographical responses for the IA 
group only, the results of both nonparametric tests 
indicated (with one feature excepted) that the two 
(early and late responding) groups were likely to have 
been drawn from the same overall population, and hence 
unlikely to hold elements of NRB. However, this did not 
appear to be true of the feature regarding the 
frequency with which respondents made use of the audit 
opinions on audited financial statements. 
With regard to the biographical responses for the 
credit manager group only, the nonparametric tests did 
not reveal totally consistent results. The results of 
K-S test indicated for all the personal features, that 
the two respondent sets were likely to have been drawn 
from the same overall population. However this was so 
for only two of the biographical responses in terms of 
the M-W U-test, these were the respondents' age-range 
and area of specialisation. 
The remaining four biographicý 
was not so, were respondents' 
audited financial statements, 
audit opinions, possession of 
frequency with which use made 
statements. 
al responses where this 
years of experience using 
familiarity with issuing 
a university degree, and 
of audited financial 
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While-it would be incorrect to state that the NRB tests 
within the responses for the two mail-surveyed groups 
revealed no traces of it at all, it is true to state 
that this was so in only an extremely limited number of 
responses. 
Further, where this was so, it is also true to state 
that in many cases the results only very marginally 
failed to meet the pre-established criteria, or in many 
other cases were not confirmed by another statistical 
test. As such, the overall conclusion in relation to 
the responses used as the dataset for this research may 
well be said to be free from NRB and a good basis for 
further investigation. 
This chapter has attempted to ensure that the responses 
obtained from all respondents were amenable to both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. Furthermore, it 
attempted to confirm that there was no NRB inherent 
within the CM and IA groups, from whom responses were 
obtained by (first and second) postal requests. 
In general, this appeared to be the case and because of 
the general consistency between the results of 
parametric and non-parametric (significance) tests and 
the nature of the response scale employed, assurance 
was taken for appropriate usage of both types of tests. 
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CHAPTER IX 
STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA ANALYSED 
This chapter provides a brief descriptive overview of 
the refined responses to the twenty situation questions 
on EAI in the research questionnaire. The first section 
of the chapter considers aspects of the data relating 
to all four research groups, while the second considers 
the same within the external auditor group only. 
The data is also described in two sets of statistical 
tables, the first relating it across the four research 
groups and the second relating it within the external 
auditor group only on a Big-Six/nonBig-six or 
Partner/non-Partner basis. Except where otherwise 
indicated, responses considered in this research 
consistently relate only to the refined responses 
obtained from respondents. 
9.1 Data for the four research groups 
As the minimum Level of Confidence (MLC) indicated by a 
respondent was vital to the development of his/her 
refined (or personalised) responses, Table 9.1 presents 
for each research group individually, and for all 
respondents together in one group, their collapsed 
percentage frequency statistics with reference to their 
responses to the MLC question [App. B, Vol. 11: 254]. 
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The MLC resDonse 
of note is the fact that Table 9.1 shows that the mean 
MLC for the EA Group (4.29) was higher than that of the 
three User Groups - Bankers, Credit Managers and 
Internal Auditors (which ranged from 3.87 to 4.02). 
Thus,, it is likely that the degree of tolerance 
permitted auditors in terms of EAI by User Groups, is 
higher than that granted by EAs (the Issuer Group) 
towards themselves. If so, this is an interesting 
insight into these User Groups' attitudes towards EAI. 
To have an insight into the dispersion for each group's 
mean response, Table 9.1 also provides, on a group by 
group basis, the standard deviations (SD) for the MLC 
response. At 0.78, the SD for the MLC question was 
lowest for EAs, and at 0.92 the highest for BAs. SDs 
for CMs and IAs were much the same at . 90 and . 89. 
A consistency of approach was noted in the response to 
the MLC question. In this regard, Table 9.1 shows that 
the median response for all groups to that question was 
4, indicating a strong consistency on this feature by 
all groups, and the fact that all groups consider a 
HIGH degree of confidence in EAI to be the MINIMUX 
level that may be justly demanded and expected by users 
of audited financial statements. 
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TABLE 9.1 
SELECT STATISTICAL DATA FOR AND PERCENT OF GROUPSI 
RESPONSES TO MINIMUM LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE (MLC) QUESTION 
External Bankers Credit Internal All 
Auditors Mgrs. Auditors Groups 
Select Statistical Data: 
MEAN 4.29 4.02 3.87 3.97 4.00 
S. DEV. (MEAN) 0.78 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.89 
MODE 4 4 4 4 4 
MEDIAN 4 4 4 4 4 
SKEWNESS 0.08 0.34 0.61 0.53 0.43 
KURTOSIS 0.13 -0.55 0.04 0.34 -0.07 
n= 120 81 244 251 696 
NOT STATED= 3 7 1 0 11 
Levels of Confidence as stated by Percent of Group: 
NONE: 0 
VERY LOW: 1 
LOW: 2 0.8 1.2 2.1 2.3 1.9 
MEDIUM: 3 11.7 30.9 35.6 25.9 27.4 
HIGH: 4 50.9 38.3 42.2 51.8 46.7 
VERY HIGH: 5 30.8 23.4 13.9 12.0 17.2 
TOTAL: 6 5.8 6.2 6.2 8.0 6.8 
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Central tendencies and dispersion 
In order to have an insight into central tendencies 
within the group responses, Table 9.2 presents the mean 
response for each group individually, and for all 
groups combined. Further, to help with an understanding 
of the dispersion for these means, the table also gives 
their standard deviation (SD). The table shows no major 
dispersion across responses to situational questions 
and all groups, with ranges of SD being as below: 
Group Responses Range of SD 
External Auditors Refined 0.94 to 1.61 
Bankers Refined 0.88 to 1.29 
Credit Managers Refined 1.15 to 1.41 
Internal Auditors Refined 1.14 to 1.45 
The above shows the highest SD within all groups for 
responses to be 1.61 and the lowest to be 0.88. As 
such, there appears to be no strong or significant 
dispersion of group responses from their mean, which 
suggests an element of centralising tendency within the 
refined responses for all groups. 
Rankinq of mean resDonses 
Table 9.3 presents a ranked order presentation of the 
twenty situations - the situations being ranked on a 
descending (intensity or concern) basis, of the 
appropriate group mean response. 
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TABLE 9.2 
MEAN AND RELATED STANDARD DEVIATION: REFINED GROUP 
RESPONSES TO SITUATION QUESTIONS 
sitn. EAs BAS cms IAS All 
Mean 1 0.42 0.07 -0.09 -0.25 -0.04 
S. Dev. 1 1.08 1.18 1.28 1.26 1.25 
Mean 2 0.07 -0.36 -0.91 , -0.75 -0.62 
S. Dev. 2 1.11 1.15 1.27 1.32 1.30 
Mean 3 0.08 -0.07 -0.61 -1.17 -0.63 
S. Dev. 3 1.13 1.13 1.30 1.45 1.39 
Mean 4 -1.15 -0.95 -1.73 -1.78 -1.56 
S. Dev. 4 1.61 1.21 1.41 1.45 1.47 
Mean 5 -0.38 -0.21 -0.30 -0.41 -0.34 
S. Dev. 5 1.26 1.23 1.22 1.20 1.22 
Mean 6 -0.12 -0.48 -1-11 -0.83 -0.76 
S. Dev. 6 1.21 1.13 1.29 1.31 1.31 
Mean 7 -0.05 0.03 -0.49 -0.45 -0.34 
S. Dev. 7 l.. 16 0.88 1.19 1.14 1.15 
Mean 8 -0.28 -0.19 -0.55 -0.43 -0.42 
S. Dev. 8 1.48 0.99 1.24 1.33 1.29 
Mean 9 -0.35 -0.42 -0.85 -0.83 -0.71 
S. Dev. 9 1.21 1.09 1.31 1.39 1.31 
Mean 10 0.43 -0.06 -0.18 -0.22 -0.08 
S. Dev. 10 0.94 1.19 1.15 1.18 1.15 
Mean 11 -0.13 -1.00 -1.29 -1.02 -0.96 
S. Dev. 11 1.19 1.29 1.41 1.29 1.38 
Mean 12 -1.63 -1.04 -1.14 -1.17 -1.22 
S. Dev. 12 1.23 1.16 1.27 1.20 1.24 
Mean 13 0.08 -0.43 -0.73 -0.85 -0.60 
S. Dev. 13 1.09 1.07 1.29 1.17 1.23 
Mean 14 -0.64 -0.90 -1.68 -1.33 -1.29 
S. Dev. 14 1.28 1.22 1.36 1.41 1.40 
Mean 15 -0.98 -0.41 -0.82 -0.85 -0.81 
S. Dev. 15 1.61 1.05 1.22 1.35 1.33 
Mean 16 -0.18 -0.26 -0.27 -0.44 -0.32 
S. Dev. 16 1.09 1.01 1.18 1.19 1.15 
Mean 17 -0.85 -0.46 -0.58 -0.66 -0.64 
S. Dev. 17 1.36 1.15 1.26 1.34 1.30 
Mean 18 -0.80 -0.21 -0.43 -0.69 -0.56 
S. Dev. 18 1.11 1.00 1.18 1.20 1.17 
Mean 19 -0.10 -0.49 -0.66 -0.60 -0.52 
S. Dev. 19 1.27 1.07 1.17 1.31 1.24 
Mean 20 -0.47 -0.43 -0.87 -0.76 -0.71 
S. Dev. 20 1.43 1.05 1.24 1.31 1.29 
KEY TO SCALES-OF ASSURANCE IN OR (CONCERN WITH) EAI 
(-)=CONCERN(CON): M=POS. ASSURANCE(PA): 0=NO CON/PA 
1=V. LOW 2=LOW 3=MEDIUM 4=HIGH S=V. HIGH 6=TOTAL 
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TABLE 9.3 
ORDERED RANKING OF SITUATIONS BASED ON MEAN VALUE 
OF REFINED GROUP RESPONSES TO SITUATION QUESTIONS 
Groups EAs BAS cms IAs All 
Rank Situation Number 
1 12 12 4 4 4 
2 4 4 14 14 14 
3 18 11 11 12 12 
4 15 14 12 3 11 
5 17 19 6 11 15 
6 14 62 13 6 
7 20 17 20 15 20 
8 9 13 9 9 9 
9 5 9 15 6 2 
10 16 20 13 20 3 
11 8 15 19 2 17 
12 11 23 18 13 
13 6* 16 17 17 18 
14 19 58 19 19 
15 7 18 7 16 8 
16 3 8 18 7 5 
17 13* 10 5 5 16 
18 2 3 16 8 7 
19 10 1 10 10 10 
20 1 71 1 1 
*= Tied with immediately following rank 
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Table 9.3 clearly does not reveal any total consistency 
of approach for the groups' refined responses. In fact, 
no single pattern of consistently overall group ranking 
emerges. However, what commonality there is, indicates 
some continued and general consistency of approach to 
EAI issues between the research groups analysed. 
One method of detecting similarity in approach to an 
issue by various respondents, is to assess any patterns 
of commonality in the way in which they rank the issues 
under consideration. Thus, the mean ranks for the 
refined responses to the twenty research questions for 
all groups were computed. The table does not reflect 
total similarity, or even a very high degree of 
commonality between the four research groups, as no 
group's order of ranking was echoed by another. 
However, pockets of similarity were detected between 
some of the groups. 
While the elements of each group's ranking order varied 
in its central parts, there appeared to be some 
parallel approach in terms of the extremes. It became 
evident that situations 4 and 12 figured strongly at 
the lowest end, while at the highest end, the same was 
true of situations 1 and 10. This would suggest most 
concern with EAI in situations 4 and 12, and least 
concern with the same in situations 1 and 10. 
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The modal responses 
Further, on the same group basis, and in order to 
provide an indication of other measures of central 
tendency, Table 9.4 presents the mode and median 
(refined) responses to the questionnaire situations. 
While the mode is not usually considered to be the 
preferred measure of central tendency for ordinal and 
interval data [Norusis, 1988b: B-85], used together 
with other measures, there are often insights to be 
derived from the use of modal values in many instances. 
Thus, Table 9.4 states the modal value of each group's 
refined responses to the twenty situations. The table 
shows good correspondence between the CM and IA groups 
only, with them sharing modes for fifteen of the twenty 
(75%) situations (all except, 2,41 61 13 and 14). A 
better modal consistency was noted between the EA and 
BA groups, with them having differing modes in only 
three situations (4,11 and 12). 
other situations showed varying and inconsistent group 
modal patterns. Thus when viewed in modal terms, there 
is some consistency of approach on EAI between the CM 
and IA groups, while this is somewhat better for the BA 
and EA groups. 
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TABLE 9.4 
MODE AND MEDIAN: REFINED GROUP RESPONSES TO SITUATION 
QUESTIONS 
sitn. EAs BAs cms lAs All 
Mode 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 2 0 0 -1 0 0 
Median 2 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Mode 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 3 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Mode 4 0 -1 -1 -2 -1 
Median 4 -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 
Mode 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 6 0 0 -1 0 0 
Median 6 0 0 -1 -1 -1 
Mode 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 9 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Mode 10 0 0 0 0' 0 
Median 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 11 0 -1 -1 -1 0 
Median 11 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Mode 12 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Median 12 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Mode 13 0 0 0 -1 0 
Median 13 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Mode 14 0 0 -2 -1 -1 Median 14 0 -1 -2 -1 -1 Mode 15 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 15 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 
Mode 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 17 -1 0 0 0 0 
Mode 18 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 18 -1 0 0 -1 0 Mode 19 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 19 0 0 -1 0 -1 Mode 20 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 20 0 0 -1 -1 -1 
KEY TO BASIS LEVELS OF ASSURANCE IN (CONCERN WITH) EAI 
(-)=CONCERN(CON): (+)=POS. ASSURANCE(PA): 0=NO CON/PA 
O=NONE 1=V. LOW 2=LOW 3=MEDIUM 4=HIGH 5=V. HIGH 6=TOTAL 
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Table 9.4 also shows that (on a modal basis) no group 
was consistently satisfied with EAI for all situations. 
However a strong pattern of modal consistency was 
revealed, with all groups sharing the same modal value 
in thirteen of the twenty (65%) situations (1,31 51 7 
to 10 and 15 to 20), and all User Groups registering 
the same mode in a further two (11 and 12). 
Thus,, when judged in terms of respondents' refined 
responses, there appears to be some consistency of 
approach towards EAI by all four groups. Further, in 
modal terms only, EAs appeared most content with their 
levels of confidence in EAI in the 20 situations, as 
they received their MLC (or better) in 19 of them. 
Situation 12 was the only one where this was not so. 
Equally, in raodal terms, CMs and IAs appeared least 
satisfied with EAI, as they were provided with their 
MLC (or better) in 16 and 15 of the 20 situations 
respectively, while Bankers received their MLC in 17 of 
the situations. 
Table 9.4 shows that in modal terms there was only one 
situation (12) where all groups consistently failed to 
receive at least their respective MLC. By the same 
token, there were only two situations (4 and 11) where 
all User Groups only failed to receive their MLC. 
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Situations 2,4F 61 11,12,13, and 14 were ones in 
which at least one of the User Groups failed to receive 
its respective MLC. In all other situations, all groups 
received their respective modal MLCs. 
The median resnonses 
The median value of a distribution (being that observed 
value in it, such that one half of the observations in 
the distribution fall above it and the other half fall 
below it)r is usually a good measure of central 
tendency for ordinal data, as it makes use of the rank 
information contained within such data [Norusis, 1988b: 
B-85]. 
Further, when the population is skewed negatively or 
positively, the median is often the best measure of 
location, because it is always between the mean and the 
model and it is not as highly influenced as the 
frequency occurrence of a single value as the mode is, 
nor is it pulled by extreme values as in the case of 
the mean [Levin, 1984: 90]. 
Thus, as skewness was revealed (Table 9.5) with 
reference to all the responses for all situations and 
across all groups, it is more than appropriate that the 
appropriate median value response for each group be 
duly considered. 
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In terms of median group refined responses, Table 9.4 
shows reasonable consistency of approach to EAI by the 
groups. Firstly, six situations (1,5,7,81 10 and 16) 
showed the same median value for all research groups. 
Secondly, two more situations (11 and 12) showed the 
same median value for all three User Groups only. 
As such, User Groups had the same median value for nine 
of the twenty (45%) situations, showing some uniformity 
towards EAI by the groups. However, equally significant 
is the fact that in 14 situations (all except, 11,12, 
14,15,17 and 18), the same median values were shared 
by the EA and BA group on the one hand. 
comparison of group means. modes and medians 
it is of benefit to note any correspondence between the 
mean, mode and median of given distributions, because 
symmetrical distributions usu ally have the same value 
for each of these statistics. In such a case, any one 
of them is suitable as an inferential statistic, as all 
give similar estimates of central tendency. 
This comparison was done for responses to the twenty 
situations. The comparison showed only weak response 
symmetry, because they consistently registered the same 
mean, mode and median, across groups, in only 8 of the 
20 situations (i. e. 1,5,7,81 10y 11,12 and 16). 
316 
Exceptionally however, the refined responses of the 
Banker group appeared to have extremely strong 
symmetry, with only one of the twenty situations 
registering varying mean, mode and median values. 
The response distributions (skewness and kurtosis) 
In addition to considering measures of central 
tendency, it is also useful to learn the nature of the 
distribution(s) underlying responses. To do this, the 
skewness and kurtosis of each set of responses was 
examined on a group basis and Table 9.5 presents these 
values for refined responses to the twenty situation 
questions. 
Skewness 
Skewness describes the symmetry (or lack 
a distribution. Positive skewness values 
proportion of observations, when plotted 
lie towards the right of it (the larger 
Negative values of skewness indicate the 
of it) within 
suggest a high 
on a graph, 
values judged). 
opposite. 
[While values for skewness are zero in an exactly 
normal distribution (indicating neither positive nor 
negative skewness), this is not true for samples taken 
from a normal distribution, where measures of skewness 
will usually not be exactly zero, but will rather 
fluctuate around it because of sampling variation. ] 
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TABLE 9.5 
SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS ON RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS: 
REFINED GROUP RESPONSES TO SITUATION QUESTIONS 
Sitn. External Bankers credit Internal All 
Auditors ýS. Auditors Groups 
Skew. 1 -0.05 -0.57 -0.60 -0.89 -0.71 
Kurt. 1 0.43 1.03 1.15 1.92 1.43 
Skew. 2 -0.21 -0.86 -0.38 -0.57 -0.49 
Kurt. 2 0.01 0.76 0.58 0.30 0.41 
Skew. 3 0.60 -0.71 -0.42 -0.54 -0.60 
Kurt. 3 1.06 1.93 0.45 0.36 0.62 
Skew. 4 -0.10 -1.09 -0.30 -0.50 -0.34 
Kurt. 4 -0.59 1.30 -0.81 0.40 0.06 
Skew. 5 -0.38 -0.63 -0.68 -0.84 -0.66 
Kurt. 5 0.11 0.48 0.49 0.98 0.55 
Skew. 6 -0.21 -0.98 -0.58 -0.63 -0.55 
Kurt. 6 0.67 1.06 0.31 0.31 0.46 
Skew. 7 -0.69 -0.61 -0.48 -0.64 -0.60 
Kurt. 7 2.52 0.23 0.52 0.87 0.98 
Skew. 8 -0.94 -0.65 -0.72 -1.08 -0.91 
Kurt. 8 1.32 0.84 0.51 2.36 1.54 
Skew. 9 -0.62 -0.92 -0.45 -0.98 -0.76 
Kurt. 9 1.42 1.68 0.72 1.62 1.32 
Skew. 10 -0.21 -1.12 -0.55 -0.48 -0.60 
Kurt. 10 0.40 3.17 0.81 1.07 1.20 
Skew. 11 -0.66 -0.36 -0.52 -0.25 -0.43 
Kurt. 11 1.41 -0.40 -0.07 0.23 0.14 
Skew. 12 0.16 -1.07 -0.35 -0.37 -0.34 
Kurt. 12 1.10 1.25 0.32 -0.05 0.22 
Skew. 13 -0.31 -1.43 -0.54 -0.62 -0.59 
Kurt. 13 0.78 4.52 0.04 0.54 0.63 
Skew. 14 -0.97 -1.00 -0.07 -0.55 -0.46 
Kurt. 14 1.88 1.91 0.02 0.45 0.21 
Skew. 15 -0.58 -0.72 -0.43 -1.18 -0.84 
Kurt. 15 -0.03 1.23 0.49 2.17 1.21 
Skew. 16 -0.69 -0.35 -0.56 -0.31 -0.47 
Kurt. 16 3.06 0.31 0.65 0.65 0.91 
Skew. 17 -0.32 -0.84 -0.64 -0.36 -0.49 
Kurt. 17 -0.43 0.72 1.14 0.84 0.63 
Skew. 18 -0.33 -0.18 -0.40 -0.46 -0.41 
Kurt. 18 -0.17 0.19 -0.08 0.11 0.03 
Skew. 19 -0.73 -0.51 -0.48 -0.39 -0.45 
Kurt. 19 2.03 0.72 0.23 0.59 0.68 
Skew. 20 -0.53 -1.32 -0.65 -0.68 -0.65 
Kurt. 20 0.69 3.73 1.53 1.51 1.39 
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Table 9.5 shows the refined responses reflected 
negative skewness for all groups and situations, the 
only exception being situation 12 for the EA group. The 
likely conclusion to be drawn from this phenomenon, may 
be that in terms of refined responses, all groups had 
distributions skewed towards the lower values of the 
response scale - lower degrees of confidence in EAI. 
Kurtosis 
Another method of describing a given distribution is to 
assess the extent to which observations in it cluster 
around a central point for a given SD. Such an 
assessment is available in the measure of kurtosis. 
In terms of the refined responses (Table 9.5), with the 
maximum exception of four situations for each group, 
all of the research groups had a positive kurtosis in 
all twenty situations. This would suggest that the 
responses for all groups (in general) tended to be 
leptokurtic, and so more than normally clustered around 
a single value on the response scale. 
Degree of Concordance 
In addition to the nature of the underlying 
distributions, it is always of interest to determine 
the degree of accord (or concordance) within 
respondents from individual respondent groups. 
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one statistic available for such assessment is the 
Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) .A "high or 
significant value of W may be interpreted (to mean) 
that ... judges are applying ... the same standard in 
ranking the objects under study" [Siegel, 1956: 237). 
The Kendall test is available for use in relation to 
two or more variables in the same set of cases (i. e. 
responses). It judges the concordance in rankings for 
pairs of observations and, after making allowance for 
"ties", computes W, which is a composite measure of the 
overall concordance present in the rankings. 
Kendall's W is appropriate in the present instance, as 
it is a nonparametric test designed for use on ordinal 
data, which the responses being considered are. When 
computed, values of W range from 0 (indicating no 
agreement at all) to 1 (indicating total agreement). 
Thus, W and its related significance for the refined 
responses provided by each research group individually, 
and by all groups pooled, were computed. Table 9.6 is a 
summary of these statistics. As Table 9.6 shows, the 
degree of rank concordance within the EA and CM groups 
was much the same at W=0.24 and 0.23 respectively, 
while that within the IA and BA groups was also about 
the same at W=0.17 and 0.16 respectively. 
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TABLE 9.6 
KENDALL COEFFICIENT OF CONCORDANCE 
-STATISTICS 
REFINED GROUP RESPONSES TO ALL SITUATION QUESTIONS 
COLLECTIVELY 
Group Kendallfs W Chi-sq. Significance 
Research Groups: 
External Auditor 0.24 545.28 0.00 
Banker 0.16 246.94 0.00 
Credit Manager 0.23 1039.36 0.00 
Internal Auditor 0.17 774.87 0.00 
All respondents 0.10 1301.34 0.00 
Ext, Auditor Group: 
Big-Six Auditors 0.31 400.29 0.00 
nonBig-Six Auditors 0.21 197.36 0.00 
Partner Auditors 0.27 147.89 0.00 
non-Partner Auditors 0.25 414.63 0.00 
* Rounded to two decimal places 
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However, there appeared to be very little accord within 
responses when those from all groups were assessed 
together. On that basis, W amounted to only 0.1o, 
suggesting little uniformity within the responses from 
all the groups when viewed collectively. 
Assessing each group individually, the W-statistics 
showed very high similarity between the raw and refined 
responses provided by each of them, as in all cases the 
statistic remained the same. However, while the overall 
level of concordance remained constant for both raw and 
refined sets of responses, specific pairs of rankings 
within each groups' responses may individually have 
been in discord. 
The most likely inference is that individual MLCs do 
not cause a significant variation between the rankings 
for group raw and refined responses; certainly not 
enough to reduce the degree of concordance (W) within 
each set of responses. 
9.2 Data for the external-auditor group only 
When analysing views of EAI within the EA group, their 
responses were considered on a Big-Six/nonBig-Six basis 
and/or on a partner/non-partner basis, with regard to 
the same features as those previously examined for all 
four research groups (mean, mode, median etc. ). 
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The MLC response 
There appeared to be remarkable similarity in the MLC 
indicated by external auditor respondents (Table 9.7). 
For all sets of them (Big-Six, nonBig-Six, partner and 
non-partner), the MLC was just somewhat over 4.0 (a 
"HIGH" level of confidence) and this is corroborated in 
consistent modes and medians of 4 for these groups. 
Thus (despite a significant difference in MLC for Big- 
six vs nonBig-Six auditors - Chapter 11), it is with 
substance to claim some uniformity of'approach by all 
external auditor sets in terms of the MLC responses. 
Central tendencies and dispersion 
In general, refined responses from the external auditor 
group reflected only moderate variability. As stated on 
Table 9.81 their mean standard deviations ranged from a 
low of . 81 (Big-Six auditors on Situation 10), to a 
high of 1.75 (nonBig-Six auditors on Situation 4). 
Standard deviations in the partner/non-partner groups 
were similar with the lowest being 1.04 for both. 
This lowest SD of 1.04 was noted for the partner group 
on Situation 1 and on Situation 2 for the non-partner 
group. The highest SD of 1.67 and 1.56 for these two 
groups was registered on Situation 8 for the partner 
group, and Situation 4 for the non-partner group. 
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TABLE 9.7 
SELECT STATISTICAL DATA FOR AND PERCENT OF EXTERNAL 
AUDITOR GROUPSO RESPONSES TO MINIMUM LEVEL OF 
CONFIDENCE (MLCI QUESTION 
BIG-SIX nonBIG-SIX PARTNERS non-PARTNERS 
Select Statistical Data: 
MEAN 4.49 4.02 4.20 4.32 
S. DEV. (MEAN) 0.74 0.76 0.93 0.73 
MODE 4 4 4 4 
MEDIAN 4 4 4 4 
SKEWNESS 0.03 0.25 0.42 -0.04 
KURTOSIS -0.23 1.14 0.89 -0.37 
n= 69 51 30 89 
NOT STATED= 3 - 1 2 
Levels of Confidence as stated by Percent of GrouR: 
NONE: 0 
VERY LOW: 1-- 
LOW: 2 2.0 3.3 
MEDIUM: 3 7.2 17.6 10.0 12.4 
HIGH: 4 43.5 60.8 63.4 47.2 
VERY HIGH: 5 42.1 15.7 10.0 37.0 
TOTAL: 6 7.2 3.9 13.3 3.4 
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TABLE 9.8 
MEAN AND S. D.: REFINED RESPONSES TO SITUATION QUESTIONS 
EXTERNAL AUDITORS FROM BIG-6 AND NONBIG-6 AUDIT FIRMS 
SITN. BIG-6 nonBIG-6 PARTNERS NON-PARTNERS 
Mean 1 0.54 0.26 0.57 0.39 
S. Dev. 1 0.98 1.20 1.04 1.07 
Mean 2 0.13 -0.02 0.40 -0.02 
S. Dev. 2 1.03 1.23 1.22 1.04 
Mean 3 0.12 0.04 0.27 0.05 
S. Dev. 3 1.08 1.20 1.14 1.11 
Mean 4 -1.09 -1.24 -0.40 -1.38 
S. Dev. 4 1.51 1.75 1.55 1.56 
Mean 5 -0.51 -0.20 -0.47 -0.33 
S. Dev. 5 1.18 1.36 1.28 1.26 
Mean 6 -0.06 -0.20 0.17 -0.20 
S. Dev. 6 1.15 1.30 1.39 1.14 
Mean 7 0.19 -0.37 0.37 -0.19 
S. Dev. 7 0.91 1.37 1.27 1.10 
Mean 8 -0.46 -0.02 -0.33 -0.26 
S. Dev. 8 1.50 1.42 1.67 1.43 
Mean 9 -0.30 -0.41 -0.07 -0.44 
S. Dev. 9 1.24 1.19 1.14 1.23 
Mean 10 0.57 0.24 0.63 0.36 
S. Dev. 10 0.81 1.07 0.96 0.93 
Mean 11 0.20 -0.57 0.47 -0.32 
S. Dev. 11 0.87 1.42 1.11 1.16 
Mean 12 -1.80 -1.39 -1.40 -1.69 
S. Dev. 12 1.12 1.34 1.38 1.17 
Mean 13 0.19 -0.08 0.37 -0.02 
S. Dev. 13 0.93 1.26 1.16 1.06 
Mean 14 -0.42 -0.94 -0.40 -0.72 
S. Dev. 14 1.22 1.32 1.43 1.23 
Mean 15 -1.33 -0.51 -1.00 -0.94 
S. Dev. 15 1.60 1.52 1.82 1.52 
Mean 16 -0.12 -0.28 0.03 -0.25 
S. Dev. 16 0.95 1.27 1.13 1.08 
Mean 17 -0.91 -0.77 -0.37 -0.98 
S. Dev. 17 1.36 1.37 1.47 1.25 
Mean 18 -0.68 -0.96 -0.50 -0.89 
S. Dev. 18 1.13 1.07 1.08 1.11 
Mean 19 -0.01 -0.22 0.23 -0.20 
S. Dev. 19 1.23 1.33 1.25 1.27 
Mean 20 -0.33 -0.65 0.00 -0.61 
S. Dev. 20 1.36 1.51 1.49 1.38 
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Ranking of mean responses 
The ranking of mean refined responses (Table 9.9) 
indicated some level of consistency, in that all 
auditor groups had their highest level of mean concern 
on Situation 12 (10% of gross fees from only listed 
client). Equally, all EA groups recorded their highest 
assurance with EAI in either Situations 1 (nonBig-Six 
and non-partners) or 10 (Big-Six and partners). 
The modal responses 
Again, in terms of their modal refined responses (Table 
9.10), external auditors appeared to be speaking with 
some uniformity. For at least 16 of the 20 situations, 
the modal responses for any of the four auditor groups 
was 0. While modal responses of -1 and -2 were noted, 
these were certainly the exception. Interpreting this 
modal statistic, one would infer that in the majority 
of situations, auditors were not perturbed by the EAI 
issues intrinsic to them. 
The median responses 
The uniformity present in terms of modal responses from 
external auditors was also noticed in terms of their 
median responses (Table 9.10), but to a lesser degree. 
Thus, in at least 14 of the 20 audit situations, was 
the median refined response recorded by the four 
auditor groups, equal to o. 
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TABLE 9.9 
EXTERNAL AUDITOR GROUP: RANKING OF SITUATIONS BASED ON 
MEAN VALUE OF REFINED RESPONSES TO SITUATION QUESTIONS 
GroujRs Big-six nonBig-SiX Partners non-Partners 
Rank Situation Number 
1 12 12 12 12 
2 15 4 15 4 
3 4 is 18 17 
4 17 14 5 15 
5 18 17 14* 18 
6 5 20 4 14 
7 8 11 17 20 
8 14 15 8 9 
9 20 9 9 5 
10 9 7 20 11 
11 16 16 16 8 
12 6 19 6 16 
13 19 5* 19 19* 
14 3 6 3 6 
15 2 13 7* 7 
16 7* 8* 13* 13* 
17 13* 2* 2 2* 
18 11 3 11 3 
19 1 10 1 10 
20 10 1 10 1 
*= Tied with immediately following rank 
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TABLE 9.10 
MODE AND MEDIAN: REFINED RESPONSES TO SITUATION 
QUESTIONS - EXT. AUDITORS: BIG-6 & WONBIG-6 AUDIT FIRMS 
SITN. BIG-6 nonBIG-6 PARTNERS NON-PARTNERS 
Mode 1 0 0 0 0 
Median 1 0 0 0 0 
Mode 2 0 0 0 0 
Median 2 0 0 0 0 
Mode 3 0 0 0 0 
Median 3 0 0 0 0 
Mode 4 -1 0 0 -1 
Median 4 -1 -1 0 -1 
Mode 5 -1 0 -1 0 
Median 5 0 0 -1 0 
Mode 6 0 0 0 0 
Median 6 0 0 0 0 
Mode 7 0 0 0 0 
Median 7 0 0 0 0 
Mode 8 0 0 0 0 
Median 8 0 0 0 0 
Mode 9 0 0 0 0 
Median 9 0 0 0 0 
Mode 10 0 0 0 0 
Median 10 0 0 0.50 0 
Mode 11 0 -1 0 0 
Median 11 0 -1 0 0 
Mode 12 -2 -2 -2 -2 Median 12 -2 -1 -2 -2 Mode 13 0 0 0 0 
Median 13 0 0 0 0 
Mode 14 0 -1 0 0 
Median 14 0 -1 0 -1 Mode 15 0 0 0 0 
Median 15 -1 0 -1 -1 Mode 16 0 0 0 0 
Median 16 0 0 0 0 
Mode 17 -1 0 0 -1 
Median 17 -1 0 0 -1 
Mode 18 0 0 0 0 
Median 18 -1 -1 0 -1 
Mode 19 0 0 0 0 
Median 19 0 0 0 0 
Mode 20 0 0 0 0 
Median 20 0 -1 0 0 
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In a minority. of situations, median responses other 
than 0 (-. 51 -1 or -2) were observed. Thus, a median 
response of -1 was noted in 6 situations for the 
nonBig-Six auditor group and 5 situations for the non- 
partner auditor group. 
Comparison of group means. modes and medians 
In general, it would appear that the EA group had a 
reasonable level of uniformity within their refined 
responses. While it would be unreasonable to expect a 
sharing of mean responses, the four groups shared most 
of their modal and median responses (at a value of 0). 
The response distributions 
As for the responses from each of the four research 
groups, responses of the sub-groups within the EA group 
may be considered in terms of skewness and kurtosis. 
Skewness 
In general, it may be concluded (Table 9.11) that 
refined responses from the EA group were negatively 
skewed. Indeed, this was so in at least 15 of the 20 
responses for all the four groups. However, as Table 
9.11 shows, with 19 and 20 of the situational responses 
from the nonBig-Six and non-partner group negatively 
skewed, their responses registered more negative 
skewness than those from partners or Big-Six auditors. 
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TABLE 9.11 
SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS: REFINED RESPONSES TO SITUATION 
QUESTIONS - EXT. AUDITORS: BIG-6 & NONBIG-6 AUDIT FIRMS 
SITN. BIG-6 nonBIG-6 PARTNERS NON-PARTNERS 
Skewness 1 -0.10 -0.59 -0.19 -0.51 
Kurtosis 1 0.31 0.11 -0.20 0.72 
Skewness 2 -0.02 -0.30 -0.61 -0.14 
Kurtosis 2 -0.28 0.07 0.89 -0.05 
Skewness 3 -0.24 -0.95 -0.57 -0.66 
Kurtosis 3 -0.16 2.17 1.44 1.28 
Skewness 4 -0.06 -0.09 -0.35 -0.07 
Kurtosis 4 -0.56 -0.68 -0.13 -0.60 
Skewness 5 -0.17 -0.68 0.13 -0.58 
Kurtosis 5 -0.33 0.78 1.68 -0.14 
Skewness 6 -0.01 -0.37 -0.16 -0.39 
Kurtosis 6 0.19 1.03 0.12 0.97 
Skewness 7 0.33 -0.74 -0.54 -0.99 
Kurtosis 7 1.01 1.60 0.30 3.97 
Skewness 8 -0.91 -1.05 -1.44 -0.68 
Kurtosis 8 1.54 1.35 3.54 0.09 
Skewness 9 -0.63 -0.63 -1.20 -0.48 
Kurtosis 9 1.77 1.13 4.13 -1.13 
Skewness 10 0.46 -0.39 0.09 -0.35 
Kurtosis 10 0.28 -0.25 -0.99 0.80 
Skewness 11 -0.55 -0.16 0.09 -0.99 
Kurtosis 11 2.33 0.55 0.07 1.48 
Skewness 12 -0.16 0.25 1.04 -0.38 
Kurtosis 12 -0.61 2.05 2.48 -0.00 
Skewness 13 0.18 -0.41 -0.51 -0.31 
Kurtosis 13 0.62 0.26 1.04 0.89 
Skewness 14 -0.69 -1.31 -1.43 -0.85 
Kurtosis 14 1.23 2.37 3.80 1.39 
Skewness 15 -0.64 -0.57 -1.03 -0.36 
Kurtosis 15 -0.10 -0.04 1.12 -0.64 
Skewness 16 -0.30 -0.81 0.24 -1.10 
Kurtosis 16 0.95 3.42 1.98 3.46 
Skewness 17 0.02 -0.79 -0.49 -0.36 
Kurtosis 17 -0.59 0.08 -0.62 -0.32 
Skewness 18 -0.10 -0.82 -0.63 -0.28 
Kurtosis 18 -0.62 0.26 0.31 -0.12 
Skewness 19 -0.51 -0.96 -0.25 -0.93 
Kurtosis 19 1.34 2.81 0.76 2.43 
Skewness 20 -0.71 -0.31 -0.34 -0.74 
Kurtosis 20 0.84 0.78 -0.17 1.10 
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The inference to be drawn from the preceding is that 
responses from the nonBig-Six and non-partner auditors 
were more frequently to be observed near the lower end 
(negative values) of the response scale than those 
provided by partners or Big-Six auditors. 
Kurtosis 
Refined responses 
(at least 60% for 
positive kurtosis 
reflect more than 
the response scal, 
of -. 62 (Big-Six) 
from the EA group showed that most 
all groups) distributions reflected a 
(Table 9.11). As such, they would 
normal clustering around values on 
e. Kurtosis values ranged from a low 
to a high of 4.13 (partners). 
Degree of Concordance 
In general, auditors tended to register more uniformity 
than non-auditors when declaring their views on EAI in 
the audit situations. This is inferred from the W- 
statistic of the Kendall concordance test (Table 9.6). 
Big-Six auditors appeared to be most in accord with the 
views of each other with a W-statistic of 0.31, and, 
nonBig-Six auditors least in accord with the views of 
each other with a W-statistic of 0.21. Equally, the 
degree of concordance of view registered by partner and 
non-partner auditors appeared much the same, with 
respective W-statistics of 0.25 and 0.27. 
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